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Abstract 
 
Being autonomous depends on the kind of relations we enjoy in the different domains of our 
lives, but the impact of decision-making and the power exercise that takes place in the 
political sphere, makes political relations crucial to our development and enjoyment of 
autonomy. This dissertation develops a novel view of political participation by interrogating 
its connection to our personal autonomy. According to this view, our political relations are 
partially constitutive of our personal autonomy, which in other words means there is a 
political aspect of our autonomy. The kind of political relations we should hold to fully enjoy 
our autonomy is what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. It is the mutual recognition of 
each agent’s autonomous standing—translated into a proper distribution of political power—
that will face dominating political relations. The basis for that domination comes from our 
democracies’ power imbalances that condition influence over political decision-making to 
each individual’s economic, social or cultural standing. Consequently, there are political 
conditions for our autonomy to thrive. Relations of Mutual Recognition require two main 
conditions: non-domination and control. I take these two neo-republican ideals and redefine 
them to shape what a proper distribution of political power amounts to.  
 
Political participation comes in precisely to identify a way to challenge power imbalances. 
Therefore, my definition of political participation, which I call Collective Self-Government, 
requires a particular sort of implementation. Accordingly, I suggest a deliberative and 
inclusive arrangement that involves direct and innovative forms of decision-making, and 
more importantly, grants relevant shares of authority to all actors, i.e., common citizens, 
legislators, technocrats, etcetera.  
 
This project could rightly belong to both a relational approach to autonomy and be labelled 
as a version of deliberative democracy. However, relational accounts focus on our social 
relations, whilst I claim that we cannot be “less” or non-autonomous in the political sphere 
and still enjoy an autonomous life. Likewise, the participatory focus—in the sense of 
inclusion of all actors—of this proposal more accurately turn it into either a participatory 
version of deliberative democracy or a deliberative version of participatory democracy.  
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Introduction: A diagnosis of problematic political relations and a 
proposal to transform them  
 
I. Identifying the problem  
 
Most democracies reduce the involvement of common citizens—generally labelled political 
participation—to an exercise through which citizens elect representatives every few years, 
or in rare occasions, vote about specific policies through referenda or plebiscites. Both forms 
of involvement do not tend to be accompanied by more regular, let alone legally binding, 
forms of involvement. Accordingly, political participation becomes a set of “one off” 
instances (they do have some regularity) because they are meant to provide legitimacy to the 
political activity and decision-making done by others, i.e., professional politicians or 
representatives, rather than to include the broader public in the process. Electing 
representatives, which is the most common form of participation, turns into transferring 
citizens’ authority to make decisions to a specific group of people deemed better qualified 
and available for the job. Plebiscites and referenda, on the other hand, come so rarely that 
even though they do constitute a direct and sometimes legally binding form of participation, 
in many occasions lack campaigns that spread reliable information about the alternatives, as 
well as fail to provide instances of open discussions of issues to support the process of 
decision-making, which distorts their potential to represent a crucial and valid form of 
participation. This limited involvement of common citizens has led to a disconnection 
between them and their representatives, as well as with consulting experts and other 
institutions. 
 
In 2003 the yougov online polling organisation with a representative sample of 2.273 UK 
citizens showed that 72% of the sample felt disconnected from Parliament, and almost half 
of them (46%) reported feeling very disconnected from Parliament (Coleman, 2005: 201). 
This lack of connection is, therefore, not new and becomes quite clear when we look at how 
much citizens trust their representatives.1 The Encuesta CEP is a monthly opinion poll 
developed in Chile by a private and independent organisation called Centro de Estudios 
Públicos. In its December (2019) edition, from a representative sample of 1.496 Chilean 
citizens, the poll reported that when asked about how much trust citizens have on various 
                                                          
1 See Norris, (1999), and Nye, Zelikow & King, (1997).  
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institutions, the two lowest scores correspond to political parties and congress, with 2% and 
3% respectively—where the higher the percentage, the higher the trust.  
 
In the last two years we have seen multiple examples of people’s intention to make their 
voices heard through a series of protests and rallies all over the world. From people objecting 
to the austerity measures implemented by Jair Bolsonaro in Brasil, as well as in Ecuador, to 
those opposing violence against women in Turkey, Chile, and various other countries, and 
the most current demonstrations against racism and police brutality in the United States 
through the Black Lives Matter movement. Another demonstrative example is what people 
called the “estallido social” (social unrest) in Chile. In October 2019 people took to the 
streets in numbers never seen before all over Chile to ask for a complete reform of the social 
and political order in the country, which led to a historical plebiscite to decide whether to re-
write the constitution (which will take place in October 2020). These examples of citizens’ 
involvement show that what seems to be happening in our democracies is not a lack of 
interest and disaffection from common citizens regarding political issues, but dissatisfaction 
with the way that political officials conduct matters and set the agenda, and with how little 
impact is available to common citizens. Protesting becomes the best way to have an influence 
and to make common citizens’ voices heard, because there is either a lack of formal channels 
of participation or the existent ones appear insufficient and inadequate.       
  
The main problem with this limited formal involvement of common citizens is that it both 
restricts their capacity to be self-governing by exercising authority over relevant matters 
affecting their lives, and it promotes relations of domination. The basis for that domination 
comes from power imbalances that condition influence over political decision-making to 
each individual’s economic, social or cultural standing, making them more or less capable 
of putting pressure over those in charge of making decisions in accordance with the standing 
they enjoy. Thus, power imbalances, lack of accountability and restricted communication 
between members of the political sphere—common citizens, representatives, experts, and 
institutions—are some of the expressions of these dominating relations.  
 
The scene is clearly especially problematic for minorities—not in the trivial sense but in the 
sense of marginalised groups, i.e., racial, ethnical, sexual minorities—since their influence 
over decision-making processes is severely reduced compared to other more privileged 
groups. Minorities have little to no agenda setting capacities and usually end up depending 
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on the good will of their representatives to see their interests and concerns somehow 
reflected in policies. Restricting our self-government and experiencing domination in the 
political sphere in this way, greatly harms our personal autonomy. 
 
Relational accounts of autonomy have argued that the relations we hold in the different 
domains of our lives shape our personal autonomy. In other words, that the capacity to direct 
our lives, and for them to reflect our values and commitments, relies on standing in social 
relations of a certain kind. In this research, I will argue that our relations in the political 
sphere also need to be of a particular sort if they are to enhance and not harm our personal 
autonomy.  
 
Some accounts of autonomy, including relational accounts, agree that autonomy is a matter 
of degrees, i.e., enjoying little economic autonomy does not necessarily amount to a non-
autonomous life if the person enjoys it in other domains. Nonetheless, my intention is to 
emphasise that the kind of standing and influence we experience in the political sphere has 
such a strong impact over our lives, that we cannot be “less” or non-autonomous in the 
political sphere and still enjoy a fully autonomous life. The latter should lead us to rethink 
the nature and character of our political relations in terms of the effect they have over the 
development and enjoyment of our personal autonomy. Redefining political participation is 
central to this goal because it dictates the role that each of us plays in the political sphere.  
 
Accordingly, the thesis I want to advance is that autonomy has a political aspect. I will 
contend there are necessary political conditions for personal autonomy. I describe these 
conditions as non-domination and control, which enable autonomy enhancing political 
relations that I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. Both conditions, in turn, require 
political participation, so they do not become merely formal for citizens. My characterisation 
of political participation to enable Relations of Mutual Recognition is what I call Collective 
Self-government. 
 
II. The diversity of available approaches  
 
The problem I have just introduced connects two concerns, namely, a concern for our 
personal autonomy, and a concern for the kind of political interactions we experience. I will 
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briefly describe how these two concerns have usually been addressed and what my proposal 
intends to do to connect both concerns.  
     
Although the diagnosis of the crisis of our democracies is transversally shared amongst 
theorists of democracy, searching for the roots of the crisis and the related best way to 
respond to it separates views into sometimes contrasting approaches, especially regarding 
political participation. We can divide accounts concerned with political participation into 
two broad groups.  
 
The first group of views focuses on examining the electorate’s capacities, which is where it 
locates the cause of the crisis and offers restricted forms of common citizens’ involvement 
in response. These rich academic discussions analyse both the electorate’s abilities and 
interest to be involved in political decision-making, and the experts’ role in decision-making 
processes. Such debates, address ideas like technocracy, and epistocracy. 2 The former refers 
to being governed by experts (scientific and other specialist bureaucrats), and the latter, to 
form an electorate that is constituted by the most competent citizens—which in some 
versions means either granting them more power than the one given to those determined 
incompetent or simply restricting the incompetent citizens’ vote completely.  
 
Conversely, the second group is inspired by deliberative democracy and thus directs its 
attention towards improving deliberation. One of the main features of deliberative 
democracy is the intention to reach well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving 
the relevant actors that will be affected by them. In order to do so, deliberative democrats 
tend to consider new ways of conducting discussions for political decision-making. Some of 
these involve instances that use citizen sortition to select members for a deliberating group, 
from minipublics to citizen assemblies. Sortition refers to nothing other than selection via 
randomised methods of common citizens as deliberators, sometimes taking a sample that 
follows specific criteria to ensure representativeness, such as socioeconomic status or 
gender. Minipublics are instances of deliberation that can use sortition to select its members, 
but most importantly, they are supposed to showcase a microcosm of how society looks like 
                                                          
2 Estlund (2008), Fuerstein (2008), Landmore (2013) and Viehoff (2016) address the electorate’s 
capacities from different perspectives. The clearest focus on this topic, nonetheless, can be found in 
Brennan (2009, 2012, 2014). Regarding technocracy, Bickerton & Accetti (2017), and Dargent (2014) 
develop views that also consider populism as the opposed phenomenon. Finally, epistocracy has its 
strongest contemporary exponent in Brennan (2011, 2016, 2018). Gun (2019), examines the concept, 
Mulligan (2015) supports epistocracy, whilst Jeffrey (201) and Moraro (2018) respond by opposing to 
the notion.        
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in the context that they take place, so they are to include in discussions, as much as possible, 
all the relevant social groups. Citizen assemblies on the other hand, can also involve sortition 
or have open participation of all those citizens who want to join, but they tend to happen in 
order to make decisions about specific matters, which makes them not so regularly held (see 
a more detailed characterisation in Chapter 4).       
 
Deliberative democrats vary in how they understand citizen involvement, and how central 
they take it to be. Joshua Cohen (1998) for example, understands deliberative democracy as 
a deliberation procedure through which members provide reasons that can be considered 
acceptable by other reasonable members (Cohen, 1998:193). In this case, the emphasis is 
placed on finding a proper way to justify the exercise of power in our democracies.  
 
My proposal moves away from both the diagnosis and responses of the first group. I do not 
share the view that the crisis of our democracies can be explained by the lack of knowledge 
or appropriate deliberating capacities or four citizens, nor that the solution involves 
restricting political participation to those who have demonstrated some particular level of 
competence. Similarly, my project is not entirely part of the second group—amongst 
deliberative democrats. More accurately, I should say that my proposal can be labelled as a 
form of deliberative democracy with the crucial caveat that it is a participatory project. My 
view portrays improving deliberation—in terms of inclusion of all actors—as a means to 
secure the equal standing of citizens, whilst granting them more authority over their lives. 
The participatory emphasis plays a central role in my proposal and therefore turns it into 
either a participatory form of deliberative democracy, or a deliberative form of participatory 
democracy. I expand on my differences and connections to deliberative democracy in 
Chapter 5.          
 
I now move on to discuss personal autonomy. This can be defined in a number of ways, such 
as, leading a life that is authentic to our values and commitments (Westlund, 2009), as an 
ideal of self-authorship over our lives (Raz, 1988), or as exercising self-government over 
our desires and goals (Dworkin, 2015). Nonetheless, these varied approaches to personal 
autonomy seem to share a tendency to separate their concerns about oppressive 
circumstances in the political sphere from the conditions required for personal autonomy. 
Most accounts consider the political aspect of autonomy as part of a separate concept, 
namely, political autonomy. Even though political conditions are relevant to most views, and 
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that political oppression is accordingly also defined as opposed to self-authorship, self-
government and authenticity, those political conditions are not understood as part of the 
autonomous life itself, and their relevance is often contingent or indirect.    
 
Relational accounts of autonomy have been able to establish the importance of our social 
relations for our autonomy, as well as the crucial role that oppressive political contexts play 
for our development of autonomy. I take these two considerations a step further to examine 
our political relations. In order to do so, I follow and adapt Catriona Mackenzie’s relational 
account of autonomy.    
 
Mackenzie is especially forceful regarding the centrality of enjoying structural conditions 
that recognise our equal standing as authoritative agents, because of their role in our 
development of autonomy.  She holds that autonomy is both a status and a capacity, and that 
oppressive contexts thus affect both an agent’s social status as an autonomous agent, and her 
development and exercise of the capacity for autonomy.3 However, Mackenzie does not 
focus on the relations we want to promote in the political sphere. Therefore, even though she 
points out specific conditions to guarantee rights and liberties, her view seems unable to 
identify political conditions directed at improving the kind of political relations we 
experience. My proposal seeks to offer an alternative reading that defines our political 
interactions as relations and elucidates their necessary conditions to constitute autonomy 
enhancing relations.  
 
To summarise, my proposal suggests connecting a relational approach to autonomy to a 
participatory arrangement by identifying the centrality of our political interactions to our 
enjoyment of autonomy. Including the political aspect to our understanding of the concept, 
offers a novel approach to autonomy that shows the potential of political relations to become 
autonomy enhancing. This could help us focus on identifying the problematic elements of 
our political relations and how to improve them. Likewise, having a clearer notion of the 
kind of political relations required for our autonomy can illuminate many of the issues 
regarding the justification of political authority, and the relevance of a democratic division 
of labour in the political sphere, which are part of my broader project.  
 
                                                          
3 See Mackenzie (2018) “Feminist Innovation in Philosophy: Relational Autonomy and Social Justice. 
Women's Studies International Forum. 
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III. Assumptions and clarifications 
 
The proposal that I develop here rests on some important assumptions that I would like to 
clarify before moving on to describe the general content and structure of the project.    
The first assumption involves two key concepts for my view: autonomy and democracy. I 
do not devote time to motivate the value of autonomy, nor of democracy. Thus, my view 
will appeal to those readers with a previous interest in both notions. Relatedly, I take the 
importance of the relations we hold for our autonomy as granted in a broad sense. The reader 
does not have to be committed to a relational account in advance to be persuaded by my 
project, but she needs to place some value to our social relations for our autonomy. This 
assumption only restricts the reach of my view by excluding readers that understand 
autonomy as a purely individual enterprise. Likewise, although the view that I offer indeed 
states that political relations are partially constitutive of our autonomy, the reader need not 
be committed to this particular understanding either. The main idea that I want the reader to 
take home corresponds to a weaker claim: just like our social relations do, political relations 
play a role for our autonomy—this is what I will characterise as the political aspect of 
autonomy. The reader can interpret that role as either causal or constitutive and still be 
moved by the overall project.        
In line with this broad approach, I follow a relational view that wants to move pass the 
distinction between procedural and substantive accounts. Thus, my project assumes that both 
procedural and substantive views—as well as not necessarily relational but relationally 
minded views—could endorse the idea of Relations of Mutual Recognition. My view does 
not aim at vindicating a constitutive view of autonomy over other versions—such as causal 
relational approaches—because I have a different aim. As explained above, my goal is to 
argue that there are political relations, and they form the political aspect of our autonomy. I 
hold that if we want those political relations to be autonomy-enhancing they need to be of a 
certain sort: Relations of Mutual Recognition. My claim that there is a political aspect of 
autonomy allows us to leave open the debate between specific relationally minded versions 
of autonomy that could be incorporated into the project.  
Another key clarification concerns my understanding of autonomy with respect to 
recognition. It could seem that my project is asking for political relations that recognise our 
equal standing as autonomous agents, despite the fact that an aspect of the very autonomy 
we seek to recognise includes those political relations. So, how can we recognise something 
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that is not already there? And if it is already there, what is it that we want to recognise? I 
assume that autonomy is not an all or nothing affair but something we can enjoy in different 
degrees. Accordingly, I acknowledge a distinction between being partially and fully 
autonomous, which refers to degrees of enjoyment of autonomy. I will argue that standing 
in Relations of Mutual Recognition is what would make us fully autonomous. However, 
there is another partial/full distinction that I identify. This concerns how autonomy is 
constituted. Political relations are partially constitutive of autonomy because the political 
aspect does no exhaust what autonomy amounts to. Therefore, one can lead a partially 
autonomous life in the absence of Relations of Mutual Recognition, but I will argue that 
these are required for a fully autonomous life. Throughout this thesis, whenever I say that 
we cannot be less autonomous in the political sphere and still be autonomous, what I mean 
is that we cannot be fully autonomous.   
 Finally, the implementation of my version of political participation; Collective Self-
Government, involves a particular design. However, two clarifications are important with 
respect to the flexibility of the design. First, Relations of Mutual Recognition require a 
particular kind of approach to political participation, which is expressed by a set of 
desiderata. But as I mention there, different contexts will need adjustments so that we select 
the best forms for each scenario—which does not mean disregarding the desiderata. Second, 
my proposal does not depend on the likely success of implementing Collective Self-
government in the way that I present it. The main goal of this research is not to identify the 
ideal implementation of Collective Self-government, but to show that personal autonomy 
has a political aspect with its related political conditions; the conditions to establish Relations 
of Mutual Recognition. Hence, my proposal is open for more expert analysts to contribute 
with considerations that can improve my envisaged implementation of Collective Self-
Government.      
 
 
 
IV. An overview of the structure 
 
The project is constituted by seven chapters. I will briefly describe the central ideas presented 
in each of the chapters.   
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Chapter 1: The Political Aspect of a Relational Approach to Autonomy 
This chapter advances the view that personal autonomy has a political aspect. To support 
this claim, it investigates the value we grant to our social relations. I argue that if we 
acknowledge the impact of our social relations over our autonomy, our political interactions 
should be no different. I explore relational accounts, Catriona Mackenzie’s in particular, to 
show that this perspective can make the connection between our political standing and our 
social relations for the enjoyment of our autonomy. Their analysis proves that we should 
indeed pay more attention to the importance of our political interactions for our autonomy. 
However, I suggest taking things a step further and defining our political interactions as 
relations, so that we can grant them the role they indeed play as the political aspect of 
autonomy.    
The chapter also includes a methodological suggestion to move towards a network analysis 
when considering autonomy (beyond identifying necessary and sufficient conditions). This 
chapter shows that such a shift would help our approaches, especially Mackenzie’s, to better 
include political conditions for autonomy.  
Chapter 2: Non-domination and Control as Political Conditions for Autonomy 
Having identified our political interactions as relations, Chapter 2 focuses on discussing the 
political conditions required to establish autonomy enhancing political relations, which I call 
Relations of Mutual Recognition. The political conditions to establish these relations are the 
political conditions for autonomy, and I identify them as non-domination and control. 
Analysing non-domination and control serves to introduce the main features of what 
Relations of Mutual Recognition amount to.  
Chapter 3: Relations of Mutual Recognition 
Chapter 3 discusses in further detail the political aspect of autonomy by examining and 
redefining a group of concepts: political power, recognition and political participation. The 
aim of the chapter is twofold; first, to complete the characterisation of what I call Relations 
of Mutual Recognition and second, to develop the theoretical background of the version of 
political participation that will enable them.  
Chapter 4: Collective Self-government 
Collective Self-government is the definition of political participation that the previous 
chapter introduced. Here I focus on thinking of the implementation of the idea. The analysis 
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begins by presenting the desiderata that should guide such implementation, according to the 
discussion developed in Chapter 3, namely, inclusion, equality, deliberation and 
accountability. Then, the chapter examines three alternatives of political participation 
regarding their capacity to fulfil the desiderata. In light of the analysis of the alternatives, I 
conclude with my proposed implementation.  
Chapter 5: Locating my proposal: participatory and deliberative 
The participatory and deliberative character of my view situates it between participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy. In this chapter I explain in more detail how both 
labels apply. I stress the relevance that inclusion has for my project in the form of ‘giving 
voice’ to citizens, and my differences and similarities with some versions of deliberative 
democracy. Iris Marion Young’s (2010) inclusive deliberative proposal and Carole 
Pateman’s (2012) participatory project are the inspiration of my view, which wants to 
promote more just outcomes in our democracies via open and deliberative participation of 
all actors involved in the political sphere—especially those usually marginalised from 
decision-making processes.   
Chapter 6: Democratic Autonomy 
Henry Richardson (2002) developed a very interesting account that connects two of the key 
elements of my proposal, namely, non-domination and autonomy. In this chapter I analyse 
Richardson’s proposal not only to discuss its similarities and differences with my own but 
to show that thinking of political processes as part of the political aspect of autonomy, as 
well as from a relational perspective, has important consequences for my overall proposal 
and for any project interested in securing our autonomy. I conclude that without a relational 
approach that allows us to re-think our political relations, the defence of our autonomy in 
the political that motivates views like Richardson’s, fails to properly challenge the status 
quo, and thus ultimately also fails at defending our autonomy.  
Chapter 7: Epistocracy: A Different View of Participation  
This final chapter discusses a prominent and contrasting approach to political participation. 
Epistocracy belongs to a group of views that make their contribution to improve our 
democracies from a completely different diagnosis than the one supporting this research. 
Accordingly, exploring their approach will show that even if the root of the problems of our 
democracies lies—as epistocrats argue—within the electorate, a participatory approach like 
mine is more appropriate as a response.  
 
 
18 
 
I analyse epistocracy’s understanding of competence and hold that although it seems to focus 
on information, it fails to include an important kind of information: common citizen’s 
preferences. I show how this shortcoming ultimately questions the project’s capacity to 
improve democracies’ outcomes.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: The political aspect of a relational approach to autonomy 
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I. Political relations  
 
Researchers interested in the value of personal autonomy have usually explored the effect of 
oppressive political contexts and our enjoyment of autonomy as separate issues.  
This lack of attention to the connection between personal autonomy and the relations we 
hold in the political sphere has two problematic consequences. First, it obscures the effect 
over our lives of the limited involvement we experience in current democracies, especially 
for minorities.  Second, it reduces the political sphere’s capacity to foster our personal 
autonomy—the space where some of the most important collective decisions are made. 
Hence, I suggest we shift the focus of our debates to analyse the value and impact of the 
relations we hold in the political sphere over our personal autonomy.  
 
The thesis I want to put forward in this chapter is that personal autonomy has a political 
aspect. I will argue that the relations we hold in the political sphere are partially constitutive 
of our personal autonomy. Furthermore, even if we identify them as causal instead of 
constitutive, we should still conclude that the political sphere is a domain in which we should 
enjoy autonomy-enhancing relations which I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. In order 
to support this claim, I will show that if we acknowledge that social relations are important 
to our autonomy; our interactions within the political sphere can be no exception.  
 
Relational theories of autonomy have been able to justify the idea that our personal 
autonomy cannot be conceived as an individual matter. Since we are shaped by the relations 
we hold, our personal autonomy is also necessarily connected to the kind of relations we 
engage in. This consideration has also permeated accounts of autonomy that are not labelled 
as relational. By looking into relational views, especially Catriona Mackenzie’s (2008; 
2014), I will argue that relational accounts of autonomy—inspired by feminist critiques—
allow us to identify the political aspect of personal autonomy precisely due to their capacity 
to make the connection between the importance of our political standing, and our social 
relations. My goal will be to stress the point that we should move even further so that we 
can conceive the political as an area where we actually hold relations.   
 
Mackenzie argues that enjoying structural conditions that recognise our equal standing as 
authoritative agents is central to our development of autonomy. This key notion explains 
why I identify her view as ideally suited to explore the political aspect of autonomy. She 
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points out specific conditions to guarantee political rights and liberties, but her view seems 
unable to identify political conditions directed at improving the kind of political relations 
we experience. My proposal seeks to address this shortcoming.  
 
Additionally, this chapter will include a methodological suggestion to approach the concept 
of autonomy. Most accounts of autonomy share a methodological approach, which identifies 
necessary and sufficient conditions that vary in accordance with each view’s particularities. 
I hold that this traditional analysis is ill-suited to identify political conditions for autonomy. 
Therefore, I propose we follow a network analysis instead.  
 
I rely on Catriona Mackenzie’s relational account of autonomy, among other reasons, 
because of its unique capacity to explicitly identify political conditions for autonomy (see 
chapter 1). The resistance of autonomy to traditional analysis is not missed by Mackenzie. 
She claims that autonomy should not be treated as a unitary concept for which there is a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions, but as a multidimensional concept. However, her 
multidimensional account does not seem to offer an alternative methodological approach. 
Even though she does intend to highlight that autonomy is constituted by interconnected 
elements, her view appears to require a different methodology. I will argue that we should 
push further and understand her dimensions as pieces of a network of mutually dependant 
elements. If we do not think of autonomy’s dimensions in this way, central elements get 
neglected. This is the case of the political aspect, that under a traditional analysis, becomes 
a separate concern rather than a definitional component. Hence, in this chapter I will argue 
for the political aspect of autonomy by looking into Mackenzie’s account in particular, as 
well as, offer a different methodological analysis for personal autonomy.  
 
The chapter structure is as follows: Part II introduces some of the most relevant accounts of 
autonomy. Part III explores feminist critiques to those versions, which motivate adopting a 
relational account of autonomy (Part IV). Part V then presents Mackenzie’s relational view 
and analyses its strengths and shortcomings to address our political relations. Part VI 
discusses my methodological worry regarding Mackenzie’s view and my suggested 
approach to overcome it.  
 
 
II. The autonomous agent 
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In this chapter, I want to show that the relational approach to autonomy4 allows me to argue 
for the political aspect of personal autonomy. Hence, I need to introduce the relational 
perspective, but the analysis would be incomplete if I do not offer a general description of 
the main accounts of autonomy first. Although I do not intend to contrast their merits, an 
overview provides the background notions to which relational theories of autonomy want to 
respond. This part describes three conceptions of autonomy. 
 
1. Three conceptions of autonomy 
 
Ben Colburn (2010) identifies three general conceptions of autonomy: rational self-
legislation, hierarchy of motivations, and individuality.  I will briefly present each of these 
conceptions following Colburn’s characterisation, since it provides a clear overview of the 
diverse approaches to the notion.  
  
Autonomy understood as rational self-legislation corresponds to views that define it as 
exercising self-control and acting according to reason at specific times. Thus, these views 
characterise it as a property of a person’s will. Colburn (2010) divides this kind of approach 
into two categories: Kantian and non-Kantian rationalism. Kantian rationalism relies on an 
autonomous will, which only follows its own laws and no alien causes. By alien causes, it 
refers not only to those coming from other agents, but also to a person’s own desires and 
impulses. It tracks morality’s demanded behaviour: The Categorical Imperative (Kant, 
2002:30-38). Therefore, the less strict versions that, for example, allow some desires to not 
be considered alien, would fall into the category of non-Kantian rationalism (Colburn, 2010: 
5-6).   
 
Harry Frankfurt (1971) and Gerald Dworkin (1988) inspire a focus on the hierarchy of 
motivations. Their central argument is that there are different types of attitudes and desires, 
which should be ordered in a hierarchical manner for the realisation of self-governance. 
First-order attitudes are those concerning particular actions, and higher-order attitudes define 
which first-order attitudes we want to follow. Some higher-order attitudes can give rise to 
first-order attitudes, but also, first-order attitudes need not derive from any higher-order 
                                                          
4 From here onwards I will refer to autonomy and personal autonomy interchangeably, but every 
mention always points at personal autonomy rather than moral or what some authors call political 
autonomy.  
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attitude and can even conflict with them. Thus, attitudes are arranged in a hierarchy of 
motivations with first-order and higher-order motivations, where they can be in tension with 
each other, or higher-order motivations generate first-order motivations (Colburn, 2010:9).  
 
Dworkin defines autonomy as a second-order capacity to exercise critical reflection over our 
first-order attitudes. For Dworkin, the autonomous agent should also have her attitudes so 
aligned. This means that, although our motivations do not have to be rational in order to add 
to our autonomy—like Kantians hold—to be considered autonomous persons, there needs 
to be identified with our first-order attitudes, which we critically revise in light of our higher-
order motivations (Colburn, 2010:10). 
 
The last group defines autonomy as self-authorship or individuality. Joseph Raz (1988) 
describes the autonomous person as being in part author of her own life. It is an ideal of self-
creation that involves a number of decisions to shape and exercise some control over our 
lives. Colburn (2010) claims it is different from the other two conceptions because it does 
not involve constraint; the person herself defines the conditions to determine whether she is 
being autonomous or not. Instead, the mentioned hierarchical and rational versions of 
autonomy include a sense of constraint, either by a specific maxim one must follow for the 
latter or the hierarchy in which motivations have to be ordered for the former (Colburn, 
2010:13). 
 
Setting aside the important differences between each, all three conceptions of autonomy 
seem to share a similar characterisation of the ideal autonomous agent of which feminists 
are sceptical. The latter involves notions such as self-transparency, self-sufficiency, 
individuality, and self-control. In what follows, I take Mackenzie and Stoljar’s (2000) sketch 
of some of the main objections from feminist approaches to these and other features of the 
most common conceptions of autonomy.   
 
III. Feminist critiques of autonomy  
 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000) describe five feminist critiques of autonomy 
to argue that none of them should lead feminists to abandon autonomy as a relevant concept 
for their views. Mackenzie and Stoljar’s overview of these critiques will introduce us to the 
main issues that the relational perspective seeks to respond to, in order to keep using 
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autonomy as an important concept for a feminist approach. Mackenzie and Stoljar call these 
critiques ‘symbolic critiques’, ‘metaphysical critiques’, ‘care critiques’, ‘postmodernist 
critiques’, and ‘diversity critiques’. I will broadly present each of them. These feminist 
critiques express concerns, particularly about the characterization of the autonomous agent 
present in many theories of autonomy, which has problematic political consequences. Hence, 
although I will not analyze the merit of each group of critiques, if moved by them we should 
acknowledge how they render ‘classic’—that is belonging to the three groups mentioned 
above—theories of autonomy unsuitable to think of the political conditions for autonomy.  
 
1. Symbolic critiques  
 
Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) hold that symbolic critiques are those against the idea of the 
‘autonomous man’ and that this view was most clearly developed by Lorraine Code (1991). 
Code claims the ideal of the autonomous man informs mainstream epistemology and moral 
theory, and leads to an ‘autonomy obsession’ in contemporary Western cultures. Mackenzie 
and Stoljar (2000) add that:  
 
 
The descriptive premise on which the character ideal is based is the notion that 
human beings are capable of leading self-sufficient, isolated, independent lives. 
From this premise is drawn the prescriptive conclusion that the goal of human 
life is the realization of self-sufficiency and individuality (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 
2000:6).  
 
 
According to Mackenzie and Stoljar, although it is acknowledged by theorists that the 
character ideal is an abstraction that is unlikely to be attained, it leads to various problems. 
Some of the problems include valuing substantive independence over other values, 
especially over ones connected to relations of interdependence, such as trust and caring. 
Relatedly, it suggests that the relations of interdependence actually compromise autonomy, 
since they are based on cooperation. Thus, the most problematic consequence is the resulting 
conception of atomistic subjectivity that conceives agents as mere bearers of rights 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:6). This last critique about understanding the autonomous agent 
as a mere bearer of rights represents an important problematic political consequence. Code 
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does not talk of political relations, but this character ideal promotes a sort of interactions that 
are deeply problematic in the political sphere. By focusing on defending rights and escaping 
or denying interdependence, our political relations get reduced to the necessary exchange 
that can secure those rights, which affects the capacity of autonomy to connect with our 
experiences of interdependence and relations of trust also in the political sphere.   
 
2. Metaphysical critiques  
 
Metaphysical critiques (Baier, 1985; Jaggar, 1983; Antony, 1995) claim that attributing 
autonomy to agents actually presupposes individualism, which goes against the idea that 
individuals are, at least partially, constituted by the social relations they enjoy. However, 
Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) state that there are four different ways of understanding 
individualism in these critiques, namely, as causally isolated agents, as agents that are 
independent of the family and community relations they experience, as agents comprised of 
essential properties that are only intrinsic, or as metaphysically separate individuals 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:7).  For example, Annette Baier (1985) argues against the first 
kind of individualism by proposing that agents are ‘second-persons’, which means that there 
is a causal relation between the development of persons and their relations with others who 
cared for them and formed them. Mackenzie and Stoljar do not agree with every type of 
individualism critique but conclude that what they are right to warn about, is the distinction 
between individual autonomy and individualistic conceptions of personal autonomy 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:8).  
 
3. Care critiques     
 
The third kind of critiques focus on the masculinist character of the different conceptions of 
autonomy, which they justify in the primacy that is given to independence and self-
sufficiency. However, they are different from symbolic critiques because they do not hold 
that the concept of autonomy is tainted by the masculinist conceptions of autonomy. Instead, 
they point out the manner in which those views are normatively flawed. Mackenzie and 
Stoljar (2000) argue that from these critiques perspective “traditional conceptions of 
autonomy not only devalue women’s experiences and those values arising from it, such as 
love, loyalty, friendship, and care but also are defined in opposition to femininity” 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:9). The latter, since relations of care, have historically been 
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central to women and associated with femininity. Therefore, their emphasis is on the value 
of relations of dependency for agents (Held, 1993).  
 
The political importance of devaluing women’s experience has been historically argued by 
feminists. When values connected to women’s experiences are absent from political 
discussions but also from what is considered suitable for our political interactions, the 
political sphere becomes an area where neither the issues nor the agents get recognised as 
relevant and equally valuable. Care critiques raise this issue in connection to autonomy and 
thus press on an issue that again directly pertains to our standing in the political sphere.   
 
4. Postmodernist critiques  
 
Postmodernist critiques (Butler, 1990; Flax, 1987; Benhabib, 1992) come from different 
theoretical perspectives, namely, Foucauldian theories of agency and power, psychoanalytic 
theory, and feminist views on otherness and sexual difference. Their shared view about 
common definitions of autonomy, according to Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000), is that the 
ideal wrongly assumes self-transparency, psychical unity and the capacity to exercise self-
mastery from agents. Drawing from psychoanalysis, critics claim that it has been shown by 
this tradition that the psyche of agents instead shows them as “conflict-ridden, often self-
deluded, fundamentally opaque to themselves, and driven by archaic drives and desires of 
which they may not even be aware” (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:10).  
 
From the Foucauldian perspective, on the other hand, the critiques are directed at the 
assumption of a pure Kantian free will, or true self, because it “ignores the fact that subjects 
are constituted within and by regimes, discourses, and micropractices of power” (Mackenzie 
& Stoljar, 2000:10). Lastly, feminist theories of difference focus on the idea that autonomy 
seems to imply a sort of universality that suppresses the internal differentiation of agents 
and, in so doing, coercively suppresses different others (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:11).  
 
 
 
 
 
5. Diversity critiques         
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Finally, in agreement with postmodernist critiques, Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) hold that 
diversity critiques (Lugones, 1987) also point at the alleged unified and cohesive agent 
portrayed by common conceptions of autonomy. These critiques argue that individuals have 
multiple identities and that this reflects in the multiple groups to which they belong. 
Therefore, they advance the view that, for example, individual women’s identities are 
intersectional because they combine group affiliations that are unique to that woman 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:11). They add,  
 
 
The idea of intersectionality may seem incompatible with the presuppositions 
of theories of autonomy. It implies that because different and sometimes 
conflicting group identities intersect in the formation of individual identity, 
many individuals do not have a unified or integrated sense of self (Mackenzie 
& Stoljar, 2000:12).        
 
 
The characterisation of the major feminist critiques elaborated by Mackenzie and Stoljar 
(2000) is helpful to motivate the following overview of relational accounts of autonomy that 
I will introduce. It will become clear that the relational perspective intends to address most 
of the concerns raised by these diverse origins. Furthermore, the main reason why it is 
important to begin by looking at these critiques is that most of the issues they raise are 
especially relevant for the political aspect of autonomy. I did not discuss how decisive these 
critiques of the classic theories of autonomy are, precisely because I am more interested in 
discovering these issues and their consequences. Nonetheless, if one is moved by the 
problematics they identify, one should also find the shift towards a relational approach 
persuasive. The following part of the chapter will discuss the relational approach in more 
detail with the aim not of persuading such shift, but to analyse the merits of this perspective 
to identify the political conditions for autonomy.  
 
 
 
  
IV. A relational approach  
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Having introduced the main conceptions of autonomy and feminist critiques to some of their 
features, I will move on to describe the relational theories of autonomy that have been 
developed to include the feminist concerns in accounts of personal autonomy. As with the 
overview of broad conceptions of autonomy, I will not compare the virtues of each account. 
Instead, I want to show that relational approaches, Mackenzie’s in particular, is capable of 
addressing the importance of relations in the political sphere for our autonomy. Their 
understanding of autonomy’s connection to the relations we hold makes them able of 
unravelling the problems associated with oppressive political structures, even if they do not 
describe agents as engaging in political relations. Describing their central features will also 
allow me to situate Mackenzie’s account in the broader group, which is the relational 
definition of personal autonomy I rely on. I will present and analyse Mackenzie’s account in 
more detail in Part V.  
 
1. Features, distinctions, and feminist concerns  
 
As expressed by Natalie Stoljar (2018) “Feminist or ‘relational’ theories of autonomy 
attempt to answer the question of how internalized oppression and oppressive social 
conditions undermine or erode agents' autonomy” (Stoljar, 2018: n.p). Nonetheless, 
Mackenzie & Stoljar (2000) rightly clarify that relational autonomy does not refer to a 
unified view or definition of autonomy, but to shared perspectives. These perspectives are 
connected by a shared central view that characterises agents as socially embedded, and 
whose identities are shaped by the intersection of diverse and complex social determinants 
like gender, class, and race. Therefore, the diversity of accounts of relational autonomy focus 
on the implications that the social dimension of our identity has for our autonomy and our 
political and moral agency (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000:4).   
 
Although joined by these shared convictions, relational accounts diverge about the 
connection they grant between our social relations and our autonomy, and the characteristics 
of the content of autonomy.  The former consideration separates accounts between causal 
and constitutive.5 Causal conceptions believe that appropriate social relationships and 
historical contexts cause autonomy. Thus, oppressive conditions can impede the 
                                                          
5 Marilyn Friedman (2003) develops an account that includes both causal and constitute conditions for 
autonomy. She acknowledges that there are causal conditions that must obtain for “choices and actions 
to manifest the constitutive conditions in virtue of which they are autonomous” (Friedman, 2003: 4). 
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development of autonomy. Contrastingly, constitutive versions hold that social and 
interpersonal relations are conditions that define autonomy. External oppressive conditions, 
in this case, are incompatible with autonomy because, they do away with the de facto power 
necessary to exercise the authority over significant actions an autonomous person must have 
(Stoljar, 2018).   
 
 
Those approaches focusing on the social constitution of the agent or the social 
nature of the capacity of autonomy itself, are constitutive conceptions, whereas 
those focusing on the ways in which socialization and social relationships 
impede or enhance autonomy are causal conceptions (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 
2000:22).   
 
 
Another relevant distinction amongst accounts is whether they consider autonomy as a local 
or global property. Marilyn Friedman (2003), for example, develops a local account. She 
defines autonomy as self-determination regarding decisions and actions. She wants to 
consider what makes them autonomous. Therefore, it is firstly concerned with the 
autonomous person and her local decisions. Accounts that understand autonomy as a global 
property, on the other hand, focus on what makes a person’s life, autonomous.  
 
Regarding content, accounts either agree or disagree with content-neutrality; that is, with the 
idea that autonomy should not be defined in terms of pre-determined values or specific 
preferences but corresponds to an ideal that remains neutral for each agent to determine their 
own. Procedural theories claim that autonomy requires a content-neutral process where the 
person reflects on her motivations, values, and beliefs to revise her preferences guided by 
such reflection. Substantive theories, instead, believe autonomy is a value-laden notion and 
thus set normative constraints to the agent’s preferences.  
 
 
Autonomy, for the substantivist, is not a matter of being free to act as one 
pleases, but a matter of living in a particular way. Autonomy is a notion 
primarily driven by a conception of the good, by some traits of character rather 
than others, and by the nondiscretionary presence of substantively specified 
relations, social roles, and natural circumstances (Oshana, 2006:73) 
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Consequently, a strong substantive account like Marina Oshana’s (1998), would consider 
subservient or enslaving preferences incompatible with autonomy, merely in virtue of the 
content of those preferences. According to her, we might mistakenly want to call a 
subservient person autonomous because “(…) we think of autonomy as a condition 
relativized to the satisfaction of a person’s desires or decided entirely by the stance a person 
adopts toward her affective states” (Oshana, 2006: 61). She holds that our mistake is that we 
confuse autonomy’s potential advantages, such as self-contentment, with actually enjoying 
autonomy.  
 
Conversely, weak substantive approaches would avoid placing direct normative constraints 
on the content of the person’s preferences (Stoljar, 2018: n.p). Catriona Mackenzie initially 
described her view as a “weak substantive, relational approach to autonomy that grounds an 
agent’s normative authority over decisions of import to her life in her practical identity and 
in relations of intersubjective recognition” (Mackenzie, 2008: 512). On a similar note, 
Andrea Westlund (2009) wants to develop an account that is constitutively relational, but 
content-neutral, because she argues that only considering a particular set of idealised 
relations as autonomous can lead to perfectionism and a patronising view of certain choices. 
She claims, “We should not assume individuals who willingly embrace subordinate roles 
will be psychologically similar to one another” (Westlund, 2009: 29). Diane Meyers (2000) 
points out that both overly restrictive substantive accounts and value-neutral accounts, risk 
oversimplifying self-alienation and what individualised autonomous living entails (Meyers, 
2000: 480). 
 
Finally, if we consider the feminist critiques I presented in the previous section, regardless 
of the differences between the kinds of approaches, the relational perspective seems to 
address them. If we remember all five critiques, we can see that they focused on the 
characterisation of the autonomous agent developed by most common conceptions of 
personal autonomy. Symbolic critiques argue against the character ideal portrayed as self-
sufficient agents living isolated lives. Similarly, care critiques raise the issue of the 
masculinist character most salient views develop, which devaluates women’s experience and 
the values traditionally associated to them (like loyalty, love, and care). Postmodernist 
critiques challenge the notion that autonomy involves self-transparency and a capacity for 
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self-mastery, because it neglects micro practices of power and the conflict-ridden character 
of most agents. Diversity critiques question defining autonomous agents as unified and 
cohesive, as it obscures people’s multiple identities and sense of belonging to diverse groups. 
Lastly, metaphysical critiques generally opposed defining autonomy as attributable to agents 
in the first place, since it denies how they are socially constituted.   
 
What Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) identify as the shared conviction of relational accounts, 
emphasises precisely how they defy the characterisation of the autonomous agent as 
separate, self-sufficient, and cohesive. Understanding agents as socially embedded amounts 
to acknowledging that they rely on others because their identities are formed in the context 
of those social relations. The complexity and social character of our identities and the 
formation of our sense of self is presented by relational accounts as central to our autonomy. 
Instead of requiring self-mastery and self-transparency, relational views understand the 
impact of oppression and, in so doing, they develop a characterisation of the autonomous 
agent that challenges masculinist views and re-signifies social connections, dependency and 
values like care and loyalty. All the above, allows for accounts of autonomy that are 
responsive to the feminist critiques and can, therefore, inform feminist arguments.        
 
2. Relational accounts and the political 
 
Relational approaches to autonomy highlight the importance of our social standing and the 
kind of social relations we engage in for our autonomy. The latter provides strong 
foundations to justify the relevance of our political relations. I will continue by outlining 
some of the elements that these perspectives put forward in their connection to the political 
aspect of our personal autonomy.  
 
First, it is important to begin by pointing out that, although there are relevant differences 
between a causal and a constitutive approach to autonomy, both situate our social relations 
at the centre of our enjoyment and development of autonomy. This centrality provides 
sufficient grounds to argue that other kind of oppressive relations are also harmful for our 
autonomy. Accordingly, the political oppression that we experience is incompatible with our 
personal autonomy, regardless of whether we consider our political relations as constitutive 
of our personal identities, and hence of autonomy, or if we identify their instrumental role 
for our development of autonomy.  
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Likewise, it is clear that gender oppression, when supported by public policies, has a special 
kind of impact over our lives. Political decisions enforce restrictions and benefits that can 
perpetuate harmful stereotypes about expected behaviour and identity traits assigned to each 
gender, or even worse, persecute those who do not adjust to them. A common example of 
the former are maternity leaves that do not allow men taking the role of carers, and a grave 
expression of the latter are laws that target LGBTI. The same concern applies to equally 
oppressive policies directed at ethnical and other minorities. Hence, the standing that policies 
reflect for diverse members of the political sphere instantiate a particular kind of relation 
between them and acknowledging the centrality of our social relations for developing 
autonomy seems an appropriate way of facing this challenge. If we grant our social relations 
the capacity to shape our identities, the way in which we relate to the exercise of political 
power surely has the capacity to, at the very least, affirm or oppose part of our identities. 
Thus, relational views provide the ideal conceptual elements to consider this kind of political 
relations’ impact on our personal autonomy, in a similar way than when we evaluate our 
socialisation and interpersonal relations’ impact. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
one can have either a constitutive or causal characterisation of our political relations, but 
both approaches should acknowledge their importance for our autonomy as well as lead us 
to want to foster autonomy-enhancing political relations.        
 
On the other hand, debates between substantive and content-neutral relational accounts of 
autonomy indeed tend to lead to considerations about the kind of political structures we 
should uphold to secure our personal autonomy. Just like the liberal debate regarding the 
legitimacy of promoting value-laden policies, relational accounts disagree, and tackle 
worries about paternalism and perfectionism in different ways. John Christman (2004) raises 
these worries about substantive accounts of autonomy. According to him, claiming that 
being autonomous amounts to standing in appropriate social relations that include particular 
institutions and practices “turns the concept of autonomy into an unacceptably perfectionist 
idea that carries with it the danger of exclusion and overarching paternalism that attention to 
autonomy should well protect against” (Christman, 2004:158). Westlund (2009) agrees with 
Christman’s critique and as mentioned, supports the need for content-neutrality in relational 
approaches. On a difference with Westlund, Mackenzie (2008) answers Christman’s critique 
by pointing out that what appears as problematic to him, is actually a strength that these 
accounts have, because of their capacity to explain unjust political contexts: 
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 (…) Although Christman is right to alert us to the danger that the more robust, 
stringent conditions necessary for personal autonomy could be used to 
undermine citizens’ de jure rights to political autonomy and to justify 
unwarranted paternalism, I think such conditions can also play the reverse 
political role. For they can be used to explain how abusive or oppressive 
interpersonal relationships and exclusionary social and political institutions are 
unjust; namely, because they impair and restrict agents’ capacities to develop 
and exercise de facto personal autonomy, even if they possess de jure rights to 
political autonomy (Mackenzie, 2008: 524). 
 
 
Mackenzie’s view on this concern helps show how relational accounts are particularly 
capable of contributing to identifying the oppressive circumstances we experience in the 
political sphere. It is precisely their focus on the impact that oppressive circumstances, 
relations, and contexts have over our development of autonomy that makes relational 
accounts especially suited to explore the nature of our political relations, and related political 
conditions. Nevertheless, even strong substantive accounts like Oshana’s do not usually 
characterize institutional decisions and our diverse standing as members of the political 
sphere as political relations. Instead, they signal “external circumstances” (Oshana, 1998: 
82) that would foster, or at least make possible, our development of autonomy. Oshana refers 
to a broad range of choices and non-manipulative or coercive environment (Oshana, 1998: 
93-94). Mackenzie’s account is unique in straightforwardly including political conditions 
when addressing the characteristics of an autonomy-enhancing context. The next part of the 
chapter will present her view in further detail and, in the following part: I specifically discuss 
the political component of her view.   
 
V. Explicit political concerns: Mackenzie’s account of autonomy 
 
Mackenzie’s definition of autonomy includes explicit characteristics to signal the kind of 
political structures necessary to safeguard our autonomy. Furthermore, she acknowledges 
the centrality of exercising de facto power, which I connect to the political attributes that we 
should be able to exercise to enjoy our autonomy.  However, she does not establish the 
connection between structural political conditions and people’s exercise of political power. 
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My aim here is to argue that ultimately it is insufficient to think of oppressive contexts as a 
structure that requires readjustment. I suggest instead to re-think the kind of relations we 
want the political structure to enable. Hence, the following sections will examine 
Mackenzie’s strengths and shortcomings to elaborate a clear set of political conditions for 
personal autonomy, capable of ruling our political relations. 
 
1. Mackenzie’s multidimensional analysis 
 
Catriona Mackenzie initially described her account as global and weak substantive 
(Mackenzie, 2008: 512). However, in a later version of her view, she does not label it in this 
way. Mackenzie (2019) states that her proposal seeks to move beyond what she calls the 
‘current impasse’ in the literature between procedural and substantive versions. According 
to her, procedural and substantive views have engaged on an exchange of examples and 
counterexamples that has led to an impasse “since different examples pull our philosophical 
intuitions in different directions” (Mackenzie, 2019:523). In order to overcome this 
impasse6, she suggests identifying different dimensions or axes of autonomy that can explain 
how oppression can “impair an agent’s autonomy in one domain but not in others” 
(Mackenzie, 2019:523).     
 
Mackenzie (2014) holds it is inadequate to treat autonomy as a unitary concept, i.e.  “for 
which there is a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions” (Mackenzie, 2014:  16) 
because it does not capture its multidimensional nature. Therefore, her definition involves 
three causally interdependent dimensions: self-determination, self-governance, and self-
authorization.  
 
Self-determination amounts to having the freedom and opportunities to make and enact 
relevant choices to one’s life (what to do, what to value). Thus, this dimension refers to 
structural conditions for autonomy, which she calls freedom conditions and opportunity 
conditions.  Mackenzie describes freedom according to the ideal of non-domination 
developed by Philip Pettit (2010). I will later address Pettit’s idea of non-domination in more 
detail, but roughly, this approach to freedom states that we should not be subject to arbitrary 
                                                          
6 I shall remain neutral as to whether or not she is capable of moving on beyond the 
procedural/substantive discussion since it does not affect the interesting features and capacity of her 
view to emphasise the political aspect of personal autonomy.  
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forms of interference or power, where the arbitrariness is granted by the lack of control of 
the interfered person, and the interferer’s capacity to uphold his will.  
 
Hence, to prevent domination, Mackenzie’s proposal holds we should enjoy “substantive 
socio-relational equality of status” (Mackenzie, 2018:5). In order to enjoy this status, 
freedom conditions are composed of basic political and personal liberties that have to be 
equally accessible and legally secured.  Some of these liberties are freedom of association 
and thought, freedom of expression and religious exercise, freedom to engage in political 
participation, and personal liberties like freedom of sexual expression, and from all forms of 
violence and manipulation (Mackenzie, 2014: 25-26). Additionally, for these liberties to be 
not merely formal, they require opportunity conditions in the shape of actual goods and 
choices.  
 
 
(…) adequate nutrition, sanitation, and personal safety; social goods such as 
quality education, affordable health care, decent housing, social support, and 
opportunities for cultural engagement; genuine opportunities for political 
participation and paid or unpaid employment; and some degree of mobility 
(Mackenzie, 2018:5). 
 
 
Mackenzie (2018) argues that lacking these options impairs our capacity to make 
autonomous choices, and therefore, to lead self-determining lives. She provides the example 
of a lack of healthy food choices in poor communities, where factors like sugary foods being 
cheaper and more readily available, added to insufficient education about nutrition, shape 
their food choices and can lead to significant health issues (Mackenzie, 2018: 5). Thus, the 
political and personal liberties she identifies, intend to signal what interferes with and what 
enables our exercise of self-determination. The opportunity conditions, in turn, specify the 
variety of opportunities that should be available for agents to choose what to value, what to 
do, who to be (Mackenzie, 2014:17). 
 
The self-government dimension alludes to the idea of authenticity. A self-governing life 
consists of enacting choices that are in line with our identities and values. Therefore, it 
demands a set of complex skills since it requires having the necessary capacities that will 
allow us to make and enact those choices. As this dimension refers to internal conditions for 
 
 
35 
 
autonomy, she identifies them as competence and authenticity conditions. Nonetheless, 
Mackenzie states that, since self-governance is a socially constituted capacity, it does not 
refer to an exercise of control over our psychology, which is how it is usually described in 
the literature. Instead, from a relational perspective, the wide range of capacities involved in 
self-government, like imagination to consider alternative ways of acting and challenging 
social norms, “can only be developed and exercised with extensive interpersonal, social and 
institutional scaffolding” (Mackenzie, 2018:6).      
 
Authenticity, according to Mackenzie (2014) should be understood as reflective self-
acceptance. She favours Christman’s view7, which defines authenticity as non-alienation 
upon self-reflection of our practical identities and position in the world. Regarding her 
definition of practical identity, Mackenzie states: “I understand practical identity as a 
normative self-conception, which embodies a person’s sense of self-identity and her 
commitments, values, and beliefs” (Mackenzie, 2014:18). She argues that we need not reject 
the authenticity condition but consider this not as a competing condition of self-governance 
over others like normative competence conditions. She believes other relational authors have 
been right to criticise conditions like endorsement for self-governance, because they do not 
account for ambivalence and internalised oppression. However, as her view does not think 
of sufficient and necessary conditions, she claims her multidimensional approach is able to 
avoid such problems. Moreover, she believes that understanding self-government in this way 
makes relational theories able to distinguish the conditions in the social environment that 
enable or constrain the development of our capacity for self-government. The latter is very 
important because it allows them to address psychological mechanisms of oppression like 
implicit bias and   adaptive preference formation. Nonetheless, she adds that acknowledging 
psychological oppression cannot amount to characterising women as “dupes of the 
patriarchy”, because psychological oppression does not constitute global oppression 
(Mackenzie, 2014:18). 
 
 
Rather, its effects are typically partial, resulting in degrees of internal conflict, 
struggle and resistance, and fractured self-concepts. For example, as the 
empirical literature on implicit bias shows, one can reject sexist or racist 
                                                          
7 For more details of his view see Christman; J (2009) “The Politics of Persons: individual Autonomy and 
Socio-historical Selves”. Cambridge University Press.  
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stereotypes about oneself or others, but still find oneself reacting or behaving 
in ways that reinforce these stereotypes (Mackenzie, 2018:6). 
 
 
Finally, by self-authorization Mackenzie (2014) means to recognise ourselves as holding 
normative authority over our lives. She defines normative authority as regarding oneself as 
authorised to exercise control over one’s life and to determine what will constitute reasons 
for acting. The conditions involved in this dimension are accountability, self-evaluative 
attitudes, and social recognition.   
 
The accountability condition means to regard oneself as responsible for the values, beliefs, 
and commitments we hold, which makes us answerable to others for them. We should be 
willing to provide reasons to others and to revise our beliefs when questioned, just as we 
should consider ourselves able to request the same accountability from others. Self-
evaluative attitudes, on the other hand, include self-esteem, self-respect, and self-trust.  Self-
esteem refers to evaluating one’s attitudes and commitments as worthwhile, whereas self-
respect relates to our position with respect to others. Having self-respect is to recognise 
oneself as the moral equal of others. Self-trust amounts to having the capacity to trust our 
judgements, which leads to being able to involve ourselves in a self-interpretative exercise, 
where we can deliberate between our desires, commitments and emotional responses to 
determine which we should attend to (Mackenzie, 2014: 36-37). 
 
Mackenzie argues that self-evaluative notions depend on intersubjective social relations that 
recognise others as autonomous agents.  Thus, the condition of social recognition identifies 
this need to be regarded as a person worthy of respect, regardless of the possible resilient 
people who are capable of holding appropriate self-evaluating attitudes even under 
humiliating circumstances. The idea is that even if there are cases of resilience, self-
evaluative attitudes are “constituted within normative structures and practices of social 
recognition” (Mackenzie, 2014:37). 
 
 
2. Characterising the dimensions further  
 
It is important to conclude this overview of Mackenzie’s account by noting some key 
characteristics of her multidimensional view. Firstly, even though the different dimensions 
 
 
37 
 
of autonomy seem to include internal and external conditions, she does not like making this 
a clear cut distinction given that the view relies on the notion of a socially constituted agent, 
also due to her intention to move beyond the procedural versus substantive discussion. 
 
 
(…)  From a relational perspective, the distinction between internal and external 
conditions   is   complicated.   If   persons   are   socially   constituted,  then   
external conditions, including our social relations with others, shape the process 
of practical identity formation—the self of selfgovernance—and the 
development of the skills and competences required for governing the self 
(Mackenzie, 2014:31). 
 
 
Mackenzie is not arguing that social and political conditions affect important parts of our 
autonomy—such as our self-affective attitudes—but that our practical identities are 
developed by our social interactions.  
 
Additionally, the causal interdependence of the dimensions makes it difficult to order them 
by some kind of standard level of importance or priority. Instead, Mackenzie acknowledges, 
“we may find that in different contexts certain dimensions of autonomy, and the conditions 
that fall under them, may be more salient than others” (Mackenzie, 2014: 40). This, in her 
view, means two things. First, that depending on the domain into consideration, some 
dimensions can be more significant than others. For example, in the medical decision-
making context, the most relevant dimensions are self-authorization and self-governance. 
Second, that we should establish different thresholds to meet the conditions also in 
accordance with the context. To support this idea, she exemplifies with democratic 
citizenship. She states that it would be appropriate to set high thresholds of self-
determination for democratic citizenship, by requiring extensive liberties and opportunities 
to enable it, but at the same time, a very low threshold to consider someone as self-
governing.8 Nonetheless, she clarifies that every axis or dimension depends on the other to 
                                                          
8 There is a risk of inconsistency for Mackenzie by phrasing thresholds for democratic citizenship like 
this. It appears as though she is characterising self-governance as a pre-condition for democratic 
citizenship, rather than a dimension of autonomy that requires the appropriate standing that democratic 
citizenship affords, in order to develop our capacity to be self-governing. It is the difference between 
thinking of autonomy as an end-state or as a precondition, where the former amounts to acknowledging 
that we require particular conditions to develop our autonomy. A charitable interpretation is to consider 
that what Mackenzie intends to express by this statement is precisely that the agent’s capacities to be 
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be fulfilled, so identifying different thresholds and salience of one dimension for a specific 
context, does not amount to neglecting the other dimensions and conditions (Mackenzie, 
2014: 40).  
 
Remember that what she intends her view to achieve is explain our contrasting philosophical 
intuitions when confronted with examples that explore the different effects of oppression 
over our autonomy: 
 
 
Each of these dimensions can and should be understood as a matter of degree 
and domain. A person can be self-determining, self-governing and self-
authorising to differing degrees, both at a time and over the course of her life. 
This explains how it is possible for a person such as King (Martin Luther), 
whose freedom and opportunities have been severely curtailed, nevertheless to 
exhibit high degrees of self-governance and have a strong sense of himself as a 
self-authorising agent (Mackenzie, 2019: 523).       
 
 
Mackenzie’s multidimensional view includes a number of concerns that seem to support my 
project of considering the manner in which our practical identities are shaped, not only by 
our social relations but also by our political relations. Freedom conditions, opportunity 
conditions, social recognition and accountability are only some of them, and their impact 
when applied to the political intuitively shows that we cannot overlook the importance that 
the relations we experience within the political sphere have for our development of personal 
autonomy.  
 
A multidimensional analysis of personal autonomy helps unravel the complexities of the 
concept and the importance of the relations each person experiences for her development of 
autonomy. By distinguishing separate dimensions, Mackenzie (2014) draws attention to 
gender-based structural inequalities and other forms of oppression. She shows how they 
impair our abilities to be self-determining by restricting our freedom and opportunities, and 
                                                          
self-governing should not condition her access to democratic citizenship. However, this phrasing also 
shows her difficulty to see the relational aspect of our political sphere. It is as if our self-governance 
relies on our social relations and then is evaluated when we want to be part of the political sphere. I take 
the distinction between end-state and precondition from an interesting discussion for the context of 
upbringing developed by Clayton, M; (2006).      
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how they are internalised constraining the agent’s psychological freedom and agency. 
However, her view seems to characterise the political sphere as a domain that can harm or 
contribute to the development of our autonomy, but not as an area where we actually 
experience relations. I claim the political sphere does not only constitute the formal 
background for our social relations. We are part of relations in the political sphere 
established under a particular set of rules, and these are the ones with the potential to either 
harm or enhance our personal autonomy. The next two sections aim at discussing these 
strengths and shortcomings in more detail.  
 
3. Dimensions and the political aspect 
 
In what follows, I will discuss the features of Mackenzie’s account that contribute to an 
analysis of our political relations. I want to emphasise Mackenzie’s concern for our political 
standing in the various components of her view. Looking at each dimension will show the 
unique capacity of Mackenzie’s multidimensional account to address the political aspect of 
autonomy.   
 
The dimension Mackenzie refers to as self-determination, directly engages with the need for 
structural political conditions to develop autonomy. Through the political and personal 
liberties condition, she identifies the things that enable, and the things that interfere with our 
ability to make and enact relevant choices for our lives. In doing so, she explicitly 
characterizes the political sphere as an area where our autonomy can be either seriously 
harmed or greatly enhanced by legal provisions. A life where there are no guaranteed 
personal freedoms like freedom of sexual expression, and freedom from violence can hardly 
be described as self-determining, but it is a novel characteristic of Mackenzie’s view that 
she includes political liberties like freedom to engage in political participation as part of the 
liberties that are necessary for our autonomy. Political participation and freedom of 
association signal our right to relate to others and to exercise our role as citizens, which 
denotes a specific standing that she is acknowledging we have to enjoy. Hence, even if she 
is not explicitly stating it, we can infer they are meant to order the relations of people 
involved in those interactions within the political sphere.  
 
Mackenzie also establishes opportunity conditions to set the options that should be made 
available for people to choose from. This acknowledges an important concern regarding the 
need for material conditions, or in other words, a relevant level of welfare in order to become 
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autonomous. A person who does not enjoy a standard of living that allows her to enact 
choices beyond mere survival cannot be considered enjoying an autonomous life.  This 
aspect, nevertheless, is not unique to Mackenzie’s view. Many accounts9 hold that there can 
be no self-governance or self-direction when our lives are plagued by worries of survival. 
Nonetheless, since in her view freedom is defined as non-domination, her concern regarding 
opportunities not only aims at making liberties be more than merely formal but at securing 
an equal standing that can prevent dominating relations. When each person enjoys liberties, 
relevant material conditions, and a substantial range of available choices for their lives, they 
relate to one another from an equal standing that allows avoiding the need to use persuasion 
or any other strategy to prevent arbitrary interferences. Thus, Mackenzie’s self-
determination dimension sets important formal conditions that recognise the role the 
political sphere plays for our personal autonomy.  
 
On the other hand, Mackenzie’s self-authorization dimension discusses the role of our social 
and political standing for our autonomy and analyses its centrality for our identity formation 
and self-perception. It is our capacity to develop autonomy, and the effective authority that 
autonomy implies, that are harmed by oppressive contexts.  Although she is not only 
referring to political contexts, her analysis discusses conditions required for normative 
authority, which are also applicable to the political sphere. She argues that oppressive 
contexts take away the agent’s de facto power to be authoritative over her life decisions. 
Thus, a context that does not properly acknowledge such authority harms her self-esteem 
and effective capacity to exercise it.  
 
 
To   lead   a   self-determining   life   requires   not   just   having   the   capacities   
and opportunities to do so but also regarding oneself, and being recognized by 
others, as having the social status of an autonomous agent. Because this status 
dimension of autonomy is constituted intersubjectively in social relations of 
recognition, it is vulnerable to others’ failures, or refusals, to grant us 
appropriate recognition in a range of different spheres (Mackenzie, Rogers & 
Dodds, 2013: 44). 
                                                          
9 Mackenzie (2014) mentions: Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986); Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Aldershot, UK:Ashgate, 2006) as accounts that also 
include freedom and opportunity conditions. 
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In other words, Mackenzie disputes the idea that having normative authority amounts to 
enjoying an authority made possible by the non-interference of others. Instead, she claims it 
involves being aware of having authority over our lives, being granted opportunities to 
exercise that authority, and being acknowledged by others as authoritative. Accordingly, the 
conditions she identifies for achieving self-authority, i.e., accountability, self-evaluative 
attitudes, and social recognition, are especially relevant in the political sphere where 
authority is connected to an exercise of political power. The idea of “one person one vote” 
that drives democratic elections is supported by the notion that acknowledging equal moral 
status to people should be translated into an equal measure of political authority. In the case 
of autonomy, we also commit ourselves to recognise that being autonomous, if considered 
valuable, should be available to everyone in equal measure, because it expresses a desirable 
and relevant aspect of our lives. There is, therefore, no reason to restrict people’s autonomy 
in the political sphere. Moreover, it can be argued that valuing autonomy should also commit 
us to foster a political sphere that allows the right to enjoy our autonomy in an egalitarian 
manner.  
 
4. The missing ‘active’ component   
 
Even though Mackenzie includes some important liberties and opportunities as political 
conditions, her view neglects the active character that is implied by her definition of self-
determination, which has some important consequences. Freedom and opportunities are 
supposed to be made available to enact and make authentic choices. However, being free, 
especially if defined as freedom from domination, has a positive aspect, even if Philip Pettit 
himself does not grant this aspect to the notion. I will briefly discuss this missing positive or 
active component from Mackenzie’s view in connection to the potential I identify in Pettit’s 
idea of non-domination, which inspires her approach to freedom.  
 
Benjamin Constant (1989) started a very rich debate about freedom by developing the 
distinction between freedom of the ancient and the modern, which Isaiah Berlin (1996) 
continued by introducing two types of freedom, namely, negative and positive. Negative 
freedom amounts to being free from interference, and positive freedom is rooted in the 
concept of self-government. This idea implies that citizens should have an active 
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involvement in public affairs in order to define by themselves the parameters of their 
freedom (Berlin, 1996:220-231).  
 
Based on Berlin’s definition, liberals have been commonly associated with negative freedom 
and republicans with positive freedom. However, Pettit (2010) intends to separate the 
republican tradition from the ideal of positive freedom by developing his ideal of “freedom 
as non-domination”.  He states the latter also has a negative character but in the shape of a 
defence against domination instead of the absence of interference. Accordingly, Pettit (2010) 
only grants that “The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs 
something more than the absence of interference; it requires security against interference” 
(Pettit, 2010:51). Nevertheless, we are not just free from (a lack of uncontrolled 
interference), non-domination amounts to being free to.   
 
Pettit (2012) talks about control understood as exercising effective influence, and Mackenzie 
(2014) adds opportunity conditions to ensure freedoms are not merely formal. Both 
proposals appear to assume non-domination requires more than a formal structure that grants 
legally-established rights and liberties. Self-determination involves having freedom and 
opportunities to make and enact our choices, and it indeed includes political conditions 
(political liberties and political opportunities), however, acknowledging the need for 
freedom and opportunities cannot suffice to claim that we can effectively enact relevant 
choices in the political sphere. If there is no explicit condition that aims at adding 
deliberation among every actor involved in decision-making processes, our capacity to 
actually make and enact those choices is still merely formal. Thus, it seems there is a third 
element missing in Mackenzie’s political conditions; one that could allow people in the 
political sphere to actively take part of decision-making processes, which again, connects 
with my critique of her neglect for the character of our relations in the political sphere and 
how they unfold.  This could be achieved by re-shaping our relations in the political sphere 
and focusing on political participation to include additional means of direct involvement of 
common citizens, among other considerations.    
 
5. Holding effective authority: beyond having the right self-evaluative attitudes 
 
In this section, I would like to consider Mackenzie’s understanding of the importance of our 
self-evaluative attitudes in connection with the relevance of holding de facto power to 
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exercise effective authority over our lives. Perceiving ourselves as being authoritative and 
actually holding authority to enact relevant choices in the political sphere, have a strong 
impact over our capacity to become autonomous. Each of the conditions considered by 
Mackenzie is amplified in the political sphere due to the reach that decisions made in it have 
over our lives. Mackenzie rightly argues that perceiving ourselves as holding normative 
authority over our lives is crucial for our autonomy, but she does not place conditions to 
guide our political relations so that we can not only see ourselves as authoritative but can 
also have the according authority in decision-making to enjoy the standing of co-legislators.  
 
Mackenzie’s (2014) self-evaluative attitudes condition follows Aderson’s and Honneth’s 
(2009) ideas of self-esteem, self-respect, and self-trust. They state that: “(…) Self-respect 
can be seen as the affectively laden self-conception that underwrites a view of oneself as the 
legitimate source of reasons for acting” (Anderson & Honneth, 2009: 132). Thus, self-
respect amounts to acknowledging ourselves as competent authors and rightful deliberators 
over our practical reasoning. Having less power, or influence over decision-making in our 
private lives affects our identity formation and self-perception, so arguing that being 
margined from political decision-making can have a similar effect does not seem 
controversial. Not being acknowledged as rightful decision-makers communicates the idea 
that we are less capable of decision-making than those who get to participate. Exclusion 
from the political sphere, where important decisions affecting our lives are made, clearly 
does not take that status seriously and can diminish people’s sense of personal authority. 
According to them, denying the standing of “legitimate co-legislators” (Anderson & 
Honneth, 2009: 132) implies that people are not competent decision-makers, which makes 
it a very difficult to overcome message that damages our perception of being equal and free 
(Anderson & Honneth, 2009: 132).  
 
Our self-esteem does not solely rely on being recognised authoritative in the political, 
however, Anderson and Honneth rightly warn us that it is our status as autonomous agents 
that is at stake when we are not recognised as capable decision-makers in the political sphere. 
The political certainly is not the only relevant area where we require recognition to promote 
appropriate affective attitudes, but the weight and impact of the decisions made in the 
political sphere make denying the co-legislators status a grave obstacle to consider ourselves 
competent deliberators, as Anderson and Honneth (2009) describe.      
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Enjoying little or no accountability in the political sphere, on the other hand, i.e., reason-
giving from each party involved, harms our identity formation because those reasons, and 
our right to ask others for the reasons supporting their choices, becomes irrelevant. It is clear 
that the latter does not imply the need to implement constant reason-giving in the political 
sphere, but it supports the importance of re-thinking deliberations as they currently take 
place in the political sphere, in order to include common citizens and establish connections 
between every agent involved in decision-making.  Similarly, that our commitments and 
values are not recognised by others, also hinders our self-perception in terms of how we 
deem them valuable and worth respecting, which again supports the idea of identifying 
political conditions for autonomy that can focus on the nature of the relations we engage in 
the political sphere.   
 
All the above considerations show that our political standing matters to our self-perception 
in terms of our authority. It shapes our identities but also, it allows for effective exercises of 
authority and demands for accountability. The latter cannot happen if we are not granted the 
power to be authoritative in political decision-making.  
 
6. Contributions and shortcomings 
 
Mackenzie’s self-determination axis establishes the need for structural political conditions 
for the development of autonomy. She includes a political and personal liberties condition, 
which is a novel element of her project, given that it explicitly considers things like freedom 
to engage in political participation. Similarly, her opportunities condition alludes to material 
conditions that connect to, not only securing a threshold of welfare, but also to guarantee an 
equal standing. This notion comes from her reliance on freedom as non-domination as a 
background ideal of freedom. However, her approach to the freedom conditions and 
opportunities conditions neglects the active or positive character of non-domination. 
Although Pettit himself is reluctant to agree with the need for more direct involvement of 
common citizens in deliberation processes, both Mackenzie and Pettit consider the 
importance of holding de facto power, or some kind of effective control, which implies an 
active component is indeed needed to guarantee our equal standing in the political sphere. 
Mackenzie’s self-authorization dimension, in turn, highlights the centrality of being 
regarded by others as authoritative. Our normative authority, according to her, involves 
being aware of our authority but at the same time being recognised as authoritative and 
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granted the opportunities to exercise this authority. Self-evaluative attitudes like self-respect, 
self-trust and self-esteem shape our normative authority, and an oppressive context conveys 
the message of being less capable to those it excludes, which can greatly harm their 
development of these attitudes.  
 
Experiencing little accountability, on the other hand, translates into undervaluing reason-
giving as a relevant exercise we should engage in, and more importantly, are entitled to also 
request from others. This worry clearly connects with the political sphere, even if Mackenzie 
does not directly include it as one of her political conditions. In conclusion, this analysis of 
Mackenzie’s multidimensional view provided sufficient arguments to justify the suitability 
and capacity of her account to identify the political conditions that will allow for autonomy-
enhancing political relations. Her definition of autonomy offers key concepts to identify 
those political conditions for autonomy beyond establishing institutional safeguards in the 
shape of liberties and opportunities. Nonetheless, in order to do so, we need an approach that 
includes political participation as an expression of our personal authority, and more broadly, 
describes the political as a domain where we hold relations, just as a different methodology 
to approach autonomy in a novel way that does not lead to a reductive analysis of the concept.     
 
VI. A methodological difference: Dismantling model and network model  
 
Finally, changing the model of analysis we usually apply to autonomy, seems promising as 
a way to identify political conditions for autonomy. In this final part, I will briefly suggest 
that a network model is more appropriate than a dismantling model for autonomy. This shift 
would allow for an approach that is more suited to interrogate the political as part of the 
network that constitutes autonomy, instead of as a separate sphere that interacts externally 
with it.  
 
Peter Strawson (1992) develops two models for philosophical analysis, namely, the 
dismantling model and the network model. The former corresponds to an analysis that breaks 
down complex phenomena into simpler, independently understood elements. These 
elements enjoy explanatory priority over the complex phenomenon, and therefore cannot be 
circular since the explanatory priority would not be satisfied in a circular analysis. 
Conversely, the network model does not require the explanatory priority of the elements and 
is not contrary to circularity. Each element of the network actually relies on the other for 
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explanatory purposes. I claim that personal autonomy, as pointed out by Mackenzie, also 
resists a dismantling analysis. Therefore, a network model is promising to identify the 
political conditions for autonomy, whilst not falling into a reductive analysis10.  
A good way to explain how a network analysis can be more suitable is to consider cases that 
seem to resist a dismantling model. The game of chess provides a very clear example11. In 
order to define chess, we could say something like ‘a game with the goal to check mate the 
opponent’. Nonetheless, such a definition compels us to refer to what ‘check mate’ is. 
Likewise, our definition of check mate will require explaining what a ‘king’ is. This example 
shows that some cases do appear to resist a model that identifies independently understood 
components. My intention is to suggest that autonomy does the same. Mackenzie’s view 
defines autonomy as constituted by interdependent dimensions, which is compatible with 
this shift of model. I will explain this in more detail in the following section. 
 
1. Dimensions of autonomy in a network  
 
In order to show the compatibility of the multidimensional approach developed by 
Mackenzie and a network model, I will begin by briefly reminding her view. Exploring these 
dimensions will provide clarity as to the motivation for her approach and allow me to explain 
how her view benefits from a network analysis to better address the political element.  
 
Let us recall that Mackenzie’s account of autonomy identifies three causally interdependent 
dimensions: self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization. Enjoying freedom 
and opportunities to make and enact relevant choices to one’s life is what she calls Self-
determination. Therefore, this dimension alludes to structural conditions for autonomy that 
she refers to as freedom conditions and opportunity conditions. These include for instance, 
political and personal liberties to signal what interferes with and what enables our exercise 
of self-determination. Likewise, it considers opportunity conditions specifying what should 
be available for agents to choose what to value, what to do, who to be (Mackenzie, 2014:17).  
                                                          
10 Kelp (2019), based on Strawson’s model, develops an account of knowledge that seeks to overcome 
the reductive character of common approaches, which establish necessary and sufficient conditions. He 
argues that traditional understandings provide a set of non-circular conditions that do not seem 
appropriate for knowledge. Instead, he proposes to approach knowledge as being part of a network of 
phenomena that includes inquiry, belief and knowledge, where they cannot be properly understood 
unless with regards to each other. My suggestion to apply a network analysis in the case of autonomy is 
inspired by his use of the model for knowledge - Kelp, C. (2019). Understanding Knowledge. Unpublished 
manuscript 
 
11 This example is presented in more detail, in Kelp (2019)   
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The self-governance dimension in turn, is connected to authenticity. A self-governing life 
means to enact choices that are true to our values and identities.  This requires complex skills 
and so this dimension refers to those internal conditions for autonomy, which she calls 
competence and authenticity conditions. However, Mackenzie characterises self-governance 
as a socially constituted capacity.  
 
Finally, self-authorization amounts to recognising ourselves as holding normative authority 
over our lives. Crucially though, she understands normative authority in a specific and 
uncommon way. In her view, it is to regard oneself as authorised to exercise control over 
one’s life and to determine what constitutes reasons for acting. The conditions she envisages 
for this dimension are accountability, self-evaluative attitudes, and social recognition.   
 
This brief overview of Mackenzie’s multidimensional approach shows that each dimension 
seems to point to a specific feature of autonomy. In turn, every dimension is constituted by 
what look like necessary and sufficient conditions. Every dimension appears to act as a 
necessary condition for autonomy, with a related set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Nevertheless, there is also a relevant difference with other accounts of autonomy. Identifying 
these causally interdependent dimensions shows that her motivation comes from a resistance 
of the concept of autonomy to be analysed in the traditional way.  
 
There is something about the constitutive parts of autonomy that leads us to look for novel 
manners to analyse the notion. This difficulty lies in the explanatory dependence of each 
element. As Mackenzie explicitly states, self-determination refers to external conditions, i.e., 
freedom and opportunity conditions, and self-authorization and self-governance are closer 
to our internal capacities. However, since her account is a relational account, the distinction 
between external and internal capacities and conditions is not straightforward. Our identities, 
values and commitments are developed because of the social relations we establish.  
 
Hence, her view exposes the resistance of autonomy to a dismantling analysis. To be 
autonomous we need to be authentic to our values and commitments, but to develop them 
we need to stand in relations of recognition, and to define what those relations should be 
like, we need to refer to the capacity to see ourselves as authoritative over our lives, which 
again depends on our relations of recognition. The problem is that in order to explain what 
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being authentic means, we need to refer to each dimension, and this inevitably leads to a 
circular analysis.     
 
The multidimensional nature of the concept that Mackenzie rightly puts forward is therefore 
compatible and could benefit from a network analysis. Moreover, thinking of her view in 
terms of a network model provides an approach to autonomy that seems the best suited to 
discuss and identify the political conditions for autonomy.       
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
Throughout this chapter, I explored relational accounts of autonomy and focused on 
Mackenzie’s specific proposal. The latter showed that relational accounts, particularly 
Mackenzie’s provide the background to focus on the character of our relations within the 
political sphere because they are able to identify the importance for our autonomy of both 
the social relations we hold and the political standing we enjoy.  These two concerns allow 
us to acknowledge not just how our political relations can become dominating and harmful, 
but how we can transform them into relations of recognition. However, in order to elucidate 
the political conditions for personal autonomy, more is required. As long as we do not 
identify the political sphere as a central domain of our lives in which we do establish 
relations, we will be incapable of determining the political conditions that should rule them.  
 
Finally, I devoted the last part of the chapter to suggest a methodological approach that 
differs from classic analysis of autonomy, namely, introducing a network analysis to 
autonomy. At the same time, I argued that Mackenzie’s account, which supports my overall 
project, actually points in this direction and would greatly benefit from this approach.   
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Chapter 2: Non-domination and control as political conditions for 
autonomy 
 
 
I. Neo-republican inspired political conditions  
 
 
The kind of political relations we hold will be determined by the way in which we approach 
our political interactions. If we begin by granting that our political exchanges indeed 
constitute relations—which I have argued for in chapter 1—then we can move on to try to 
identify the necessary requirements for them to be autonomy-enhancing. I mentioned in the 
previous chapter that the political relations we should hold for enjoying our autonomy are 
what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. The goal of chapter 1 was first to show that 
there are such political relations and that they prove there is a political aspect of autonomy. 
Thus, I did not define what I mean by Relations of Mutual Recognition. In this chapter, I 
will again move beyond providing a definition for Relations of Mutual Recognition and 
instead focus on the conditions for them to take place. The idea is to analyse the political 
conditions for autonomy, which are none other than the conditions for Relations of Mutual 
Recognition. Discussing these conditions will at the same time, serve as a clear introduction 
to the central features of what Relations of Mutual Recognition amount to.  
 
Accordingly, the focus of this chapter will be on discussing what I identify as two central 
conditions for Relations of Mutual Recognition, namely, non-domination and control. I will 
analyse the meaning of each notion, as found in Philip Pettit (2010; 2012). My intention is 
to build upon them and re-define both concepts to overcome some of the shortcomings that 
I claim weaken both ideas.   
 
The chapter begins by analysing Pettit’s definition of both non-domination and control. Part 
II and III continue by considering critiques—other authors and my own—to both concepts 
and by elaborating my version of each..  
 
 
II. Non-domination 
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Philip Pettit holds that dominating relations occur when there is “exposure to another’s 
power of uncontrolled interference” (Pettit, 2012:28). He claims that not only should we not 
be arbitrarily interfered with, but also never reduced to use persuasion or any strategy to 
prevent that interference. Thus, non-domination in the political sphere requires equal 
treatment and equal share in power.  
 
I will briefly address what I identify as two important critiques to non-domination: (1) the 
need for a connection between non-domination and autonomy, and (2) the importance of 
political participation for non-domination. I want to show that they rightly identify 
weaknesses in Pettit’s concept. Based on these concerns, I discuss the neglect of a more 
active or positive aspect to non-domination that motivates the different approach to non-
domination that I develop. Likewise, I will show there is a connection between my 
understanding of non-domination and the relational approach that guides my view. 
Considering subtler and also structural cases of domination, makes this connection very clear 
and justifies non-domination’s capacity to address them.    
  
I begin by presenting the main features of Pettit’s non-domination and continue by 
discussing objections to his view. I conclude by emphasising that part of the importance of 
being free from domination is to be free to pursue our own goals or hold our personal 
commitments.12 My intention is to add this positive aspect to non-domination in my proposal 
by defining control as a separate political condition for autonomy.  
 
1. An overview: beyond interferences 
 
Freedom as non-domination amounts to a life without subjection to another agent’s will. It 
does not only refer to interference but also to the ability not to depend on deference or any 
other attitude to secure freedom. The main feature of non-domination is that it seeks to 
prevent the status of domination that results from arbitrary interference. Thus, it is important 
to note that, according to Pettit (2012), not every interference is dominating, and determining 
what makes an interference arbitrary is key to his view. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Rainer Forst (2005) in “Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy” holds a very 
similar view. He states that every “freedom from” is indeed a “freedom to”, hence the differences 
amongst conceptions of freedom are connected to the notion of autonomy they are based on.   
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Domination is defined by reference to interference but is distinct from it. 
Someone, A, will be dominated in a certain choice by another agent or agency, 
B, to the extent that B has a power of interfering in the choice that is not itself 
controlled by A. When I say that B has a power of interference I mean that B 
has the unvitiated and uninvaded capacity to interfere or not to interfere. And 
when I say that that power of interfering is not controlled by A, I mean that it 
is not exercised on terms imposed by A: it is not exercised in a direction or 
according to a pattern that A has the influence to determine (Pettit, 2012: 50).  
 
 
The arbitrariness of an interference, or what he later prefers to call uncontrolled interference 
(Pettit, 2012), hinges on whether we are given the opportunity to direct or influence the terms 
that will rule it. Pettit (2012) claims that what characterises an interference as uncontrolled 
is the discretion that the interferer exercises; in other words, the manner in which the 
interference is exercised at the interferer’s will, and as the word expresses, the receiver’s 
lack of control over it (Pettit, 2012:58). This imposition of the interferer’s will can take 
different forms. It can entail a direct restriction of options, manipulation of the characteristics 
of each available option, or imposition of what the interferer interprets as the receiver’s 
interests (paternalism). However, an uncontrolled interference need not be active. It suffices 
that the interferer has “an uncontrolled power of interfering with the choice of any option” 
(Pettit, 2012:59) to attribute the label. This means that the mere capacity to exercise 
uncontrolled interference constitutes domination, even if the interferer chooses not to 
exercise that power out of some favourable disposition towards the receiver. Such power to 
interfere is dominating, because the receiver’s choices are not what they would be if the 
power did not exist, but more importantly, since the subject depends on the interferer’s good 
will to remain such, if she is to have the possibility to choose as she wishes (Pettit, 2012:59).   
     
Pettit’s definition of domination, therefore, shows that we can be subject to the mastery of a 
third party, even if not expressed by active interferences. To support this idea, he describes 
two broad types of domination without interference: invigilation and intimidation. 
Invigilation means the third party stands guard over what you do, and even if he is not 
currently disposed to interfere, he remains in a position where he can interfere in case his 
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disposition changes.13 This invigilation will lead to a change in your choices’ cognitive and 
objective character, due to your dependency on the third party’s goodwill to keep your 
chance to choose. Furthermore, this means that you will be free to choose but only with the 
third party’s permission (Pettit, 2012:61).   
 
Intimidation, as the common use of the word suggests, amounts to threats or any direct forms 
of pressure. Intimidation does not necessarily come together with invigilation, but it can 
certainly enhance the effect of the invigilation and provide incentives to caution and 
deferential treatment on your part (Pettit, 2012:61). Thus, our equal standing should amount 
to removing not only evident instances of abuses of power, but also chances for any third 
party to curtail or distort a person’s choices by subjecting her to his will. This regardless of 
whether that third party is an institution or an individual “My power of interference in your 
choice, and my domination over you, can only be contained by external checks that remove 
or replace the interference option or put it cognitively off the menu” (Pettit, 2012:63).  
 
Non-domination, according to Pettit, is a self-sufficient ideal capable of supporting a 
republican project; therefore, it should be understood as the goal of the state to foster non-
domination. The idea is that by promoting the relations that non-domination entails, other 
desirable outcomes will follow. This is one of the aspects of his view that has been strongly 
criticised (See Boyer, 2001; McMahon 2005). Similarly, the distinctly republican character 
of his proposal has also given rise to critiques that, nonetheless, seem to contend the label 
but not the content of the notion (Carter, 2000; Dagger, 2000).14  
 
Finally, Pettit (2012) states that non-domination requires an individualized, unconditioned, 
and efficacious form of popular control (Pettit, 2012:168). I will explain this condition in 
more detail when I examine the concept of control that I include in my view, and how it 
differs from Pettit’s version. For now, it is important to mention that this last consideration 
regarding control shows that non-domination acknowledges the importance of addressing 
our power relations within the political sphere. He understands that part of enjoying an equal 
standing is to “enjoy an equally accessible form of suitably unconditioned and efficacious 
                                                          
13 Following other authors example, I use the masculine form to refer to cases of exercise of 
domination, to point out the usual status of our current relations.    
14 I will address neither of these critiques, since non-domination does not occupy this self-sufficient role 
in my proposal, nor do I engage further with the debate about differences between his view and other 
liberal approaches to freedom.   
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influence” (Pettit, 2012:303). This condition for non-domination seems to address the issue 
of having an appropriate capacity to affect outcomes to effectively enjoy an equal standing.   
 
Non-domination, as described by Pettit, seems suited to capture the kind of political relations 
we should experience to develop and enjoy our autonomy. It points out the different ways in 
which others can exercise a dominating role even if not intentionally. Thus, thinking of non-
domination as a condition for autonomy serves to establish structures and relations capable 
of avoiding those different kinds of dominating scenarios. I will continue by emphasising 
what I take to be the connection between non-domination and relational autonomy, namely, 
their capacity to address oppressive contexts beyond concerns for basic rights and liberties. 
This connection is important because it provides additional evidence to support non-
domination’s suitability to be a political condition for my relational proposal.    
   
2. Power imbalances and domination 
 
Distinguishing different kinds of dominating relations as Pettit does, allows for a more 
nuanced analysis of circumstances that impose imbalances of power and subjection to 
another person’s will. By doing so, non-domination becomes an ideal that can address very 
common, but also subtler examples of oppression. In this section, I want to put forward the 
idea that additionally, non-domination has two relevant features that easily connect the 
concept to a relational approach to autonomy like Catriona Mackenzie’s. The latter supports 
its place as a condition for establishing relations of mutual recognition. The first 
characteristic is that it focuses on relations, i.e., it signals the way in which we can develop 
non-dominating relations by avoiding subjection to another person’s will. At the same time, 
it acknowledges the risks of political structures becoming dominating.  These two 
characteristics justify thinking of non-domination as a constitutive part of our political 
relations, because through it, Pettit intends to rethink our role and standing within the 
political sphere, which accommodates the key relational concern regarding gender and other 
minority-related oppression.    
 
Non-domination’s relational approach is communicated by Pettit’s “eyeball test” (Pettit, 
2012:84). The eyeball test, to be able to look someone in the eye as an equal, means that 
every person should be independent of someone’s good opinion or favour to decide the 
manner in which to live her life (Pettit: 2012:82). Accordingly, it is not just a matter of 
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securing basic rights or guaranteeing some level of welfare. Non-domination refers to a 
status of freedom that allows for the absence of deference or any similar strategy to relate to 
others. “(…) Satisfying the test requires full freedom as non-domination and not just the 
absence of poverty. Escaping the shame of poverty is only a first step towards the enjoyment 
of interpersonal status and achievement of freedom” (Pettit, 2012:87). Although Pettit does 
not use the word relational, his concern about dominating relations, in terms of interpersonal 
status, supports the inference that his view is indeed relational.  
 
Furthermore, this relational character of non-domination shows its connection to concerns 
raised by relational accounts of autonomy, regarding the dominated agent’s self-evaluative 
attitudes, and their related tendency to adjust their behaviour and preferences. As mentioned, 
when characterising invigilation, Pettit (2012) states that this kind of domination changes 
our choices’ cognitive and objective character due to the dependency on the dominating 
agent’s goodwill.   
 
 
(…) Relations of domination shape the psychology of members of dominant 
groups so that they are extremely likely to become haughty and arrogant. A 
particularly pernicious consequence of this state of affairs is that haughty and 
arrogant behaviour is most likely to be exhibited in interactions with members of 
subordinated groups, since they are more likely to be judged as intellectually 
inferior and are less likely to have the power required to put a stop to the 
inappropriate behaviour. Since such behaviour is often intimidating and 
humiliating, when it is encountered on a daily basis it is likely to affect 
profoundly the psychology of those who are on its receiving end. More 
specifically, it makes it more likely that they will develop the twin intellectual 
vices of intellectual timidity (as a result of intimidation) and servility (as a result 
of humiliation) (Tanesini, 2016: 87).    
 
 
If we apply this analysis to the relations we hold in the political sphere, the concern that 
domination leads to deference or servility from the dominated agent, seems very 
straightforwardly related to the feminist view on the impact that oppressive relations have 
over a person’s self-perception.  
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The risk of political structures themselves becoming dominating is the second aspect of 
Pettit’s non-domination that connects it to relational accounts of autonomy. By addressing 
cases of indirect or even involuntary domination, the notion reflects the way in which, even 
an allegedly democratic and egalitarian context, can be susceptible to domination. Think of 
the case of a student’s representative within a university structure. The university designs a 
council constituted by representatives of the different members of the university. The 
university assures her that she has the same standing than the staff’s representative, for 
example, for every case of internal decision-making or dispute. Formally, she has a seat in 
the council, and the university’s constitution states she should be treated equally to every 
other member, by giving her the right to a vote that has the same weight than the one given 
to every representative. Nonetheless, in practice, the staff representative has access to and 
participates in informal discussions over lunch and coffee breaks involving the rest of the 
council, where most of the decision-making actually takes place, and to which the student 
representative has no access. Even if there are formal faculties in place, in order to prevent 
domination, it seems clear that each actor’s capacity to exercise influence does not solely 
depend on their formally secured equal standing.     
 
Imagine if we extrapolate this case to lobbying before a law is passed, where the staff’s 
representative is now a citizen that owns a company affected by the future legislation, and 
the student’s representative corresponds to another citizen who has no particular sort of 
economic or social power. The company owner can negotiate the terms of the future law 
with the rest of decision-makers by offering monetary incentives, whilst the common citizen 
cannot even take part in those private discussions. Moreover, if the common citizen happens 
to belong to a perceived minority, she stands at an even higher disadvantage; because her 
views and interests have even less visibility and related chance to be included in legislation15. 
As Pettit puts it:  
 
 
It is usually because of the ways a society is organized, culturally, economically 
or legally, that some people have such power in relation to others that they 
                                                          
15 Schmidt; A (2018) develops an interesting view where he claims that domination can happen even 
when there is an equal distribution of power. Using the example of gun control, he refers to what he calls 
cases of mutual domination. However, he does not seem able to address the relevance of our initial 
unequal standing, especially in the case of minorities.  
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dominate them directly, and dominate them without necessarily wishing for 
domination or even approving of it (…) but they can indirectly facilitate the 
worst forms of invasion and domination in a society. (Pettit, 2012:63).        
 
 
It could be argued that, for example, establishing clearer and more stringent regulations on 
lobby and campaign funding, in this case, can address or prevent such power imbalances and 
the related abuse of power. However, as with the first case, the informal instances or social 
encounters that will normally exclude common citizens, or the student representative, reveal 
a deeper problem. These examples show how equal rights do not necessarily amount to equal 
treatment in practice. The language of non-domination expresses precisely how power 
imbalances are extremely susceptible to become dominating. If we believe that no person 
should have uncontrolled interference over our lives, it is clear that our relations require 
more than a formal acknowledgement of our equal standing. Hence, equal rights and liberties 
constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-dominating relations, because the 
problem with subtler cases like these, seems to be connected to the differences in the exercise 
of some kind of influence that actors have. Therefore, non-dominating relations need clear 
boundaries and regulations, but also, attributions to have some impact over outcomes. This 
necessity for attributions explains why Pettit includes control, understood as an exercise of 
influence, as a condition for non-domination.  
 
Given that these two features of non-domination—a focus on relations, and 
acknowledgement of the potential dominating character of institutions— prove the 
suitability of non-domination to support a relational approach, it seems appropriate to move 
on to examine the active aspect implied by the notion. A central part of the second feature’s 
weigh depends on making sense of the attributions that non-domination entails each person 
to have. If control is required for non-domination, that it involves a positive character is a 
reasonable assumption. Nonetheless, Pettit separates his ideal from the need for political 
participation and from a possible connection to personal autonomy. In the next section, I will 
engage with these two objections, i.e., a disconnection to autonomy, and a restricted view of 
political participation, in order to show that the ideal can constitute a political condition for 
personal autonomy.      
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3. The positive aspect: autonomy and political participation 
 
Richard Dagger (2000) objects to Pettit’s approach to non-domination as being disconnected 
from autonomy and provides three arguments to support his view. I will focus on two of 
them to stress, as Dagger does, that non-domination implies a concern for our personal 
autonomy. Likewise, Nadia Urbinati (2011, 2012) objects to Pettit’s attempt to separate non-
domination from the importance of political participation.  I present their critiques and join 
their conclusions regarding non-domination’s inherent connection to autonomy, and political 
participation’s centrality to achieve non-domination. My intention is to take Pettit’s non-
domination to imply the value of both self-governance and political participation. With this 
in mind, I conclude that if paired with a more demanding view of control, non-domination 
expresses the necessary active aspect of Relations of Mutual Recognition, and thus 
constitutes one of the key political conditions for our personal autonomy.     
 
Dagger (2000) claims the republican tradition, in which Pettit wants to situate his project, is 
committed to the value of autonomy. Being independent from other people’s arbitrary power 
over us is rooted on the value we grant to our self-government. Therefore, his first objection 
to Pettit’s non-domination is that he is wrong to label non-domination as merely expressing 
a form of freedom, disconnected from the value of autonomy.  
 
 
As the traditional republican opposition of dependence to independence 
indicates, the desire to be free from domination is rooted in the desire to be in 
some sense self-governing. That does not mean that one can or should even 
want to be the complete master of his or her domain, for we must depend upon 
the impersonal force of the rule of law to secure our independence from the 
arbitrary power of others. But it does mean that we can, as interdependent 
citizens, stand on an equal footing with others in making the laws that secure 
us from arbitrary power, and in that sense we can be self-governing. We want 
to be free from domination, then, so that we can enjoy autonomy (Dagger, 
2000:52). 
 
 
His approach to the justification of non-domination is surely implied in Pettit’s own 
understanding of the ideal of freedom as non-domination. Our desire to be free from 
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domination clearly comes from our previous acknowledgement of the authority we have over 
our lives; in other words, to the right we must be the authors of our lives. Self-government 
here amounts to exercising that authoritative role and seems like the only plausible base for 
our concern for non-domination.  
 
The second reason Dagger offers to support the connection between non-domination and 
autonomy is that, although taxation and legal coercion in general take away the agent’s 
freedom, they do not harm our autonomy. By basing non-domination in a concern for 
autonomy, one can argue that if they issue in some way from citizens as self-governing 
agents, those coercive means do not take away our autonomy (Dagger, 2000:52). The latter 
provides a more straightforward way of arguing, as Pettit does, that laws are not necessarily 
dominating. Pettit’s view certainly suggests that the reason why some interferences do not 
constitute uncontrolled interference is that I have the right to grant the capacity to interfere 
to a third party (if it happens under my own terms). I hold authoritative agency over my 
choices, or rather; I am the legitimate source of the authority over decisions affecting my 
life. Hence, it implies some kind of right to be self-governing, even if he does not establish 
this connection to his ideal of non-domination.  
 
Pettit’s (2000) response to Dagger (2000) states that he would be happy to describe as 
“autonomy”, his conception of an ideal of freedom that is not merely political. However, he 
argues that his concept is more feasible to represent the state’s goal. “(…) it may be 
dangerous to charge the state with advancing any richer ideal, in particular any ideal that 
touches people’s souls in the manner of an ideal of personal self-rule” (Pettit, 2000: 57). 
Elsewhere, Pettit (2010) similarly argues that non-domination is not connected to the idea 
of self-mastery. He appeals to an ideal of self-rule that alludes to an internal process, separate 
from our desire to enjoy non-domination. 
 
 
Freedom as personal autonomy may be a very attractive value (…) Freedom as 
personal self-mastery, however, is a richer ideal than that of freedom as non-
domination; there can certainly be non-domination without personal self-
mastery, but there can hardly be any meaningful form of self-mastery without 
non-domination. Moreover, freedom as personal self-mastery ought to be 
facilitated, if not actively promoted, under a state that assures freedom as non-
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domination; it is bound to be easier for people to achieve autonomy once they 
are assured of not being dominated by others (…) People can be trusted to look 
after their own autonomy, given that they live under a dispensation where they 
are protected from domination by others (Pettit, 2010:81-82).  
 
 
Since he does not provide any further details to explain how a person can enjoy “non-
domination without personal self-mastery”, we can only infer that he characterises personal 
autonomy as some kind of internal self-government. His comments regarding personal 
autonomy indicate that his understanding of the concept does not grant an important role to 
the relations we hold. Thus, although he is concerned with relations of domination, his 
characterisation of autonomy is not relational. That we can “look after” our own autonomy 
is because he deems it mostly as an individual concern or process, and if there can be non-
domination without self-mastery, is because the latter depends on the single subject’s 
capacity to “govern her inner self”, which varies in accordance to the personal features of 
every agent.  
 
Dagger’s objections are on point to highlight that Pettit’s proposal would benefit from 
acknowledging its connection to personal autonomy, which given the relational character of 
his view, would have to be equally relational. Thinking of non-domination as a political 
condition for personal autonomy expresses this connection clearly, by understanding both 
notions as dependant on each other.   
 
Nadia Urbinati (2011), on the other hand, develops a strong objection towards freedom as 
non-domination. She argues that Pettit’s project did not only intend to dispute the negative 
conception of freedom, but the ideal of “liberty as active participation or political autonomy” 
(Urbinati, 2011:165). Urbinati (2012) claims that freedom as non-domination is equally 
suspicious of the “democratic principle of taking part in imperium” (Urbinati, 2012:608) 
than of freedom as non-interference. She believes that neo-republicanism, in its Roman 
version, historically rests in their opposition to democracy and disbelief in equal political 
power. According to her, freedom cannot be secure only by legal constraints which people 
are not even involved in creating but requires their participation. Thus, liberty should involve 
a direct connection to popular control, instead of being presented as a means to fostering it.  
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Equality in respect to political power is an essential condition for the enjoyment 
of liberty: this principle is democracy’s contribution to the theory of political 
liberty, the meaning of isonomia (…) If anything, it can be regarded as a 
precondition for the pursuit of an autonomous moral life (Urbinati, 2012:608).   
 
 
Not only does she claim that republicans do not commit to political participation, but that 
the ideal of non-domination developed by Pettit actually requires reshaping our power 
relations, and that this cannot happen without the citizen’s active involvement. “Without an 
equal relationship of power among citizens (the principles of reciprocity and autonomy) (…) 
legal liberty and due process of law are not secure acquisitions” (Urbinati, 2012:619). Her 
critique, contrary to Dagger (2000), begins by aiming at the republican tradition more 
broadly. She claims that the republican credentials do not help Pettit’s proposal to include 
the value of political participation—and of democracy—because it was never truly part of 
their historical background worries. Still, she acknowledges that non-domination indeed 
seeks to address the power imbalances, and consequent need for re-shaping our power 
relations.  Thus, non-domination is capable of expressing the importance of establishing 
appropriate conditions that guarantee and secure our equal standing but requires political 
participation to achieve that goal. As she argues, without proper involvement of citizens, we 
are left with laws and constraints that can be completely disconnected from them and their 
interests, which is insufficient to secure freedom, and even more so, to secure our autonomy.     
 
To conclude, Dagger’s (2000) and Urbinati’s objection support the need for an active aspect 
to non-domination. Moreover, they can show that non-domination, both needs and indeed 
implies, the value of personal autonomy and the importance of political participation to 
achieve its aim. The reason why we want not to be dominated rests on our interest in leading 
a self-governing life and preventing dominating relations involves a kind of control that 
cannot merely amount to legal constraints that do not seriously include the affected citizens 
on their development. Non-domination comprises the considerations relevant to relations of 
mutual recognition, and those relations require control. Moreover, non-domination cannot 
be analysed without appealing to the positive aspect represented by control. The following 
section will address the understanding of control that follows from valuing non-domination 
in our relations.    
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III. Control 
 
If successful, the previous analysis of non-domination established that our relations of 
mutual recognition should be non-dominating, because only by securing our equal standing 
in the political sphere can we develop autonomy enhancing political relations. However, the 
analysis also led us to affirm the relevant active character of non-domination, which requires 
some level of control over decision-making processes within the political sphere. The 
problem is that although, as mentioned, Pettit (2012) develops his own approach to control 
as a condition for non-domination, his view fails to convey the active character of non-
domination. Pettit allows for indirect influence over outcomes, and mere dispositions to 
interfere are capable of satisfying the “control condition”. This part of the chapter will 
address Pettit’s view of control and my approach to overcome the shortcomings I identify in 
his proposal.  
 
Naturally, approaches to control are vast and varied, which prevents me from examining the 
relevant debates on the notion here. Instead, I will base my own definition of control in an 
approach that I deem able to overcome the problems with Pettit’s understanding of control. 
I will not just question the capacity of Pettit’s definition to secure non-domination but argue 
that even though its central components are appropriate, we require a different approach to 
popular control to guarantee political relations that secure our personal autonomy. 
Accordingly, I begin by describing and analysing Pettit’s definitions of control, influence, 
and popular control. I present my objections to Pettit’s version of control and introduce my 
definition.  
 
When examining non-domination as an appropriate way of establishing autonomy-
enhancing political relations, it became clear that power imbalances are one of the main 
problems to tackle to prevent dominating relations. This suggests that the version of control 
that non-domination should be paired with, must include the concept of political agency. My 
definition of control intends to do so.  
 
1. Control and influence in Pettit  
 
According to Pettit (2012), to control is to exercise influence over the process leading to a 
result, to impose a direction in accordance to a previously designed pattern (Pettit, 2012:153 
- 154).  In addition, he states that control can be either intentional or non-intentional. The 
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first kind amounts to producing a desired outcome by exercising influence. Thus, changes in 
the agent’s beliefs and desires will also change the resulting actions and effects in response. 
He describes this kind of control as the paradigm case.  
Nonetheless, he argues there can also be “purely mechanical nonintentional mechanisms” 
(Pettit, 2012:155) that we would be happy to call control, such as a cooling-heating system 
or a homeostatic system. These have an influence over a process that makes a designed 
difference and imposes an identifiable direction.  
 
Moreover, Pettit (2012) holds that “even the control exercised by intentional agents may be 
non-intentional” (Pettit, 2012:155). To explain this idea further, he provides an example he 
attributes to Amartya Sen16 in which a comatose patient’s wishes control the treatment she 
receives, thanks to her family or friends. If her wishes had been other, her treatment would 
have also been different. Hence, Pettit argues that even though the patient did nothing 
intentionally to communicate those desires or to implement them, they are effective via other 
people’s effort.  
 
In order to explain what he refers to by influence, Pettit (2012) makes a distinction between 
active, virtual, or reserve influence. The former requires “a positive input on the part of the 
controller” (Pettit, 2012:156). He compares this kind of influence to actively pulling on a 
horse’s rein to steer it in a desired direction. Virtual influence, on the other hand, means that 
the agent only intervenes when she believes it is necessary to maintain the direction of the 
outcome in accordance with her intention. In this case, the rider of the horse does not 
intervene because the horse is going in her desired direction but is willing to do so in case 
the situation changes. Lastly, reserve influence, amounts to accepting the current direction 
of matters, and only holding the disposition to interfere, in case our desires change. 
Following the same example, the idea is that I as an agent give the horse free rein “given 
that I am happy for it to go wherever it wishes” (Pettit, 2012:156).   
 
It is puzzling that Pettit (2012) does not explicitly provide a definition of influence. Instead, 
he describes these three possible forms of influence, in order to argue that not only active 
influence can count as the kind exercised in control. However, we can infer what the concept 
amounts to from two allusions. First, Pettit explains that influence is an obvious component 
of control, since we could not claim controlling a result if we have “no capacity to make an 
                                                          
16 Sen, A (1983) “Liberty and Social Choice”. Journal of Philosophy 80:18-20 
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input” (Pettit, 2012:154). On a similar note, he states that “Active, virtual and reserve forms 
of influence all serve to put a factor in place that raises the probability of a certain result” 
(Pettit, 2012:156). Thus, according to Pettit, influence appears to be the capacity to make the 
input that will impose a direction over the process leading to a result.    
 
Lastly, popular control corresponds to an individualized and unconditioned system of 
directed influence that citizens can exercise over the government to avoid domination (Pettit, 
2012:167). His definition of popular control includes three main requirements: that it is 
individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious. An individualized system is one where 
people have equal access to popular influence, hence, it will be individualized “insofar as it 
gives a comparable role to each of the individuals involved in the exercise of control” (Pettit, 
2012:168). He holds that the latter means to have an equal share both in exercising influence 
and in determining the direction of outcomes. Nevertheless, having an equal share should 
not amount to a requirement to participate equally in the system, instead, it should mean 
“equal access to the system of popular influence: an opportunity for participation in that 
system that is available with equal ease to each citizen” (Pettit, 2012:169).  
 
The second requirement intends to stress the necessary correspondence between the 
controlling agent’s inputs and the controlled agent’s outputs. There should be a correlation 
between the exercised influence of the controller and the variations on the controlled agent’s 
behaviour. He claims, “One agent will count as controlling another only insofar as the 
influence exercised leads to the required result independently of the will of the controlled 
agent, or indeed of any third party” (Pettit, 2012:170-171).  
 
All these definitions contribute to characterise Pettit’s version of control and its connection 
to his view of non-domination. I will develop three objections to his approach to control, so 
that I can show how my version of control, by adding political agency, can overcome the 
problems I identify in his definition. 
 
2. A critical analysis of Pettit’s control 
 
Before introducing my approach to control, I will present my analysis of Pettit’s idea of 
control. In doing so, the capacity of my version of control to overcome these shortcomings 
will easily become apparent. At the same time, taking Pettit’s perspective as a starting point 
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will allow me to situate my concern for control within a definition that focuses on political 
control, rather than control over our beliefs17, or other very relevant considerations, which 
can prevent misconceptions of the kind of conception of control I want to establish for our 
autonomy.      
 
2.1. The good-will objection  
 
My first objection to Pettit’s (2012) idea of control is connected to his willingness to 
characterise as an example of control a case that strongly relies on a third party for its 
achievement. I call this the good-will objection.  
 
The case of the comatose patient counts as control because it indeed shows every necessary 
element to identify it as control. It constitutes an example of exercising influence over a 
process, (in this case selecting an appropriate treatment), to impose a direction (the 
implementation of a specific medical treatment), in accordance with a previously designed 
pattern, (the patient’s wishes). Nonetheless, what would have happened if the family or 
friends of the patient had decided to ignore, or had no clear idea of her wishes? The exercise 
of influence to impose the desired direction in this case, not only depends on other people’s 
effort, but relies on another agent’s goodwill to succeed.  
 
Having to rely on another agent’s goodwill goes precisely against what Pettit seeks to 
accomplish by introducing control as a requirement for non-dominating relations. Holding 
control for Pettit should lead to avoiding the subjection to another party’s will, in order to 
achieve a desired outcome. It is not problematic that we consider situations of dependency 
on other agents as control, because there are many agents who depend on others on a daily 
basis,18 what makes this case problematic is how susceptible the agent is to domination. 
Pettit (2012) defines domination as exposure to uncontrolled interferences, therefore, it is 
contradictory that the control which prevents this domination can be defined as non-
intentional in the sense expressed by the comatose patient example, namely, as relying on a 
third party’s good will. The fact that such indirect cases as the comatose patient can count 
                                                          
17 Levy (2011) develops a compelling approach to control in order to address his worry regarding 
individual responsibility over our actions. He examines how, to count as responsible for the actions that 
are partially caused by our beliefs, the agent should have some level of control over them.   
18 Relational theories of autonomy intend to address this issue. Since all of us hold relations of 
dependency of some kind, or at some point in our lives, being autonomous should not amount to an 
individualistic ideal that does not take into account how we rely on others in many domains. 
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as expressions of control, suggests that the concept can accommodate circumstances we 
would probably not want to call control and is therefore in this respect too inclusive.   
 
2.2. The agency objection  
 
Pettit’s (2012) approach to non-intentional control also shows there seems to be something 
lacking in his general definition of control. The two key elements of his definition of control 
are influence and direction, however, non-intentional control implies there can be control 
without agential involvement, in other words, without the agent’s active contribution to the 
result. The latter leads to a definition of control that does not include agency as a 
requirement, because directing an outcome without intending for this to happen does not 
express any particular capacity to impose such change. This is what I refer to as the agency 
objection. Surely, there are many definitions of power, and not all of them refer to agential 
power as the central or proper kind.19 However, exercising agency does not only describe a 
capacity or an ability to impose some change but include a willingness behind it (Gilabert, 
2018).    
 
It is important to clarify that I do not want to argue control has to be exercised directly by 
the agent. Rather, since the comatose patient does nothing to communicate or implement her 
wishes, her influence over the outcome can be merely lucky if it is not connected to some 
kind of agency exercise. Qualifying a lack of control as an experience of being subject to 
luck has been greatly discussed (See for example Lackey, 2008 and Coffman, 2009) and, as 
expected, there is no agreed position regarding this relation. Nonetheless, the importance of 
considering a level of intentionality in the agent’s capacity to impose changes on an outcome 
hails from the connection between control and non-domination. Pettit’s control is supposed 
to be securing non-dominating relations, but at the same time, accepts lacking the intention 
to make changes on results affecting our lives; not because he does not intend to impose 
burdensome conditions of self-knowledge on the agent, but because the mere change of 
circumstance appears sufficient. This lack of intention could end up qualifying changes on 
the direction of outcomes that were merely lucky, as an expression of agent’s equal standing, 
which does nothing to address her vulnerability or capacity to be non-dominated.  
 
                                                          
19 Fricker (2007) makes the distinction between agential and structural power without implying any 
primacy of one over the other when referring to social power.  
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Furthermore, controlling without intention also means that there is no need to grant 
appropriate means to exercise power as influence, or in other relevant sense, to the agents in 
the political sphere. Non-domination is directed at securing our relations and the vices that 
come from power imbalances but including non-intentional control and indirect influence as 
cases of control, takes away the focus from addressing those power imbalances by making 
sure that each agent has an equal share in political power as his own view holds.   
 
2.3. The visibility objection 
 
Finally, Pettit’s negative approach seems appropriate to secure the formal aspect of equal 
treatment required by relations of recognition. Nonetheless, he is sceptical of political 
participation, particularly in electoral terms, as a means for exercising influence by common 
citizens. His distrust of majorities is reasonable but dilutes his intention to uphold a system 
of influence for citizens because it even leads him to suggest that some issues should not 
involve popular deliberation. It is not particularly contentious to affirm that some central 
matters should not be subject to the popular vote and be secured by constitutional means 
instead. However, his focus on contestation seems insufficient and inadequate to set a 
direction over the course of decision-making processes.  
 
 
Control of the people over the state can be grounded in a disposition of people 
to rise up in the face of a government abuse of legitimacy and a disposition of 
government to back down in response to the fact or prospect of such opposition 
(…) To the extent that the possibility of popular, successful resistance is on the 
cards- to the extent even that it is on the cards as a matter of common belief- 
the influence of the people over government can be established on a robust basis 
and can constitute a real form of power (Pettit, 2012:173).   
 
 
The problem with his idea of control lies precisely in his definition of influence. The mere 
disposition of the people to contest, and of the state to prevent the need for that contestation, 
constitute a very weak form of control to be characterised as a system of directed, 
unconditioned and efficacious influence. Surely, a system that relies on the state’s 
disposition to back down cannot be unconditioned, and similarly depending on the people’s 
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disposition to contest, and even just the possibility of resistance, does not express an 
efficacious sort of influence.  
 
It is unclear how an agent’s disposition to interfere can increase the probability of a result 
without any manifestation that can prove this disposition. Additionally, this definition would 
need to include some way of communicating that disposition for it to hold any effect on third 
parties involved, which should be central to secure non-domination. According to Pettit 
(2012), the exercise of influence is constitutive of control, and control provides the agent 
with the capacity to prevent domination. Thus, defining influence as the manifestation of a 
disposition, or the capacity to make an input expressed as a disposition, would require some 
means of communicating it to others to fulfil the role of granting the equal standing non-
domination needs.  
 
These concerns are pressing for the kind of political relations I want control to uphold. In 
my view, control, and its related exercise of influence, should not only guarantee relations 
of mutual respect for each person’s authority over their lives, but also translate that authority 
into effective impact over outcomes. The latter seems unlikely to happen through a mere 
disposition that need not be manifest or communicated to others. It should be made visible.  
 
In summary, Pettit’s definition of control and influence shows some problematic features, 
which are connected to a certain reliance on a third party to realise the active component that 
non-domination suggests, and that is crucial to my view. Non-intentional control seems 
problematic because it exposes the agent to rely on the third party’s goodwill to carry out 
her wishes. Virtual and reserve influence in turn, are not active in a different way, namely, 
by reducing the agent’s exercise of influence to a mere disposition to interfere. By separating 
our negative and positive influence over outcomes, my view of control seeks to address these 
problems.  
 
3. The active control view  
 
Having control expresses the acknowledgement of our equal standing as autonomous agents, 
but more importantly, it provides us with effective capacities to influence those decisions 
affecting our lives. Pettit’s (2012) approach to control as a condition for non-domination 
fails to convey the active character of non-domination, because indirect influence over 
 
 
68 
 
outcomes, and mere dispositions to interfere can satisfy the “control condition”. In other 
words, the analysis of Pettit’s definition of control showed that if it does not include a strong 
positive aspect, we are forced to rely on third parties, and our input is reduced to a passive 
expression of intention. My view of control addresses this problem.  
 
Identifying non-domination as an appropriate way of establishing political relations of 
recognition showed that power imbalances are one of the main problems to tackle. The latter 
necessarily suggests that control has to include a positive aspect. I will briefly outline, in 
what follows, my view of an active kind of control. I base my view on an account of control 
that explicitly includes the positive aspect, and I show that my approach is not vulnerable to 
any of the three objections I posed to Pettit’s definition.   
Most mainstream views in the philosophy of control accept that it has both a negative and a 
positive dimension. For instance, according to Nicholas Rescher (1969) control is 
the capacity to produce the occurrence of an event—what Rescher calls positive control—
and the capacity to prevent it—what he calls negative control (Rescher, 1969: 329). 
Likewise, in response to views that define luck as lack of control, particularly to Jennifer 
Lackey’s (2008), Coffman (2009) develops what he calls a Clear Lack of Control 
Requirement. “Clear LCR: E is lucky for S only if S isn’t both free to do something that 
would help produce E and free to do something that would help prevent E” (Coffman, 
2009:500). Although he focuses on luck, his Clear LCR also offers the chance to think of 
control as composed by both a negative and a positive aspect.  
Rescher’s definition of control is especially appropriate for thinking about political control. 
What we are looking for is a definition that helps us determine the kind of standing and 
attributions we should experience in our political relations. By considering that a definition 
of political control should include the capacity to both bring about and to prevent the 
occurrence of an event, we can take Pettit’s definition of control—both in general and of 
popular control in particular—but add an active character to it. Accordingly, my definition 
of active control amounts to enjoying political influence. This notion follows from Pettit’s 
definition in the sense of having influence over events. However, it places equal emphasis 
on the negative and the positive aspect of such influence. In other words, I understand active 
control as being determined by our capacity to both provoke and prevent events. Therefore, 
the main requirement for having active control is holding political power. I will present my 
definition of political power in detail in the following chapter, but for now, think of political 
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power as the kind of political influence that would allow for that negative and positive aspect 
of active control, i.e., preventing and provoking.  
 
More needs to be said to describe the characteristics of our self-rule within political relations. 
I call these the agency condition, and the epistemic condition.   
 
The capacity to influence an event, either to produce or to prevent its occurrence, implies 
agency to not qualify the lucky occurrence of our desired outcome as an exercise of control. 
Consequently, being in control cannot solely amount to having the capacity to influence an 
outcome; it requires the exercise of that capacity. This is where political participation comes 
in. The clearest expression of our negative and positive capacity over events has to do with 
the role that we play within the political sphere.20 
 
Two clarifications are important here. First, the requirement to exercise the capacity, does 
not imply that we only count as having control when we achieve our desired outcome. Since 
our political relations include other agents with equal rights and standing, each person’s 
exercise of their control will influence the outcomes in different ways. What our political 
control requires are the conditions for us to exercise the capacity to produce and prevent 
events. Therefore, we need substantive attributions over decision-making. The exercise of 
our capacity will, hence, require compromises to accommodate to our equal right as 
autonomous agents. Inclusive and well-established deliberation processes are the best way 
to address the need for compromises without suffocating the different “voices” or 
perspectives.  
 
The second clarification refers to agency. It would seem that, since I hold that agency is 
necessary for control, I am arguing for direct involvement as the only way to have political 
control. Nevertheless, for example, there is still agency when we appoint a representative for 
decision-making purposes. For political participation to accommodate the definition of 
control I have provided, it clearly needs something more than granting most decision-making 
attributions to representatives, which is what we experience in our current democracies. 
However, it is important to note that political control can also involve representatives, and 
does not imply forcing constant deliberation upon agents, which would be very costly and 
                                                          
20 I will develop my view of political participation in detail in the next chapter.          
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unfeasible at a large scale. I will say more about this when I focus on my approach to political 
participation in Chapter 3.  
  
The epistemic condition, on the other hand, addresses the vulnerability of agents to 
domination. As the analysis of non-domination showed both at an individual and collective 
level we are exposed to uncontrolled interferences by others. This means that, if we are to 
have political control, our decisions need to be neither manipulated, tricked, or coerced by 
others.  Most of this is already included in the requirements for non-dominating relations but 
is also actually related to what Catriona Mackenzie described as authenticity conditions. Our 
capacity to affect events must come from desires and beliefs that are truly our own, which 
means they cannot be forced or designed by others.     
 
3.1. Active control: visible, agential, and power centred  
 
I presented three objections to Philip Pettit’s definition of control, namely, the good-will 
objection, the agency objection, and the visibility objection. I will briefly show how my 
approach to control does not fall prey to any of them.    
 
The objection I described as the good-will objection pointed out that Pettit’s approach 
subjects the exercise of influence that control entails to another agent’s good will. In order 
to stress this idea, I looked into his use of the example of the comatose patient, whose 
exercise of influence relied on her family and friend’s willingness to carry out her desires. 
The active control view involves a positive aspect; consequently, it implies an effective 
exercise of influence. This amounts to providing genuine de facto power in the form of 
decision-making capacities, so that we can actually produce the occurrence of events. Since 
it includes proper means to instantiate our desired direction, my approach does not rely on a 
third party’s goodwill.    
 
Pettit (2012) holds there can be non-intentional control, which implies there can be control 
without the agent’s active contribution to the result. I called my objection to this idea ‘the 
agency objection’. Removing intentionality impoverishes the idea of exercising influence 
and amounts to claim there can be control where there is no agential power to impose a 
change. My view has at its centre the notion of active involvement of agents. The idea is to 
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secure our standing and related attributes in order to exercise a role that can guarantee our 
influence.  
 
My final objection to Pettit’s view on control was the visibility objection. Pettit argues that 
what is required for the influence of the people over government to constitute real power is 
the mere possibility of successful resistance. However, it is unclear how an agent’s 
disposition to interfere, and the government’s disposition to back down, can suffice to grant 
the former control over the latter. This is especially concerning since their dispositions do 
not seem to involve any expression or visible exchange to communicate them in some way 
to one another. Active control instead, makes visible the equal standing of the agents by 
reinforcing the need for appropriate means to express our equal share in political power. The 
exercise of influence over outcomes is meant to be effective; visible.      
     
To conclude, a definition inspired by this understanding, allows for a stronger version of 
control than the one offered by Pettit (2012). Having control, therefore, does involve 
influencing an outcome in some way but such influence is to include the capacity to produce 
an event and to prevent an event. Imposing a pre-determined direction on the outcome is an 
adequate way of describing the kind of control required by non-domination. Nevertheless, if 
it does not include a positive aspect, or in other words a chance for substantive involvement 
in political decision-making, it leads to affirm mere means of contestability as sufficient to 
secure those non-dominating relations.  
 
Additionally, control is understood here as a capacity and the central requirement to exercise 
this capacity is to hold political power, in other words, the right sort of influence that comes 
with related faculties that allow imposing negative and positive changes. Producing an event 
implies having the power to play an active role, which is precisely what Pettit’s version 
neglects.    
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
The goal of this chapter was to think about the political conditions for autonomy. Having 
already established that what takes place within the political sphere are indeed political 
relations, I set out to identify the political conditions for those relations to be autonomy-
enhancing, or what I call Relations of Mutual Recognition. I argued that the two main 
conditions to establish that sort of relations—which is the same as saying the political 
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conditions for autonomy—are non-domination and control. Both concepts are based on 
Philip Pettit’s definitions. Thus, I began by analysing each of these concepts. In light of other 
authors and my own critiques, I reformulated both non-domination and control.  
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Chapter 3: Relations of mutual recognition 
 
I. Political power, recognition, and political participation 
 
I have argued that there is a political aspect to personal autonomy. Our relations in the 
political sphere are central to personal autonomy, in the sense that they partly constitute the 
autonomous life. Recall, however, that throughout this research, I have held that even a 
causal approach should be moved by my argument regarding the political aspect of 
autonomy.  
 
There is an important assumption behind the idea that we should investigate the political 
aspect of autonomy and political relations that I have not discussed in detail. I refer to the 
‘political sphere’ instead of ‘public’ or ‘social’ intentionally. This choice relies on the notion 
that there is something particular and relevant about the political that requires a different 
approach. In this chapter, I will analyse and introduce my understanding of political power, 
recognition, and political participation. These set of concepts will help make the distinct 
character of the political, and the relations we hold in it, come to the front. Thus, the aim of 
the chapter is twofold; first to provide the final elements that complete the characterisation 
of the political relations required for our autonomy; what I have called Relations of Mutual 
Recognition (political power and recognition). Second, to set the theoretical background for 
the kind of political participation that I sketched in the last chapter, and which I will argue 
(in Chapter 4) should be implemented to achieve Relations of Mutual Recognition.     
 
I begin by arguing that the differentiating elements of the political sphere are both the kind 
of decision-making processes that take place in it, and the power that rules them: political 
power.  My view regarding the kind of decision-making that takes place in the political 
sphere constitutes a descriptive argument to characterise some features of our democracies. 
Contrastingly, the approach to political power that I will present is both descriptive and 
normative. My intention is to provide a characterisation of political power that makes sense 
of our intuitive understanding of how power works in the political sphere, whilst also 
offering a novel approach that could transform how we relate to one another with respect to 
political decision-making. Political power is presented as what we require to enjoy what I 
defined as active control in Chapter 2.    
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Thinking of recognition, on the other hand, sets the basis to understand how and why we 
need to re-think political power and our political participation if they are to promote our 
autonomy.  
 
The chapter has three main parts. Part II presents the elements that I claim distinguish the 
political sphere and thus justify developing a separate approach for our political relations. 
Part III analyses power and my preferred model to understand the notion. Part IV 
characterises my view of power, and Part V will introduce my approach to recognition and 
discuss the role of political participation for our political relations.  
 
II. Delineating the political sphere 
 
Acknowledging that there is a political aspect of autonomy amounts to recognise that there 
is something particular about our political relations that merits a distinct approach. 
Accordingly, it says something about the political sphere. I identify two differentiating 
elements of the political sphere, which I claim justify analysing our political relations and 
the conditions that would enable them as distinct from those required for our social 
interactions. The kind of political decision-making that takes place within the political sphere 
and the power that rules over these decisions (and that shapes our interactions) are what I 
recognise as the two differentiating elements of the political sphere. 
 
1. Political decision-making processes  
 
This section will briefly explain what makes political decision-making processes distinct 
enough to require a separate analysis.  
 
Democracies’ rule via decision-making over important and many times, controversial 
issues—think of assisted suicide and euthanasia, for example. Public policies and legislation 
at the same time set boundaries, rights, and the general conditions for most of our daily lives’ 
interactions—think of wearing a seat belt in cars and working only a set number of hours 
each day. This is also true regarding non-democratic regimes where decision-making might 
involve little to no collective deliberation, but still pertains to issues related to most aspects 
of people’s lives—one could say that the scope of decision-making is even wider in non-
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democratic regimes. Likewise, decisions are usually directed at most of the citizens (of 
course the focus is sometimes placed on specific groups) of a determined territory. 
Additionally, the impact of those decisions is undeniably evident, not only due to its broad 
reach, but because they tend to be enforced by law.   
 
Political decision-making processes have thus, two main features:  
 
(i) Wide-ranging scope: they concern issues from most aspects of people’s lives 
(from working conditions and education, to religion and sexual relations);  
(ii) Far-reaching impact: they usually affect most citizen’s lives and are generally 
enforced by law.  
 
It is important to clarify that there are obviously various other important kinds of collective 
decision-making instances, such as those that happen at the workplace, in education (schools, 
universities) and within a household. These are also sometimes both impactful and of a 
relatively ample range. However, the two features, when describing political decision-
making speak of consequences or effects that are not comparable to the ones produced by 
any other sort of decision-making. The scope of political decision-making processes is 
certainly wider than that of workplace decisions, for example, but more importantly, even if 
the scope of decision-making that takes place in the household might compare, the impact 
in terms of the numbers that political decision-making reaches, next to the capacity to 
enforce them by law are sufficient to separate political decision-making from other forms of 
decision-making.   
 
2. Political power  
 
Arguing that political decision-making has a wide-ranging scope and far-reaching impact 
also says something about the power that rules and shapes those processes. Power has been 
commonly defined by political theorists as the main concern of politics (Laswell, 1950; 
Morgenthau, 1968; Dahl, 1957). Political studies are many times described as focusing on 
power, which is believed to foster inquiry about other central political notions such as 
authority, freedom, and democracy. This characterisation makes speaking of political power 
seem redundant. Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous section, political decision-making 
has features that make it unique, and the same applies to the power that rules them. In other 
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words, just as political decision-making requires a distinct approach, the power that is 
expressed in them and that shapes the interactions between those involved—to a higher or 
lesser degree—in decision-making processes equally necessitates its own approach. 
Analysing the model and perspectives of power that inspire my view of political power will 
provide enough evidence to justify taking this distinct approach.   
 
Hence, before moving on to Part III where I start discussing the model of power that shapes 
my view, i.e., the master/slave model, I would like to begin by situating my approach to 
political power amongst the feminist perspectives of power that inspire it. I will not be 
developing a complete overview of the different feminist versions of power but instead, I 
will follow Amy Allen’s (2016) useful description of the most relevant groups of feminist 
approaches to power.  
 
Allen (2016) identifies three main groups of feminist approaches to power. She refers to the 
first group as liberal feminist approaches that view power as a resource (see Okin, 1989). 
These accounts criticise the unequal and unjust distribution of power between men and 
women that gender-structured societies grant. Allen claims that we can understand Okin, for 
example, as implying that feminism should aim at the redistribution of the critical social 
good that power is.  
 
Allen calls the second group views that conceptualise power as domination. This approach 
thinks of power as an illegitimate power-over relation, in other words, as a relation of 
domination. Thus, power is not considered a resource like in the first group, but a relation of 
oppression or subjection. Allen explains that domination has been differently conceptualised 
in accordance to how each approach has been influenced by analytic philosophy (see Cudd, 
2006; Haslanger, 2012), radical feminism (Mackinnon, 1987; Pateman, 1988), 
phenomenology (Beauvoir, 1974; Young 1990b, Oksala, 2016), socialist feminism (Young, 
1992; Hartsock 1983), intersectional feminism (Crenshaw 1991; Collins et al. 2002; Nash, 
2008; Garry, 2011) and post-structuralism (Foucault 1977; Allen 1999; Bordo 2003; Butler 
1990; Fraser 1989). Although these group of views use remarkably diverse theoretical tools, 
what some of them share is that they use the analogy of the master/slave relationship to 
describe their understanding of domination.  
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The final group views power as empowerment (Miller, 1992; Held, 1993; Hoagland, 1988). 
Allen holds that empowerment views also come from a variety of theoretical backgrounds 
but that what they have in common is the intention to re-conceptualise power as a capacity. 
These accounts argue that the common characterisation of power as power-over is implicitly 
masculinist. Hence, their aim is to instead understand power as the ability to transform 
oneself and others, or in other words, as power-to. Some have also referred to power-with to 
express this notion of transformative power (see Follett, 1942).  
 
My view belongs to the second group of approaches that understand power as domination, 
but there is an important difference: I do not define power as domination, but our political 
relations as relations of domination. Thus, although I also take the master/slave model as the 
analogy to develop my characterisation, I understand political power as a shared capacity, 
and in this sense, my view comes closer to the third group. I draw from empowerment views 
to propose an approach that even though takes a power-over approach as its starting point, 
can move beyond towards a power-to (or power-with) understanding.   
   
III. The master/slave model  
 
The master/slave model looks at the relation between a master and slave in order to illustrate 
the relation of oppression in the evident as well as more subtle ways in which the former 
subjects the latter. As we saw in the previous section, there are a variety of accounts that 
take this model to develop their view. My approach takes inspiration from the master/slave 
model—albeit critically—that Philip Pettit (2010-2012) elaborates for his account of 
freedom as non-domination. Sections 1 to 3 will analyse the master/slave model, which 
introduces the neo-republican character of my proposal.  
 
Robert Dahl (1957) provided an influential definition of power. According to Dahl, an agent 
has power over another agent if he can get the latter to do something she would not otherwise 
do (Dahl, 1957:202-203). Another similar classic understanding of power is developed by 
Max Weber (1978), who states that power amounts to: “the probability that one actor within 
a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 
1978:53). This idea of power is still present in recent approaches to the notion such as Rainer 
Forst’s (2015) Noumenal Power. Forst defines power as “the capacity of A to motivate B to 
think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done” (Forst, 2015:115). 
 
 
78 
 
Forst (2015) claims that power is the capacity of agent A to influence agent B’s ‘space of 
reasons’. As mentioned above, this view of power also strongly resonated with feminist 
accounts of gender oppression, and as such, featured in the logic of master/slave (see 
MacKinnon, 1987; Pateman, 1988) all through what has been called the second-wave 
feminist movement between the 1960’s, 1970’s and beyond (Oksala, 2019: 679). The master 
slave model amounts to nothing more than taking the paradigmatic case of a master and a 
slave relation to show the subordination of the slave to the master’s will.  
 
This part will discuss the master/slave model’s problems and strengths to address power 
relations by looking briefly into the neo-republican version of the model. There is of course 
an ample variety of ways to define power21 which are not going to be mentioned here. 
Likewise, I do not intend either to outline the various feminist views on the master/slave 
model debate. Instead, I would like to consider two objections to the model. In light of both 
objections, I will argue that especially to define political power; it is indeed necessary to re-
think the master/slave model. Still, I will stress that this approach does hold the potential to 
develop a definition of political power able to address both feminist critiques and to provide 
a novel view of political power as an enabling condition for Relations of Mutual 
Recognition.  
 
1. The Power-over Objection  
 
Although the master/slave model has been extremely relevant to approach power, Oksala 
(2019) identifies two main critiques. The first critique addresses the problem of theorising, 
in particular, women’s subordination without allowing for agency and the positive aspect of 
resisting. The model appears to narrowly define the subordinated as victims, which leaves 
no room to analyse the latter’s own role in terms of resistance and action. I call this the 
Power-over Objection. The second critique raises the concern that power-over tends to 
restrict the analysis to an individual level, which I call the Structural Constraints Objection. 
This is problematic because it neglects social structures and systemic constraints in their 
connection to power (see Honig, 1995; Held, 1993; Okin, 1989; Young, 1990a; Allen, 1996). 
                                                          
21 A central critique to this common approach to power, for example, was raised by poststructuralist 
views such as Michel Foucault’s (1978) ‘microphysics of power’ as well as by Steven Lukes (2005) who 
argued that conceptions of power are ultimately an outcome of political struggle. Both critiques have 
been and are still very relevant to feminist approaches to power.   
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In what follows, I analyse both objections when considered within the framework of a neo-
republican version of the master/slave model.  
 
The master/slave model has been particularly central to one tradition, namely, 
republicanism. Neo-republicans during the late 1990’s did an impressive historical and 
theoretical analysis to search for the key elements that made republicanism a separate 
tradition. One of the agreements between the different neo-republican versions was precisely 
that the master/slave model played a definitional role in republicanism, since the whole 
motivation of the republican project was to oppose and prevent domination (Pettit, 2010). I 
have argued (see Chapter 2) that the rich interpretation of non-domination developed by 
Philip Pettit (2010) provides a solid and appropriate base to think of the political conditions 
required to enjoy our personal autonomy from a feminist perspective. I identified and re-
defined those conditions as non-domination and control.   
 
One of the most important contributions of Pettit’s non-domination is his view about 
different sort of interferences, which relies on the master/slave model. Examining the figure 
of the benevolent master led Pettit (2012) to argue that a relation of domination need not be 
expressed in obvious or visible ways. The benevolent master still holds the slave to his will, 
even if he decides to not interfere with the slave’s life. The subjection of the slave to the 
master’s will, thus, does not depend on whether or not she’s interfered with and constrained 
by the master, but on the very nature of their relation. It is about the capacity of the master 
to arbitrarily interfere or his ability to exercise uncontrolled interference (Pettit, 2012:59) to 
the slave’s life if he wants to.  
 
Through this portrayal of the master/slave relation, Pettit allows us to think of power 
relations beyond the classic liberal concern for non-interference. We can extrapolate this 
master-slave model to the subtler ways in which we can be subject to the arbitrary 
interference of others. Moreover, we can use the master-slave model and Pettit’s non-
domination, to identify systematic forms of domination of women and minorities—I will 
return to this later when I address the structural constraints objection. Pettit himself describes 
the compatibility of his reading of non-domination to feminism.  
 
 
[I]f the main problem for women is that cultural, legal, and institutional pressures 
combine to put them in a position akin to that of slavery—combine to place them 
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under the thumb of men—then the ideal for women is precisely that of being 
secured against arbitrary interference: being given freedom in the sense in which 
this connotes, not just an absence of interference, but an absence of domination 
(Pettit, 2010:139).    
 
 
However, the idea of power that is implied by Pettit’s (2010) non-domination comes from 
his focus on the arbitrary imposition exercised by the dominating party over the dominated 
agent; in other words, it is a notion of power-over. Due to this focus, it is indeed vulnerable 
to the power-over objection, i.e., viewing agents as mere victims. One of the reasons why 
non-domination is vulnerable to the objection is because it corresponds to a negative—in the 
sense of representing an absence—version of freedom. In this case, it is not the absence of 
interference as it is for classic liberals, but the absence of arbitrary or uncontrolled 
interference that makes a person free from domination; where the arbitrariness is determined 
precisely by the level of control that the dominated agent has over the interference. Hence, 
there is no domination when the agent has control. The latter means that the dominated is in 
some way stripped of her agency and that her enjoyment of non-domination depends on her 
exercise of that agency in the form of control.  
 
The idea of somehow regaining control can seem to bring the positive aspect into the account 
since although the dominated is the victim, power is portrayed as mobile; it depends on the 
control exercised by the agent over interferences. If such control is not fully dependant on 
external structures being in place, or other agents granting it, then there is space for resistance 
and challenging agency by the dominated. Nonetheless, this rendering of the master/slave 
model faces an additional problem. As my detailed examination showed (Chapter 2, Part 
III), according to Pettit (2012), to control is to influence an outcome. However, Pettit 
includes in his definition both an indirect kind of influence, as well as a type of non-
intentional control. Approaching control in this manner prevents it from adding the active 
character that non-domination needs to go beyond describing the dominated as a mere 
victim. If control does not represent a way to regain at least some of the agency that was 
stripped from her by the domination, then the use of the master/slave model only plays a 
descriptive function. I will not go into further details here about other problematic 
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consequences of this passive understanding of control,22 but move on to consider the 
Structural Constraints Objection before making some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Structural Constraints Objection 
 
Let us recall that the Structural Constraints Objection states that the master/slave model 
prevents an analysis of power that takes into consideration the systemic oppression and 
structural constraints connected to power. This is due to it being an approach that deals with 
individuals, the oppressed and the oppressor. It could be argued that the master/slave model 
can be applied to collectives or institutions and in that way address structural constraints, but 
it does seem apparent that following versions of the model like Dahl’s can make it harder to 
explore the systemic constraints involved in power. The problem does not solely lie on the 
collective versus individual character of power, what seems problematic is that having power 
depends on the specific characteristics of the dominating party.  
 
That the master indeed plays that role clearly does not depend on him alone but on the social 
structures that allow this to be the case, as well as on legal and political constraints that are 
in place to perpetuate set roles and oppressive relations. Hence, this use of the model does 
not consider how power works in different domains and the differences in standing of each 
agent as contributing or limiting factors to exercise any form of power—even if it is power-
over.  
 
Although the Structural Constraints Objection makes a strong case against the master/slave 
model, Pettit’s use of it has one important feature that can overcome it. Non-domination uses 
the master/slave model in a different way because it concerns relations. My analysis of 
Pettit’s non-domination (Part II, chapter 2) showed that it is not just about an agent having 
the capacity to make another person do things she would not otherwise do; it has to do with 
the oppression that another person, institution, or any sort of agent can exercise even if they 
do not want to, and even if they do not realise, they are oppressing you. The latter means 
that it considers the different standing that structural injustices grant to different agents. We 
can easily imagine that different standing in the case of a well-intended, but unaware, man 
that establishes dominating relations with women due to his privileged social standing. Pettit 
                                                          
22 I have already analysed in detail the problems with the lack of a positive aspect in Pettit’s non-
domination, especially regarding his definition of control in the form of an objection I called the agency 
objection (the detailed analysis can be found in chapter 2) 
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does not go as far as providing this sort of example, but he refers to the interpersonal status 
of equal dignity and freedom we should enjoy to avoid domination (Pettit, 2012). Likewise, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, he even claims that domination can change the cognitive 
and objective character of our choices because of the dependency on the good will of the 
dominating agent it creates. Therefore, we could interpret his view as actually 
acknowledging the manner in which relations of domination perpetuate oppression, which 
is another way of recognising systematic forms of oppression as connected to power.    
      
There are a few important things to conclude on how Pettit’s interpretation of the 
master/slave model fairs when faced to both the Power-over Objection and the Structural 
Constraints Objection. First, it allows us to understand why power imbalances are so 
pernicious: because they strip the individual’s full agency over her life. The problem is that 
thinking of power over someone in this sense does make the approach vulnerable to two 
problems; portraying the oppressed as victims that merely experience the power that is 
exercised over them, and oversimplifying power. If power involves the holder and the 
dominated in terms of an agent having a straightforward capacity to impose his will over 
another agent’s, it can disguise or not attend to the structural and systemic background that 
perpetuates domination. However, non-domination does have the theoretical tools to avoid 
the oversimplification and the victimising of the oppressed.  
 
Including control as a central element to secure non-domination, as Pettit (2012) does, 
considers the agency of the dominated, and the relational aspect of the proposal can introduce 
systemic oppression into the analysis.  
 
I described how Pettit’s idea of control is insufficient to face the Power-over Objection and 
the importance of its relational aspect. In the following sections, I will introduce my version 
of political power and how it relates to the definition of control I already explored in Chapter 
2. The idea is to show that the master/slave model, in the non-domination reading, can set 
the basis for a definition of political power if it becomes a power-to approach. My definition 
of political power takes into account the analysis of Pettit’s reading I presented here and 
introduces other considerations which make it a novel approach able to include the strong 
elements of Pettit’s master/slave model.  
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3. Non-domination and power-to 
 
Based on the previous discussion about the master/slave model, in this section, I will briefly 
explain how my view is inspired by non-domination but takes a power-to stand. As we saw 
previously, a way to address the first feminist critique to the master/slave model (the Power-
over Objection) was by adding some strong element of agency to avoid presenting dominated 
people as mere victims. I will discuss here how non-domination can be related to a power-
to definition by including what I have called active control (Chapter 2).   
 
Domination in Pettit’s reading is the capacity to interfere with another agent’s life, without 
the latter having any control over those interferences. It is about having power over another 
person’s life. Does that mean that non-domination is the reverse? Securing that we have 
power over another’s life? This is one of the concerns that feminists have voiced in terms of 
how we describe power (Oksala, 2019:680). Why would we want to have more power if it 
is defined by this kind of domination? But this not what the notion implies.  
 
Since non-domination has to do with power relations, to not be dominated what we need is 
to avoid the imbalances in power. This does not translate into who has more power over 
another person’s life, but how we can manage to remain authoritative over our own lives. 
What we need for non-domination is power to pursue our own goals. What non-domination 
requires is regaining control; not just to oppose the interferences or struggle for dominion 
over others, but to regain or retain our own agency. This is why (as I argued in the previous 
section and in Chapter 2) non-domination is connected to a definition of control that should 
be active. The capacity for uncontrolled interference depends on the faculties—not in an 
internal sense but as those that are granted to an agent—that each person has, and how we 
secure control is what will allow for non-domination. My view of political power focuses 
precisely on those faculties or attributes.  
 
IV. Power as authoritative influence: between power as domination and 
empowerment  
 
By now I have situated my view amongst feminist approaches to power, and argued it 
belongs to the group of accounts that think of power as domination—with the key caveat 
that I take political relations to be relations of domination and not power itself as defined in 
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these terms. Likewise, my analysis of the master/slave model allowed me to elaborate on 
how useful this analogy is to characterise our political relations. On the other hand, in Part 
II, I claimed that I take inspiration from the group of views that characterise power as 
empowerment. Accordingly, I mentioned that I think of political power as a shared capacity. 
In this part, I will explain what I mean when I describe political power as a shared capacity 
by introducing what I call political power as authoritative influence.  
 
Section 1 describes the notion of authoritative influence and its connection to my idea of 
active control. Section 2 explains how I think of political power as a shared capacity, and 
Section 3 discusses some final elements of my version of power and its scope.      
 
1. Active control and political power: a matter of influence 
 
In my discussion in Chapter 2, I characterised political control as one of the political 
conditions of autonomy and defined it as active control. The latter amounts to the capacity 
to both bring about and prevent the occurrence of an event. Thus, I defined active control as 
enjoying political influence. I did not provide further details regarding the features of that 
influence. However, I claimed that the central requirement to exercise this influence is 
holding the related faculties that will allow imposing negative and positive changes over 
decision-making. In this section, I will describe the characteristics of the political influence 
that allows for active control, which is what I call authoritative influence and corresponds to 
nothing other than political power.  
 
I define political power as holding authoritative influence over political decision-making, 
which we grant each other in the political sphere. This influence is authoritative in two ways, 
first in the sense that it is perceived by others as legitimate, and second in the sense that it 
has an effective impact. These two aspects, namely, perceived legitimacy and the effective 
impact, are interrelated. Perceived legitimacy has to do with the standing that we have as 
agents in our political relations. We are perceived as having legitimate authority over 
decision-making depending on the social and cultural recognition we receive from others—
which I will discuss in detail in Part V—but also, with respect to the actual impact that our 
input has in the political sphere. The roles that each agent plays in the political sphere, inform 
others of the kind of involvement they have regarding decision-making, which elicits an 
according recognition of that standing. That impact, therefore, depends on the formal 
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attributes or faculties that the agent has over political decision-making. By attributes, I mean 
the agent’s formal faculties over political decision-making, which are granted to her in 
accordance with a role (citizen, legislator). 23  In our democracies, formal attributes granted 
to common citizens are usually restricted to voting for representatives, where every 
individual vote has very little impact over the final result and does not have a direct impact 
over decision-making. Accordingly, it is clear that the kind of political power that I am 
characterising requires something more than the sole faculty to regularly elect 
representatives. There is a key feature that some formal faculties have: binding force. The 
latter means that their effects can be enforced upon others. The formal faculties required to 
allow for effective impact have to include some that involve this binding force, in order for 
them to have effective impact. My approach to political participation will discuss this in 
more detail in Part V.      
 
It is important to clarify that my definition of political power implies that it is not a sum cero 
matter. It is not the case that some agents have political power—authoritative influence over 
decision-making—and others do not. Influence is shared in different degrees in the political 
sphere, in accordance with the role that each agent plays. As I said at the beginning of this 
chapter, my definition of power is both descriptive and normative. Throughout this research, 
I have argued that our current standing and attributes in the political sphere do not allow us 
to be authoritative over our lives as our autonomy requires. Therefore, what I am arguing 
here is that having sufficient authoritative influence is what would allow us to have active 
control, and thus, would foster the relations of mutual recognition we currently do not enjoy. 
Recall that control and non-domination are what I have identified as the two political 
conditions for autonomy. Therefore, political power as I define it here is nothing other than 
the required form of influence to have active control: the capacity to bring about or prevent 
political outcomes (or events, as I called them).     
 
2. Authoritative influence as a shared capacity 
 
As I mentioned, some formal attributes are especially significant, because their impact is 
secured by the mandatory character of the decisions and measures that emanate from them. 
                                                          
23 There are informal expressions that I am not including in this definition. Contestation in the shape of 
protests, rallies and others are indeed impactful and could therefore be conceived as political power. 
However, their informal character means that they can be ignored or require numbers and many times 
violence to put enough pressure on the formal structures in order to achieve results.  
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But where do the attributes come from? Who grants them? I understand the origin and 
granting of political power in a very similar way to what Rainer Forst (2005) describes as 
the origin and granting of political liberty: 
      
 
(…) Political liberty is the form of liberty that persons as citizens grant each 
other reciprocally and generally. It is not “the state” or “the community” that 
“distributes” rights and liberties to citizens; rather, the citizens themselves are at 
the same time the authors and the addressees of claims to liberties (usually in the 
form of rights claims). As citizens, persons are both freedom-claimers (or 
freedom-users) and freedom-grantors (Forst, 2005:227).      
 
 
Forst’s definition of political liberty applied to my view of political power amounts to think 
of our attributes as mutually granted.  This understanding of political power—as something 
we grant each other—justifies a democratic division of labour where different roles involve 
different faculties, but do not imply different treatment. As such, the definition of power I 
offer both describes the kind of power that currently rules over our political relations, 
expressed mostly in the form of unequal formal attributes, and at the same time identifies a 
central consideration that should lead to structural changes in our democracies. If political 
power is something that we share in measures that only vary depending on the practical roles 
we play, then there is no such thing as a power transfer from ‘the people’ to representatives 
for example.  
 
The way in which we organise our democracies seems to mix a contractual inspiration with 
democratic concerns. What appears to motivate our democratic arrangements is the idea that 
‘we the people’ somehow transfer our political power—and are thus stripped from it—so 
that our representatives can have the monopoly of political power (which can only be 
contested under specific circumstances). The latter shows in the way that the attributes of 
common citizens, especially formal ones, are strongly restricted. We are not meant to have 
further faculties because we ‘agreed’ to transfer them to others in charge of political 
decision-making. Therefore, the striking feature of a definition of political power that re-
thinks the dynamic of shared influence is that it allows for a crucial re-structure of our 
political relations.  
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Having sufficient political power is an enabling condition for establishing Relations of 
Mutual recognition because it helps to guarantee that power imbalances (having more 
attributes) are only connected to the characteristics of a role, and do not equal to experiencing 
either special treatment or abuses of power. For example, it is the case that a legislator will 
have more formal faculties than a common citizen, but we should make sure that the common 
citizen will not be left with so little attributes that her standing with regards to others prevents 
her to remain authoritative over her life and avoid domination. She should enjoy active 
control. 
 
My definition of political power justifies thinking of the political sphere as an area with a 
separate kind of relations. I have developed this idea to some extent in my discussion about 
the political aspect of personal autonomy. However, my aim here was to explore in more 
detail how relations ruled by a certain kind of power—political power—require not only a 
different analysis, but new ways of challenging oppression, domination, or subordination. 
The ambition so far has not been to present an overview or a critical analysis of existing 
approaches to the concept of power, but to discuss one particular approach, the master/slave 
model, in its weaknesses and strengths to later apply it to a definition of political power. I 
wanted to stress the importance of having political power to experience Relations of Mutual 
Recognition. 
 
3. Power imbalances and other types of power 
 
There are two important things to add about political power as I defined it here before saying 
more about the political relations that are ruled by it. The first has to do with what I referred 
to as power imbalances. I have only hinted at ways in which we can challenge the power 
imbalances, or differences in attributes as I defined them. I stressed that thinking of political 
power as something we grant each other means securing equal treatment, but I will say more 
in terms of how we should address power imbalances when I discuss recognition and 
political participation in Part V. Furthermore, political participation will be introduced 
precisely to address the sort of attributions we should secure.      
 
Also, it is important to clarify that my definition of political power aims at finding the best 
way to describe, but more importantly, to challenge the manner in which our political 
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relations work in our current democracies. The latter does not mean that it extends to or that 
I intend to solve other non-political imbalances of power and spaces of domination. Neither 
do I envisage a scenario where addressing political power imbalances and abuses will solve 
those other areas where we experience oppression. My focus on political power and on our 
political relations has to do with the elements that I identified as differentiating the political 
from other spheres. This confers both the relations and power that rules them a special 
character that could indeed help improve the conditions of our relations in other areas of our 
lives. Re-thinking political power in this way will not grant more power or change the abuses 
of power within households, or in our society—at least not in the short term—but it would 
surely improve the kind of relations we establish in the political and the sort of decision-
making that will affect those other areas of our lives.    
 
V. Recognition and political participation 
 
Analysing political power helped to elucidate what makes our political relations different 
and particularly important. Likewise, it showed that we should conceive of our political 
relations as ruled by a kind of power that we grant each other, instead of something like 
transferring the sovereignty of the people to representatives. In what follows, I will introduce 
more components to my view of how our political relations should be for our enjoyment of 
autonomy.   
 
In Chapter 2, I identified and discussed two constitutive elements of the kind of political 
relations I argue are necessary for our enjoyment of autonomy: non-domination and control. 
This part of the chapter will explain two additional key components of what I call Relations 
of Mutual Recognition: recognition and political participation. Recognition is what supports 
the idea of granting each other political power. Political participation, on the other hand, will 
shed light over how to challenge power imbalances in the political sphere.   
 
The literature on recognition, like the literature on power, is also vast and very diverse, so it 
is not my ambition to either discuss the state of the art of the concept, or to develop my own 
novel account. I will base my approach to recognition on Nancy Fraser’s (2000) 
understanding of the notion and argue that, although recognition features in Mackenzie’s 
relational view, our political relations are better characterised by a definition with a stronger 
focus on securing our equal status like Fraser’s.  
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Having discussed the definition of recognition that is behind the ideal of mutual recognition 
I argue for, I will move on to define political participation. I conclude by connecting the 
conceptual analysis presented throughout the chapter between political power, recognition, 
and political participation. The latter will provide a clear overview of how our political 
relations should be for our enjoyment of autonomy.  
 
1. Two different approaches to recognition 
 
Mackenzie (2008, 2014) has characterised recognition in different ways, both as 
intersubjective recognition and as social recognition. These definitions share a focus on the 
agent’s self-perception. In this section, I will present each version and show this common 
thread between them. The idea is to discuss the issues that may arise by focusing on the 
agent’s self-perceived authority instead of the conditions that can make agents effectively 
authoritative in the political sphere.   
 
Intersubjective recognition signals two important considerations to develop our capacity for 
autonomy. According to Mackenzie, recognition allows for the attitudes towards ourselves 
that affirm our normative authority; in other words, it is required for conceiving ourselves 
as a legitimate source of authority.  
 
 
[T]o claim oneself as able and authorized to speak for oneself is also to situate 
oneself as answerable and accountable to others. It is thus to situate oneself in 
a complex network of intersubjective discursive norms and practices involving 
mutual expectations and governed by social standards (Mackenzie, 2008:527).  
 
 
The affective attitudes that are necessary to think of ourselves in this way (self-esteem, self-
respect, and self-trust) depend on us standing in relations of intersubjective recognition.  
Secondly, in order to claim authority, the agent needs to “have a sense of what matters to 
her. And to have such a sense of herself she must engage, to some degree, in activities of 
self-understanding and self-interpretation” (Mackenzie, 2008:527). The latter is inevitably 
bound to the relations and interactions we experience. Thus, establishing relations of 
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intersubjective recognition is how we can acquire sufficient self-understanding to determine 
what counts as desires and reasons for actions for us.  
 
In Mackenzie’s second approach to recognition, she argues that social recognition amounts 
to be regarded by others as having the social standing of an autonomous person (Mackenzie, 
2014: 35). In this second way of approaching recognition, Mackenzie (2014) identifies 
(social) recognition as one of the conditions involved in the dimension of autonomy she calls 
self-authorisation—to recognise ourselves as holding normative authority.  Let us recall that 
by normative authority, Mackenzie means to regard oneself as being authorised to exercise 
control over one’s life, as well as to determine what will constitute reasons for acting. 
Accordingly, she argues that social recognition, accountability and certain self-evaluative 
attitudes—the same set included in the previous definition of recognition, i.e. self-esteem, 
self-trust and self-respect—are the conditions that make an agent capable of perceiving 
herself as authorised and in control of her own life.  
 
Both versions seem to focus on the same idea: that our self-evaluative attitudes are 
constituted by practices of intersubjective/social recognition. Mackenzie does consider 
recognition as a matter of experiencing an equal standing in both versions. Nonetheless, the 
justification of the importance of recognition in each of them relies more on the impact that 
an equal standing has over our self-perception regarding our authority, than on the effective 
capacity to be authoritative that standing on an equal footing can provide. Our self-evaluative 
attitudes certainly depend on social recognition, but there are some problems with 
Mackenzie’s approach if it is to inform the kind of recognition required for our political 
relations.  
 
Mackenzie herself acknowledges one of them, which is resilience. Cases of resilience are 
those where people are capable of developing appropriate self-evaluative attitudes that 
provide them with a sense of normative authority, even though they are continuously 
exposed to misrecognition and dominating contexts. According to Mackenzie, resilience 
cases do not oppose the idea that self-evaluative attitudes are indeed constituted within social 
recognition practices (Mackenzie, 2014:37). However, resilience cases take away some of 
the strength of the idea of social recognition.  
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Mackenzie has a reply to this problem at the basis of her multidimensional definition of 
autonomy. As I pointed out when presenting her view (see Chapter 1, Part II), part of her 
motivation to employ a multidimensional approach was to attend to cases that pull our 
philosophical intuitions in opposite directions, such as examples of resilience. Recall that 
she takes Martin Luther King as a case that proves how a person can be self-authorising and 
self-governing in different degrees. The impact of oppressive circumstances affects each 
dimension in different levels, which justifies how Martin Luther King can express high self-
governance even though his freedom and opportunities were curtailed (Mackenzie, 2019: 
523).  
 
However, it is not entirely clear whether this reply can account for all sort of cases of 
resilience.  We do not need to look far to find numerous cases of resilient groups—women, 
sexual dissident groups, ethnical minorities, people with disabilities—that although faced 
with lacks in all dimensions, still manage to develop the self-evaluative attitudes that allow 
them to perceive themselves as having normative authority over their lives. It appears that, 
although Mackenzie’s view of recognition sheds light over the impact that a lack of social 
recognition can have over our normative authority, there is some other consideration or focus 
that escapes her definition. Cases of resilience show that there is something central to being 
recognised as authoritative that goes beyond our self-evaluative attitudes.   
 
Nancy Fraser (2000), by contrast with Mackenzie, defines recognition according to what she 
calls the status model. Recognition is enjoying the status of peers that make us capable of 
participating in social life on a par with each other. Fraser adds that to think of recognition 
as a matter of status entails “examining institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their 
effects on the relative standing of social actors” (Fraser, 2000:113). Under this definition, 
misrecognition happens when we are denied that status because, as a consequence of the 
institutionalised patterns of cultural value, we are deemed less worthy of respect. According 
to Fraser, the patterns are perpetuated by what she calls “social institutions that regulate 
interaction” (Fraser, 2000:114) such as marriage laws and social welfare policies.   
 
Fraser’s definition of recognition as a matter of status allows us to think of our effective 
capacity to be authoritative. Instead of focusing on the impact that recognition has over our 
self-perception, Fraser’s view emphasises the importance of relating to one another on an 
equal footing; in other words, on the capacity of each person to participate in equal 
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conditions. Differences in status lead to subordination, which is why Fraser argues that the 
claim for recognition aims at overcoming subordination. In order to address misrecognition, 
we need to replace the institutionalised value patterns that prevent equal participation with 
ones that can enable participation instead (Fraser, 2000:115).  
 
Fraser refers to ‘institutionalised’ value patterns, and in doing so, her view provides the 
perfect framework to think about ways of challenging those patterns, whilst at the same time 
acknowledging that they do not depend on individual’s traits or some kind of broad cultural 
tendency to disrespect some individuals or groups. Her emphasis on the institutionalised 
character amounts to ‘point the finger’ at unequal structural ways of regulating our social 
interaction (Fraser, 2000:114). “Misrecognition is neither a psychic deformation nor a free-
standing cultural harm but an institutionalized relation of social subordination” (Fraser, 
2000:113).  
 
Although Fraser (2000) is considering our social interactions, her definition of recognition 
can easily set the basis of the kind of mutual recognition necessary for our political relations. 
Furthermore, even the examples that Fraser gives of social institutions that perpetuate 
patterns could be (and should be) understood as political more than social. Public policies 
for welfare and marriage laws are the result of political decision-making processes.  
 
Fraser does consider what she calls a “political kind of obstacle to participatory parity” 
which she names “political marginalization or exclusion” (Fraser, 2000:116), but she 
clarifies that she will not focus on this kind. Nonetheless, Fraser’s definition of recognition 
provides the perfect approach to understand and justify political relations with an equal share 
of political power. What I called ‘imbalances of power’ amounts to the subordination that 
misrecognition—as Fraser understands it—provokes because of our unequal standing to 
participate in political decision-making processes.  
 
Finally, Fraser’s status model includes another analytically distinct dimension besides 
recognition as a matter of social justice, namely, distribution (Fraser, 2000:116). Whilst 
recognition has to do with the effects of institutionalised norms on the social standing of 
agents, distribution “involves the allocation of disposable resources to social actors” (Fraser, 
2000:116). Each dimension is also connected to a distinct kind of injustice; for recognition, 
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the injustice is misrecognition, and for distribution, the injustice is maldistribution. They 
both correspond to forms of subordination.    
 
 
[T]he recognition dimension corresponds, as we saw, to status subordination, 
rooted in institutionalized patterns of cultural value; the distributive dimension, 
in contrast, corresponds to economic subordination, rooted in structural features 
of the economic system (Fraser, 2000:117).   
 
 
Fraser holds that these two dimensions are not reducible to the other, especially in capitalist 
societies, because cultural value patterns do not necessarily determine the distribution of 
resources. This is important since, according to Fraser, it entails that a politics of 
redistribution is necessary given that not all maldistribution can be addressed by recognition 
(Fraser, 2000:118).  
 
Fraser’s concern for distribution addresses an important issue for political recognition. An 
unequal distribution of resources prevents equal participation in the political, since we 
cannot be peers in our political interactions if some agents lack the appropriate economic 
conditions that allow engaging in an equal standing. Recognising each other as full partners 
in our political relations amounts to guaranteeing an equal standing, and that can only be 
accomplished by making sure that economic inequalities will not prevent or distort that peer 
relation. Therefore, distribution connects with the conditions that should be in place for being 
acknowledged as full peers in the political sphere, in other words, it seems clear that 
distribution will be a very relevant concern to take into account when we discuss how to 
implement political participation (see Chapter 4). 
 
The two approaches to recognition that I analysed here share one central element, which is 
the concern for an equal standing. We cannot characterise a relation as being one of 
recognition if we are not acknowledged and treated as equals by others. Mackenzie focuses 
on each person’s normative authority, more precisely, on the importance of social 
recognition to develop the self-evaluative attitudes that will allow us to perceive ourselves 
as having normative authority over our lives. This view puts our self-perception in the centre 
and in so doing allows us to analyse the strong impact that a lack of social recognition can 
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have over a person’s notion of self-worth—and eventually over her capacity to determine 
the things that constitute reasons for acting. However, that same emphasis proves 
problematic due to various cases of resilience that seem to indicate there is something about 
lacking recognition that goes beyond the impact on our self-evaluative attitudes.  
 
Fraser’s view instead, emphasises the idea of equal status. Her account intends to show that 
what happens in cases of misrecognition is that we are denied the status of equal partners to 
participate in social interactions. There are patterns of cultural value that have been 
institutionalised and characterise some as less worthy than others. This is what recognition 
should challenge: the relations of subordination that result from such misrecognition. I 
argued that most of the elements of Fraser’s view are ideal to understand the kind of 
recognition we should enjoy in our political relations and hinted at some adjustments that a 
version of political recognition would require.    
 
In the following section, I will describe my view of mutual recognition. I will show how my 
approach takes Fraser’s view as a starting point, whilst adjusting some elements to the 
political context. The next and final section will introduce my definition of political 
participation, especially in terms of its role to foster mutual recognition.  
 
2. Political mutual recognition  
 
I began this chapter by arguing that the political sphere has a particular kind of decision-
making processes. Political decision making has not only a wide-ranging scope but also far-
reaching impact. These two conditions make our interactions within the political sphere 
unique. Unfortunately, the relations we hold in our democracies are dominating because they 
do not guarantee the equal status of its members. The character of the relations we hold in 
the political sphere is not inherently dominating; our political relations are currently 
dominating precisely because they are not based on recognition of each agent’s equal status 
as autonomous agents. Recall that at the beginning of this research, I made some important 
clarifications, regarding two partial/full distinctions. One concerns the idea that our political 
relations are partially constitutive of our autonomy, and the other the degrees of autonomy 
that we can enjoy. That our political relations are partially constitutive of our autonomy 
means that they are not all there is to our autonomy. Therefore, standing in relations of 
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recognition makes us fully autonomous (in the sense of the second partial/full distinction) 
because it acknowledges and enables the exercise of our autonomy in crucial ways.  
Accordingly, mutual recognition amounts to acknowledging each other as equally entitled 
to enjoy the standing of an autonomous agent in the political, and consequently, to affirm 
each agent’s authority over their lives. Thus, I understand mutual recognition in our political 
relations, or political recognition, as having the status of a peer in the political sphere. My 
analysis of misrecognition in the political sphere, consequently, follows the same approach 
that Fraser (2000) identifies for social relations. Applied to our political interactions, 
misrecognition means to be deprived of the status of a full partner in political interactions 
due to institutionalised patterns of cultural value that label one as less worthy of respect.   
 
Unlike Fraser, I understand political misrecognition, which she calls political 
marginalization, not merely as a kind of political obstacle to full participation, but as an 
additional dimension to her status model. Fraser relates recognition to social interaction and 
the distribution dimension to the economic structure, but we should think of political 
recognition as the dimension related to our interactions within the political sphere; which is 
to say, in terms of our standing as peers in political decision-making processes.  
 
Someone could argue at this point that we are already treated equally in our democracies, so 
that there is no need to think of political recognition as a separate dimension, especially 
because that is the very idea behind notions such as being ‘equals when facing the law’ and 
‘one person one vote’.24 Nonetheless, this objection would deny how minorities and 
marginalised groups are neither treated equally nor have an equal authoritative status over 
their lives in practice. Looking into marriage laws and policies of social welfare—Fraser’s 
example of social institutions—proves there is no equal treatment and no equal status in 
practice. Sexual minorities, women, people with disabilities and racial minorities (among 
others) are commonly not treated equally by these institutions, and this certainly puts them 
in a status that is not one of peers with respect to others.    
 
 
Consider again the case of marriage laws that deny participatory parity to gays 
and lesbians. As we saw, the root of the injustice is the institutionalization in law 
                                                          
24 For a classic discussion regarding our equal right to participation see Waldron (1998).   
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of a heterosexist pattern of cultural value that constitutes heterosexuals as normal 
and homosexuals as perverse (Fraser, 2000:115).  
 
 
My point, as mentioned in the previous section, is that the institutions that perpetuate the 
cultural patterns by which some are deemed less worthy of respect, like marriage laws, are 
not social but political. It is by acknowledging their political character that we can challenge 
the patterns, and as Fraser argues, replace them with ones that foster parity (Fraser, 
2000:115) in our political interactions. But more importantly, it seems like the kind of 
decision-making that takes place in the political sphere calls for additional measures.  
 
Political subordination means that there are imbalances in power that need measures beyond 
changes in terms of the cultural values that guide political decision-making. The latter is 
what makes the political sphere especially susceptible to failures of recognition, and in turn, 
instantiating mutual political recognition an urgent matter. Defining mutual recognition as 
the recognition of a separate political dimension allows us to think of those additional 
measures. If we want mutual recognition (relating like peers in the political sphere), we need 
to address the power imbalances, or the differences in attributes to have authoritative 
influence—as I defined political power—over political decision-making. Therefore having 
sufficient political power is an enabling condition of Relations of Mutual Recognition, 
because it allows for the active control that makes them possible.  
 
My definition of mutual recognition also includes Mackenzie’s concern for upholding our 
normative authority, however, my view follows Fraser’s focus on status because what 
recognition does to our normative authority is to acknowledge that being authoritative 
requires being guaranteed the status of peers in our political interactions. Being recognised 
as holding normative authority over one’s life is key to actually holding that authority in the 
political sphere.    
 
3. Political Participation  
 
This section will introduce my definition of political participation and its role for enjoying 
Relations of Mutual Recognition The kind of involvement that people have in political 
decision-making, in terms of the role they play in the overall structure of the division of 
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labour in our democracies, is what I identify as political participation. It concerns the 
exercise and share of political power that agents experience in a democratic context. For our 
political relations to be ones of mutual recognition, we should think of political participation 
as collective self-government.  
 
Previously I have argued (see Chapter 2) that our relations of mutual recognition should be 
non-dominating and allow certain control over political outcomes; both to prevent and to 
provoke them. Exploring recognition provided more elements to identify what goes wrong 
in our relations that turns them into relations of subordination, and analysing political power 
proved that we need sufficient formal faculties to avoid that subordination. Looking into 
what political participation entails will, in turn, describe how we should think of our standing 
and attributes in order to have control.     
 
Current democratic arrangements rest on a set of liberal premises intuitively easy to identify. 
First, they rely on the need to find a way to coordinate and secure rights and liberties for all, 
whilst also acknowledging that no particular agent has an inherent right to rule over others. 
The latter entails that we must find a collective way of ruling ourselves that considers some 
practical constraints: not everyone has the time and resources to take part in decision-
making; not everyone will want to, and we would anyways be unable to include everyone 
due to the high number of citizens in most territories. An option that attends to those practical 
constraints is electing representatives to play the active role of political decision-making, 
whose authority is justified by being elected by the majority of citizens. Additionally, since 
decision-making will affect everyone’s lives, another premise is that we have to implement 
an accountability system that keeps things on track, one that also conveys the notion that we 
are indeed ‘ruling ourselves’. This accountability is then accomplished by the same system 
that elects representatives because it allows those who are not directly involved in decision-
making processes to ‘punish’ or ‘reward’ the performance of those who are.25    
 
The problem is that differences in status prevent us from relating to one another as peers, 
and the political sphere with its focus on political power creates a setting that makes this 
liberal accountability system insufficient to prevent subordination. Our division of labour 
has proven unable to address abuses of power, and secure equal treatment in practice. 
                                                          
25 For a detailed critical analysis of liberal democracies, what he calls Thin Democracy, see: Barber; B 
(2003) “Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age”, University of California Press  
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Moreover, in this chapter, I have advanced the idea that the problem with our democracies 
lies in the little consideration given to the relational character of our political interactions. 
Feminists have challenged the individualist nature of liberal arrangements, as well as the 
importance of using political power to face the subordination of women and minorities. 
These critiques point out precisely two great weaknesses of the liberal framework as I briefly 
described it here, namely, its individual centred character and its failure to acknowledge the 
impact of political power over our effective capacity to be authoritative over our lives.   
 
The liberal framework that shapes our democracies focuses on autonomy and its related need 
for justification of political authority, whilst looking to secure rights and liberties for all. 
These are some of the main elements that have earned it its place as a desirable model. 
Nevertheless, that focus has at the same time prevented us from understanding the political 
sphere in terms of relations; both as constituted by relations and as the ideal space to 
challenge subordinating relations in every domain of our lives. This dual relational character 
of the political sphere should be reflected in how we understand political participation—the 
role of agents in democratic contexts—and that should be as a form of collective self-
government.  
 
Whether or not we enjoy an equal standing to participate in political interactions—in Fraser’s 
words whether there is misrecognition—depends on the patterns of cultural value that get 
institutionalised and typify some as less worthy of respect. However, my interpretation 
showed that the political sphere has a particular kind of power ruling over agent’s 
interactions. Therefore, political misrecognition also depends on the share of political power, 
the kind of influence expressed in attributes, we enjoy in the political sphere. Those who 
have more formal faculties are usually more capable of impacting most people’s lives and 
their own; they enjoy more control (positive and negative as defined in Chapter 2). Hence, 
finding new ways to foster and secure relations of mutual recognition within the political 
sphere necessarily involves re-arranging the kind of attributes each role has so that we not 
only address subordination in the political but grant every agent with capacities to be 
authoritative over their lives.  
 
Governing ourselves whilst acknowledging our equal standing as autonomous agents is what 
collective self-government is about. Political participation as collective self-government 
emphasises the relational character of our interactions in the political, which amounts to 
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focus not on the justification of authority of someone ruling over another agent, but on the 
kind of attributes and standing each agent should have in order to remain authoritative over 
her life, whilst also being authoritative over political decisions that affect all agents.  
 
Recall that I characterised political power as something we grant each other. When we 
identify each other as co-rulers of the political sphere, imbalances of power become 
incompatible with the equal status—or recognition—that is due to each agent, regardless of 
their specific role in the political division of labour.   Relatedly, when the political sphere 
becomes an area where we are to challenge all other relations of subordination (the second 
part of its dual relational character), there are no limitations to the content of the issues that 
are appropriate to discuss in political decision-making processes, for example.    
 
The role that political participation plays for our political relations is therefore crucial. It 
challenges political misrecognition and allows for us having the authoritative influence 
(political power) that not only prevents domination but grants the attributes that make us 
truly authoritative over our lives.  
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
I devoted this chapter to two goals. The first one was to provide a more detailed analysis and 
description of what I mean by Relations of Mutual Recognition, which involved examining 
political power and recognition. I followed by exploring the notion of political power, which 
I framed in terms of the master-slave model (exploring its strengths and weaknesses) that is 
behind the neo-republican approach that inspires my definition. Additionally, I discussed the 
special character of political decision-making—of wide-ranging scope and far-reaching 
impact—and moved on to provide a definition of political power, namely, as the 
authoritative influence over political decision-making that we grant each other.   
 
Then I moved on to explore recognition. I argued that Nancy Fraser’s (2000) status model 
of recognition was ideal to think of political recognition because, unlike Mackenzie’s (2014), 
it does not emphasise our self-perceived normative authority but whether we enjoy the status 
of peers in our interactions with others. Accordingly, I defined political recognition as being 
equally entitled to enjoy the standing of an autonomous agent, which means to relate as peers 
in our political interactions. My view differed somewhat to Fraser’s because I understand 
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political recognition as a fully distinguished dimension in her model, instead of merely as an 
obstacle for (social) recognition.  
 
Finally, I addressed the second aim of the chapter, which was to introduce my view of 
political participation and its role in establishing relations of mutual recognition. Political 
participation as collective self-government takes the definition of political power and my 
view of recognition to offer an approach that connects with the other constitutive parts of 
our relations of mutual recognition, non-domination and control. The definition of political 
participation that I analysed here provides key desiderata for its implementation, which will 
be the aim of the following chapter.    
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Chapter 4: Collective Self-government 
 
I. Implementing collective self-government  
 
In the previous chapter (see Chapter 3) I defined political power as the authoritative 
influence we grant each other to govern ourselves. Looking into recognition showed that 
those attributes must reflect an equal respect for every agent, but more importantly, they 
have to allow them to relate as peers in our participation within the political sphere. 
Additionally, I defined political participation as the kind of role we play, and the share of 
political power we hold, with respect to political decision-making. These background 
concerns amount to some important requirements when considering the implementation of 
the definition of political participation that I called collective self-government. Based on this 
previous conceptual analysis of political power, recognition, and political participation itself, 
this chapter will discuss the desiderata that should guide such implementation, which I 
identify as: inclusion, equality, deliberation and accountability.  
The aim of this chapter is not to circumscribe my project of collective self-government to a 
specific implementation but to look at different alternatives of political participation in order 
to evaluate their suitability with my proposal, which I do by contrasting their capacity to 
meet all four desiderata, i.e., inclusion, equality, deliberation, accountability. Therefore, my 
focus is set more on showcasing the key components that a form of implementation should 
include, than on prescribing the ideal formula. I do suggest a specific model to implement 
collective self-government, as the conclusion of an analysis of three alternatives of political 
participation in terms of how they fare with respect to my desiderata. Nonetheless, I wish to 
remain open to the possibility that other similar arrangements can be even more suitable for 
the project.  
I use the labels that John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright (2018) use to group what they call 
“democratic alternatives” when they discuss sortition to refer to these three alternatives, 
namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition, and direct participation. Since each of 
them portray a different implementation and approach to political participation, I call the 
same three labels democratic alternatives of political participation.     
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Part II of the chapter introduces the desiderata. Part III describes and analyses how each 
alternative fare in terms of the desiderata. Part IV presents my preferred model to implement 
collective self-government, and some challenges it could face with respect to my desiderata.   
   
II. Four desiderata for collective self-government 
 
I identify inclusion as my first desideratum because, part of what being autonomous means 
is having normative authority over our lives, which in turn requires being included and 
treated as a peer in political decision-making. The analysis of recognition showed how 
central it is to be acknowledged as a peer in our political relations. Being seen and treated as 
a peer means to be recognised as equally entitled to exercise that normative authority over 
our lives. In the political sphere, the latter should translate into inclusion. We require 
inclusion because “(…) inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect” (Young, 2010:23). For 
the autonomy minded, this is respect for each person’s autonomy. Iris Marion Young (2010) 
claims that people are treated as means if they are asked to adjust their behaviour and abide 
by norms from which their interests and voice were excluded. Precisely because we respect 
people’s autonomy, we should include agents in decision-making processes as much as 
possible, so that we do not fail to express that respect. Moreover, the analysis of political 
power showed that not only should we show respect by including, but that this inclusion 
should bring with it the formal faculties granted to those who are part of decision-making 
processes, which is an essential part of securing control and non-domination.  
Equality is closely connected to inclusion since the same reasons that support being included, 
justify that the inclusion involves equal treatment. Nonetheless, I describe it as a separate 
desideratum because I understand it as signalling the terms of inclusion. Enjoying an equal 
standing was one of the requirements that we saw for mutual recognition, which is to say 
that as Young states it “Not only should all those affected de nominally included in decision-
making, by they should be included in equal terms” (Young, 2010:23). Thinking of political 
power as something that we grant each other also justifies that those are attributes that secure 
an equal treatment. Hence, equality is identified here to stress the importance of the equal 
terms of inclusion, especially regarding political power, or authoritative legitimacy with its 
related formal faculties over political decision-making.       
With regards to deliberation, I identify it as a desideratum for the implementation of 
collective self-government, given that another vital kind of inclusion and expression of 
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equality is the one that refers to people’s diverse views, concerns and interests. Deliberation 
is important because it is a way to include not just agents but their many times contrasting 
views in a fair manner. What deliberation allows for is an exchange of those various views 
with the aim of finding the best way to accommodate that diversity. Additionally, 
deliberation also involves taking into account the testimony and opinions of experts. Thus, 
deliberation amounts to consider issues in a well-informed manner that includes other 
people’s preferences, technical information, and the likely consequences of choosing one 
response over another.    
Finally, accountability is paramount in any democratic arrangement due to its connection to 
self-government. Provided that not every citizen will be capable of being involved in 
political decision-making, those who are directly involved have to be accountable if what 
we want is to really portray some kind of ‘rule of the people’. Even more so if, like my 
analysis suggests, what we are looking for is the collective self-government that fosters 
Relations of Mutual Recognition. One of the conditions for those relations is non-
domination, and accountability plays a crucial role in achieving it by preventing abuses and 
keeping the focus on the idea of political power as shared and mutuality granted.    
 
III. Democratic alternatives of political participation 
 
Political participation is usually understood as the way in which we organise common 
citizen’s involvement in the political sphere. From my earlier definition (see Chapter 3) I 
understand the notion in a broader way. Political participation includes every member of the 
political sphere since what the term represents is the set of roles and division of labour that 
we define to govern ourselves. This different approach, and the more citizen-focused 
definitions, assume a democratic context; therefore, I will not discuss non-democratic 
options.  
I will examine three democratic alternatives of political participation that include diverse 
implementations: electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. Although 
all three of them can be combined, and in many cases, they are, my intention is to discover 
the potential of each alternative to meet the desiderata so that if combined we can also 
determine the centrality that should be granted to one over the other. This goal merits a 
separate analysis of each alternative.    
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1. Electoral representation 
 
The kind of political participation that Western cultures are most familiar with is electoral 
representation. Although it takes different forms—including more or less number of 
representatives—this alternative has a central feature, namely, the mediated involvement of 
common citizens in political decision making by agents that are solely devoted to that task 
(Urbinati, 2000: 766). These representatives are elected by popular vote open to all citizens, 
and the elections take place on a regular basis. Each country establishes different norms 
regarding the length of the period for which a legislator, a primer minister, president (and 
various other elected roles) will be in her position, and whether the system implemented to 
elect them is proportional, majoritarian, or other.   
The implementation of this central feature also varies in terms of the capacity that common 
citizens have, to communicate with their representatives. A usual channel of communication 
is individual letters that any citizen can send to their representatives, as well as collective 
petitions for specific issues. However, in most cases, the communication of common citizens 
to their representatives is limited to the expression that the former do via the elections. The 
latter means that the main accountability system is the same election that determines who 
will become a representative. By choosing to re-elect a representative or to vote for her main 
competitor on the following election, common citizens have a way to show their support or 
disapproval of the performance of a representative.  
The function that representatives are supposed to fulfil in general is to take part in decision-
making processes about various issues, which will result in laws and policies that apply to 
most or all citizens. In order to allow the citizenry to elect representatives for this function, 
democracies hold political campaigns presenting candidates for the available seats. 
Accordingly, electoral representation usually relies on political parties, or at least on the 
notion of identifying a set of ideals, values, and concerns that each candidate to a 
representative post showcases for elections. Since common citizens will not be directly 
involved in decision-making processes, the idea is that they should be able to choose a 
representative that either proposes measures that they approve of, focuses on topics they 
deem relevant or supports ideals they share. This logic is nonetheless not the only one that 
motivates votes. Many times, people strongly rely on the personal characteristics of a 
candidate to make their choice, and as a result, candidates themselves have become used to 
 
 
105 
 
focusing more on making people aware of their personal features than their political views. 
On the other hand, historically common citizens also vote out of alignment with a political 
party without paying much attention to the specific candidate and her proposals.  
All of the above-mentioned considerations connect to another important aspect of electoral 
representation, which pertains to the kind of role that representatives should play. This is a 
contentious issue that opposes two main views; either representatives should merely express 
the interests of their constituency in political deliberations—setting aside their particular 
views—or they should be entitled to put their own views first when deliberating. Hanna 
Pitkin (1967) expresses this distinction by contrasting the figure of representatives as 
delegates and trustees. The former view rests on the idea that to represent means to ‘give 
voice’ to the elector’s concerns, whilst the latter understands representatives as being 
entrusted by the citizenry to deliberate according to their own judgement. 
There are as well, those who support something like an in-between version. Nadia Urbinati 
(2000), for example, claims that representatives are supposed to act as advocates.   
 
The representative takes the claims and ideas of the people to the assembly so 
debate there expands and is enriched. Yet, for this to happen, society cannot be 
a silent place. Advocacy in parliament both requires and stimulates advocacy 
in society. (Urbinati, 2000: 766-767).  
  
The role of representatives for Urbinati is to take the citizen’s concerns into political 
decision-making where they deliberate in accordance with their own judgement. She claims 
that what made Athenian democracy exceptional was simultaneity; standing and acting in 
the assembly, so that what representative democracies need is to overcome the lack of 
simultaneity with an active sort of public sphere. Thus, what makes possible the 
communication of the citizens’ interests to representatives is their own public involvement.  
I have briefly described some of the main features of electoral representation. Based on these 
characteristics, I will move on to analyse how it upholds inclusion, equality, deliberation, 
and accountability.   
 
2. Inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability via representatives 
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[R]epresention has been associated with the weakening of self-government. For 
democrats in particular, it has held little appeal, first because it is seen as 
justifying a vertical relation between the citizens and the state, and second 
because it is seen as promoting a passive citizenry (Urbinati, 2000: 759). 
 
Urbinati (2000) rightly points out that electoral representation tends to provoke distrust for 
democrats because of what I identified as its main feature; the mediated involvement of 
common citizens. The lack of direct involvement can seem to compromise some of the 
desiderata I have presented. But let us begin by considering inclusion.  
Electoral representation does imply inclusion in a significant way because it involves every 
citizen in the election of representatives. As we saw above, candidates even cater to voters 
in particular ways because they depend on their vote to get appointed. Since we are thinking 
of democratic contexts, these elections would be in general open to all citizens that are 
eligible to vote, which usually amounts to all “adults” (depending on the age restriction set 
for this purpose in each country), or at least to most (keeping in mind countries that 
disenfranchise past criminal offenders or those who are in prison). What we need to consider 
now is whether this seems like appropriate inclusion for instantiating relations of 
recognition.  
For common citizens, although voting is inclusive of most, in electoral representation, it 
becomes the ultimate means of inclusion they have. There can be other, usually informal, 
means to become included, but elections are still the main tool to achieve inclusion for this 
alternative. Being included in the form of choosing representatives constitutes a mediated 
and at the same time, a highly ambitious form of inclusion. It is mediated because, as 
expressed by Urbinati, we are not directly involved in decision-making processes, and it is 
ambitious in the sense that we are expected to choose in a single act a person that is to signify 
the inclusion either of ourselves as agents in discussions, or of our interests or concerns. 
Thus, electoral representation creates a mechanism that is inclusive in two ways, first by 
allowing all citizens to take part and second, by giving them the chance to choose the 
representative who is going to act in their staid in decision-making, or in other words, who 
will include them as citizens (or their interests) in those instances.  
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It is very problematic that the degree to which citizens will be included in political decision-
making depends on whether they were capable to identify in an instance that takes place 
every few years, the most suitable person for this purpose. Likewise, this kind of inclusion 
heavily relies on representatives to, in fact, enact the inclusion of citizens’ interests when 
they engage in decision-making. In Chapter 2, I discussed the pressures that representatives 
are subject to (from their party, powerful donors, etcetera) when analysing non-domination. 
My worry that in many cases (or most) they are unable to surpass those pressures, clearly 
justifies thinking that entrusting inclusion like this to them, is probably the main problem 
regarding inclusion for electoral representation.     
Technocrats and social movements, on the other hand, do get included in many countries by 
being granted consultative faculties during decision-making processes. However, such 
inclusion could be improved to guarantee that all the relevant actors are included and that 
their information and expertise has a wider reach and impact. Currently, bigger, and more 
visible professionals and social movements can tend to have the upper hand in terms of being 
called upon to take part in decision-making processes, which can leave out other key actors.   
The problems that I identify for inclusion also reveal the weakness of electoral representation 
with regards to equality. When considering equality, Barber argues that the mere legal and 
electoral equality that representation allows for, creates a fictional sense of a mass society 
composed of indistinguishable agents, and so it omits the economic and social determinants 
that should be considered for its fulfilment (Barber, 2003:146). Although electoral 
representation does enable effective equality by implementing the idea of “one person, one 
vote” it is also incapable of securing any other more substantive sense of equality. Besides 
weighing every vote equally, electoral representation does not offer any additional guarantee 
of our equal standing in the political sphere.  
There are two types of deliberation that take place thanks to electoral representation; the 
process by which each citizen decides who will be their preferred choice of candidate (or 
policy in rare cases), and the decision-making process for legislation that involves 
representatives. Some cases include deliberating faculties for prime ministers and the 
president as well. In the introduction, I pointed out that one of the key benefits of deliberation 
depends on its capacity to promote discussions that include the plurality of views of the 
citizenry. We could in some sense, find a variety of views included in deliberation in a 
context where some quotas to secure minorities’ voices will be considered, for example. 
Nonetheless, deliberation has to do with the whole process of discussion and weighing of 
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options that do require direct involvement. Electoral representation, hence, fosters full 
deliberation mostly for legislators. It offers a restricted sort of deliberation or at least offers 
a rich kind of deliberation for legislators and scarce chances of deliberating (mostly to elect 
representatives) to common citizens.   
Finally, as described above, accountability takes the form of “punishing” or “rewarding” the 
performance of representatives that citizens express on elections. If a representative gets re-
elected, we can assume that people approved of her performance. Representatives 
themselves then intend to show to their constituents that they have been doing a good job, in 
order to get an encouraging response during the next elections. Of course, there are other 
ways in which electoral representation offers accountability. Transparency of deliberations 
amongst legislators and the use of public funds has been implemented in many democracies, 
in order to ensure that representatives hold themselves accountable to the citizenry. The 
problem is that accountability mostly functions as a contestation method in electoral 
representation. We hold representatives accountable (usually only legislators and no other 
actors) in an after the fact manner. The citizenry is unable to put any strong pressure on their 
representatives because their main accountability instrument is only elections, whereas it 
opens the way to pressures that other actors with economic power can exercise during 
decision-making. On a similar note, Barber argues that representation impairs the ability of 
citizens to act as “a regulating instrument of justice”, given that it prevents the public 
participation that would permit the notion of justice to take hold in the community (Barber, 
2003:145).  
To conclude, electoral representation offers some level of inclusion, equality, deliberation, 
and accountability, but always mediated by representatives. The latter means that it can only 
partially meet the desiderata because it provides limited chances for common citizens to be 
involved in a more substantive manner, which seems insufficient to call the arrangement 
self-government. The problem with electoral representation is that it relies on elections to 
provide inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability all at once, which in practice is 
clearly inadequate to secure the standing of peers amongst agents in the political sphere.   
 
 
 
3. Citizen sortition 
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Citizen sortition roughly amounts to a method of appointing common citizens for a political 
role by lottery. The inspiration for this alternative of political participation comes from 
ancient Athens. Athenians used lottery to include citizens in assemblies where they were 
able to take part in political decision-making. Accordingly, citizen sortition amounts to 
randomly select—although in many occasions the selection is stratified by demographic 
criteria—a sample of people to exercise a deliberative function that can be either binding or 
non-binding. There are different ways to implement this method. Ben Saunders (2010) for 
example, proposes replacing majority rule by lottery, which amounts to after conducting 
elections as usual, rather than deciding the outcome in accordance with the majority of the 
votes, choosing one random vote to determine the outcome. Claudio López-Guerra (2011), 
argues for another use of sortition. He suggests replacing universal suffrage with a randomly 
selected sample of the population to act as the electorate. Another way to implement sortition 
is a sortition legislature:  
   
The defining feature of a sortition legislature is the method of selecting its 
participants. Three factors go into our selection method: identifying a target 
population and then drawing a sample; specifying qualifications and 
disqualifications for service; and creating incentives for those invited to become 
legislators (Gastil & Wright, 2018:312) 
 
A sortition legislature is a legislative body fully composed of citizens appointed by lottery 
(see Callenbach and Phillips, 2008). They can have binding faculties like an elected 
legislature, as well as the same capacity to deliberate and put motions forward, or they can 
have some difference in attributions depending on the model. Gastil and Wright (2018) 
suggest that a sortition legislature should have the same faculties than an elected legislature, 
including the same pay. In their proposal, the sortition body serves a two-year term with the 
possibility to extend it to another term. Additionally, the sortition body can block party-
generated policy, which according to Gastil and Wright means that “the elected chamber has 
to craft policy that not only meets its political objectives but also has a good prospect of 
passing muster under citizen scrutiny” (Gastil & Wright, 2018:324).  David Owen and 
Graham Smith (2018) disagree with the idea of implementing such broad agenda-setting 
powers for the sortition body and instead support a more restricted mandate (Owen & Smith, 
 
 
110 
 
2018:420). Fishkin (2018) suggests institutionalised instances of deliberation that act as a 
prefilter or post-filter for the agenda instead of establishing a permanent sortition legislature 
“In either case, the deliberative body does not do the actual lawmaking but rather filters the 
agenda (in the prefilter cases), or it provides final approval (in the postfilter cases)” (Fishkin, 
2018:360). 
Another example of citizen sortition are minipublics. These can be implemented in the shape 
of a citizen’s assembly, Deliberative Polling (Fishkin, 2018), citizen juries and others. The 
main characteristic shared by all minipublics is that they are intended to constitute a 
microcosm of voters, in other words, a group as representative as possible of diverse views 
and demographics present in the citizenry, via random sampling. Minipublics vary in sizes 
and roles, but another common characteristic is that they are supposed to create an instance 
of deliberation for lay citizens.   
 
Deliberative mini-publics are groups of 20 to 200 or more citizens tasked with 
learning, deliberating and advising or deciding on a policy or issue. Participants 
are selected through random or stratified sampling in such a way that they are 
descriptively representative of the public affected by the issue (Beauvais & 
Warren, 2019: 893) 
 
Mark Brown (2006) identifies four central features of what he calls citizen panels and that I 
have included under the notion of minipublics. First, they enable opportunities for dialogue 
among common citizens and experts, and they restrict the participation of members of 
interest groups to the role of expert witnesses instead of being included in the panel. 
Additionally, citizen panels have no capacity to make legally binding decisions, and they 
address the general public as well as public officials (Brown, 2006:204). As Brown points 
out, minipublics tend to have an advisory character. Regardless of the specific type of 
minipublic considered, all of them constitute spaces for deliberation amongst common 
citizens whilst incorporating experts’ input, but decisions resulting from such process are 
not binding, their outcomes are usually communicated to other deliberating bodies that do 
have binding faculties as advices and suggestions.    
Minipublics have been implemented in various countries. Some examples are the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (BCCA), Vancouver’s Grandview-
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Woodland Citizens’ Assembly (GWCA), and the Citizen Parliament in Ireland. The BCCA 
took place in 2005 and was the first of its kind (a citizen’s assembly). The province of British 
Columbia called upon its citizens to deliberate and ultimately propose a reform to the 
electoral system, with no involvement from elected representatives (Beauvais, 2018: 345). 
The GWCA instead, had a much broader mandate. Officials from the planning department 
in Vancouver suggested to develop a deliberative minipublic to outline a 30-year plan for 
the neighbourhood of Grandview-Woodland, which included issues from housing to 
transportation and arts.  
 
The GWCA took place between September 2014 and May 2015. Assembly 
members met as a group 11 times in this period, and additionally met with 
members of the public at three open, roundtable meetings. In June 2015, the 
GWCA's final report, the "Citizens' Assembly on the Grandview-Woodland 
Community Plan," was presented to City Council. In July 2016, the report was 
ratified by City Council (Beauvais, 2018: 345).  
 
The Irish self-denominated Citizen Parliament began by following the initiative of a Non-
Governmental Organisation movement. 100 citizens gathered in June 2011 in a citizens’ 
assembly seeking to come up with suggestions for constitutional reform. It received such 
good response from the media that the incoming government accepted and supported the 
initiative—so did most political parties—which led to the organisation of a constitutional 
convention. The latter was composed by 100 participants 67 of which were common citizens 
(the rest of them were politicians to avoid political parties’ pushback), and from it came 
proposals like legalising same-sex marriages, later validated by a referendum in 2015 
(Sintomer, 2018: 345).  
Deliberative Polling is another type of minipublic developed by James Fishkin. It originated 
in the context of presidential primaries in the United States. The idea behind it is to generate 
a representative sample of the public, which is to deliberate extensively about the merits of 
the candidates, in order to make recommendations to the wider electorate according to the 
results of this deliberation. Those recommendations are then communicated by national 
television to act as cues for voting (Fishkin, 2018:51). This was first implemented in 1996 
for presidential primaries but given that the deliberation considered topics and not the merits 
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of the candidates, its conclusions did not offer clear cues for voting. Nonetheless, this kind 
of model can and has been replicated for ballot propositions and other policy issues.  
 
An example is the case of the projects that took place in Uganda in the region of Mount 
Elgon. Two districts were involved: Bududa and Butuleja by conducting focus groups in the 
local language, as well as interviews with informants and the creation of an advisory group 
involving academics and government officials. Part of the project involved the advisory 
group identifying policy options to be implemented in both districts, which were then 
included in pre-deliberation and post-deliberation questionnaires completed by the 
participating citizens (Fishkin, 2018:100-110). Europolis is another example of Deliberative 
Polling, which was a Europe-wide Deliberative Poll that took place before the European 
parliamentary elections in 2009 (Fishkin, 2018: 117-126).        
 
One characteristic that separates Deliberative Polling from other minipublics is that it 
includes another representativeness consideration, namely, attitudinal representativeness. 
This amounts to ensuring that the sample includes the various viewpoints or attitudes present 
in the general public.  
 
 
For random samples of ordinary citizens the recruitment of the microcosm 
should provide a basis for empirical assessment of how attitudes of participants 
compare to the attitudes of the rest of the public. One simple approach is to ask 
potential participants to complete the questionnaire before recruitment, allowing 
comparison of participants and non-participants in attitudes as well as 
demographics. In addition, having another comparison group who are never 
asked to deliberate is useful and can also be used for matching in case there is 
any sampling bias (Fishkin, 2018:74).      
 
 
Fishkin does not provide a clear number for the size of the sample for Deliberative Polling, 
but states that the important thing to keep in mind is that the sample should be large enough 
to allow us to make a statistically significant evaluation of changes in opinions. The cases 
he introduces usually consider around 300 or 400 people in total.  
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In terms of how to engage participants in discussion, or to promote the weighing of 
arguments during the deliberation (usually through the course of one or two days),  
Deliberative Polling uses three methods: balanced briefing materials made by policy 
community experts from “both sides” of a discussion, small group discussion where people 
can share their reasons to object or support proposals, and “access to competing experts who 
can answer questions arising from the small group discussions” (Fishkin, 2018:75). In order 
to avoid distortions such as domination of the process by men, the most educated or in some 
way more advantaged, and group polarisation, Fishkin argues there should be good 
moderators, balanced materials and various opportunities for everyone to express their views 
suffice. According to Fishkin, Deliberative Polling results support these measures because 
they show that there is no pattern of movement of the positions of small groups towards the 
positions of the more advantaged, nor are they dominating the discussions by imposing their 
views (Fishkin, 2018:77). He adds that the same can be held against the risk of group 
polarisation. 
 
I have described some of the main forms of citizen sortition present in the literature; sortition 
legislature, minipublics and in more detail a specific kind of minipublic (Deliberative 
Polling). Although I identified some of their shared central features, there is an important 
clarification to be made. There is a significant difference between two of the forms of citizen 
sortition that I included here, which will be important when we analyse citizen sortition’s 
capacity to meet the desiderata as a whole. Sortition legislature, by contrast with minipublics, 
is a permanent instance of citizens’ deliberation. As such, it fares differently in terms of 
inclusion, deliberation, equality, and accountability. I will thus continue to analyse both 
forms—minipublics and sortition legislature—as a part of the same group but keeping in 
mind this key caveat.        
 
4. Evaluating Sortition  
 
Although some may think that random sampling is not an effective way of inclusion, Fishkin 
states that citizens are included since they can see that their viewpoints and interests are 
expressed in dialogue with all competing perspectives. Citizen sortition indeed has the 
inclusion of common citizens as one if its main motivations. This alternative of political 
participation seeks to replicate in some way the Athenian sortition system to include lay 
people in political deliberation. However, in line with the caveat I mentioned above, there 
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seem to be important variations in the way that citizen sortition is implemented, which 
accordingly fare better or worse in terms of their capacity for inclusion.  
 
Minipublics provide a valuable instance of direct involvement of common citizens in 
political decision-making. Citizens get to discuss relevant issues and receive sound 
information to support their deliberation process. This kind of inclusion certainly constitutes 
an expression of recognition of their standing as autonomous agents. Random selection of 
those who will be part of the minipublic also contributes to inclusion since it does not 
condition citizens’ involvement to any specific requirement. Nonetheless, there are a few 
important shortcomings that reduce the capacity of minipublics to be more inclusive. Yves 
Sintomer (2018) identifies eight features of minipublics (and other similar forms of 
sortition). Three of them help explain the shortcomings of minipublics in terms of inclusion.  
 
Most minipublics are organised by public authorities and are not in any way related to social 
movements. According to Sintomer (2018), they are even sometimes opposed to grassroots 
democracy. This top-down design takes away some of its inclusiveness because it leaves out 
important political agents such as community organisations and small foundations that in 
many cases advocate for minorities’ interests, which should be one of the key concerns of 
an alternative of political participation that is compatible with autonomy. Relatedly, 
Sintomer points out that most minipublics are one-off events, and that they are generally 
only consultative. Many have not been organised more than a couple of times and, as 
mentioned above, they do not result in legally binding outcomes. The latter amounts to a 
type of inclusion that is not really substantive due to the limited impact of the decision-
making that takes place in them, as well as the lack of regularity “The aim is not to make 
decisions but to improve the decision-making process with a sophisticated deliberation of 
lay citizens” (Sintomer, 2018:341). If minipublics only take place non-consecutively or with 
very little regularity, it is very unlikely that an important number of citizens get the chance 
to become involved in this instance of public deliberation.  
 
A sortition legislature instead, seems shielded from most of the problems described. The 
sortition legislature does not share two of the three features identified by Sintomer: being 
merely consultative and a one-off event. Although it would probably be organised in a top-
down fashion, its regularity and the binding character of its outcomes contribute to its 
effective capacity to include common citizens and their views, as well as experts and social 
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movements in decision-making processes. However, we have to consider that the design of 
the sortition legislature, as is the case of minipublics, is intentionally restricted to a relatively 
small number of participants, because of the emphasis on achieving real deliberation. Hence, 
the format is unavoidably restrictive in some sense and less inclusive than other forms of 
participation that involve all citizens. 
 
Considering how sortition fares in terms of equality, citizen sortition appears to be capable 
to express the agent’s equal standing. Not only do the members of the sortition body 
participate in deliberation, but their decisions have the same weight as those of elected 
legislators. There is an exercise of political power that expresses in practice an effective 
equality to relate as peers in the political sphere for common citizens and representatives 
alike. Additionally, the fact that this is a permanent institution, increases the chance of 
playing this role for most citizens. Therefore, one of the major contributions of this 
alternative lies on the faculties it grants common citizens to stand on an equal ground with 
elected representatives.  
 
I will move on now to analyse how sortition fares regarding deliberation. Citizen sortition 
(in its different forms) promotes a particular kind of deliberation because it uniquely 
connects common citizens, experts and elected representatives in the same discussion. 
Depending on the form of citizen sortition, common citizens come in direct contact with 
experts and elected representatives, whilst they also weigh the arguments of their fellow 
citizens. At the same time, sortition intends to include the diversity of views present in the 
citizenry by usually considering demographic criteria for the sampling process. Taking into 
consideration demographic characteristics can secure that the microcosm is indeed as close 
a representation of the citizenry as possible, which also secures the inclusion of marginalised 
groups in the deliberation process. Moreover, it supports the notion that discussions are 
enriched by including diverse interests, concerns and points of view: 
 
 
A representative sample or a fair cross-section of the people has epistemological 
advantages over representative government and committees of wise men: good 
deliberation must include diverse points of view, so that the range of arguments 
considered will be broader and discussion will be more inclusive (Sintomer, 
2018: 353).    
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Thus, citizen sortition seems to foster an ideal kind of deliberation by not only supporting a 
relevant sort of inclusion but providing the conditions that can lead to real exchanges among 
its participants. Nonetheless, there are two important considerations that can affect the 
capacity of citizen sortition to promote good deliberation. First, the lack of expertise of the 
members of any form of citizen sortition body could have an important effect over their 
capacity to discuss diverse issues, even in terms of their self-confidence to actively engage 
in discussions (especially for those who belong to already marginalised groups). The 
professionalisation of the political career can in this respect provide an advantage that new 
and inexperienced legislators or participants in minipublics do not have. The way to counter 
these issues can be by establishing well defined and equally distributed spaces for open 
discussion, as well as by allowing some form of professionalisation through set periods of a 
couple of years to exercise the role, like the one suggested for sortition legislatures. 
  
Second, citizen sortition’s capacity to truly promote inclusive deliberation that can be 
impactful over political decision-making, strongly depends on the form of citizen sortition 
we are thinking about. Clearly, those forms that are one-off events do not allow for impactful 
deliberation, nor inclusion of different views at a larger scale given that the little chance of 
rotation (since it is not regularly held) will leave out a significant number of people. It seems 
insufficient to hold a non-permanent or regular deliberative space for common citizens and 
label it self-government. It appears that if not regularly held and complemented by other 
direct and open to all citizens means; citizen sortition can come to merely express “a 
counterfactual opinion that is representative of what the larger public opinion could think” 
(Sintomer, 2018: 343-344, original emphasis).  
 
Finally, the accountability of citizen sortition also seems to depend significantly on the form 
we examine. Minipublics do not provide much accountability from participant citizens to the 
rest of the citizenry. However, some argue that even if there are no explicit or formal means 
for the accountability of the members of a minipublic towards the rest of the citizenry, the 
members themselves report to feel accountable. This was the case of the members of the 
GWCA, who reported feeling accountable to the neighbourhood (Beauvais & Warren, 2019: 
902). Additionally, it is important to consider that a space of deliberation that only plays a 
consultative role does not require as high accountability as the one we would expect from 
something like a sortition legislature with its binding force. It would be key to secure some 
kind of accountability if outcomes from a sortition body are in any way going to prove their 
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responsiveness to the overall citizenry. The fact that members from the sortition legislature 
are not elected by universal suffrage but selected via random sampling makes achieving 
accountability challenging. As suggested by Gastil & Wright (2018), we would require 
establishing an ethics committee—whilst assuming its limitations—that sanctions and has 
the ability to even remove members in serious cases of breach or failure to abide by the 
characteristics of their role.    
 
Overall, citizen sortition offers a high level of common citizens’ involvement in decision-
making. Likewise, it introduces well-thought instances of deliberation that include common 
citizens, experts, and elected representatives. Although these spaces are not inclusive of all 
citizens, they are open to all of them by using random sampling. The method of random 
sampling has its difficulties and could require additional measures to guarantee the inclusion 
of marginalised groups. Nonetheless, citizen sortition does provide equal treatment, and in 
some cases, equal authority to common citizens, like no other method seems to achieve.  
 
5. Direct Participation 
 
All the forms of citizen sortition mentioned above include the direct involvement of common 
citizens in deliberation processes. However, by direct participation, I will be referring to 
forms that stress the importance of the involvement of common citizens in political decision-
making by making it available to every citizen. The main feature of this alternative of 
political participation is the focus on the notion of granting common citizens the authority 
to make binding political decisions. Accordingly, I will focus on two forms of direct 
participation: voting with universal suffrage—mostly referenda—and participatory budget.  
 
One of the things that diverse democracies have in common is the implementation of 
universal suffrage for regular elections of various kinds of representatives, as well as for 
other purposes. In fact, unconditioned (to something other than the citizenship status) voting 
has become the main marker of a democracy. If there are no regular (and free) elections, a 
system cannot be labelled a democracy26. We have already discussed elections when 
examining electoral representation, which is why I will focus here on voting as a form that 
                                                          
26 This idea became key to the literature on democracy partly due to contributions connected to the 
notion of procedural democracy such as Robert Dahl’s. See “Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition” 
(1972) and “Procedural Democracy” (2005).   
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is not always connected to the election of representatives, but that is always motivated by 
the idea that common citizens should have a direct capacity to make binding decisions.  
 
Some democracies have instances that allow common citizens to vote for especially weighty 
new laws or public policies. The latter usually takes the form of a referendum, which is 
nothing more than a ballot that offers two choices: accepting or rejecting. Referenda has 
been used to decide matters from same-sex marriage laws to independence (Scotland, 
Catalonia and Puerto Rico are well-known examples). Another kind of referendum has been 
implemented to ratify constitutional changes or even full new constitutions. Countries that 
have established constitutional assemblies or conventions to re-draft their constitution, use 
referenda as a way to sanction the outcomes. In Chile, a recent agreement between all 
legislators and the government establishes two referenda, one to determine whether a new 
constitution will be elaborated (to take place in October 2020), and an additional referendum 
to ratify the final draft of the constitution in case the first one dictates that such a process 
occurs.  
 
A central characteristic of referenda is, therefore, that they seek to guarantee the legitimacy 
of an initiative or outcome. The idea is that popular support provides such legitimacy, which 
again proves direct participation’s focus on common citizens.  
 
It is important to note, as mentioned above, that what makes this kind of direct participation 
distinct from other forms of common citizen’s involvement is the kind of authority that is 
granted to common citizens. In the case of many, but not all referenda, the results are legally 
binding. An example of a non-legally binding referendumthat has been extremely 
controversial is the case of the referendum to decide the permanence of the United Kingdom 
in the European Union, better known as Brexit. Many have argued that the result of the 
referendum—leaving the European Union—will bring undesirable consequences for the 
UK27, which also led the media to cover some speculation on repeating the referendum, 28 at 
least to accept or reject the Brexit deal. Repeating referenda is not unheard of (Ireland for 
                                                          
27 See Rudolf. G Adam (2019) “Brexit: Causes and Consequences” and Martill and Staiger (eds) (2018). 
“Brexit and beyond: rethinking the futures of Europe”,  
 
28 See the BBC news: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46591250 ; The Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/11/second-brexit-referendum-ireland-
lisbon-polls ; The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/12/could-
there-be-second-brexit-referendum/   
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the Lisbon treaty is an example), but much of the weight of the process does seem to rely on 
the seriousness of outcomes that command subsequent action.             
 
Participatory Budget (PB), on the other hand, offers an additional component compared to 
referenda. It not only allows for the direct participation of all citizens but involves 
deliberation. Essentially, PB amounts to involving common citizens in the allocation of 
public resources.  
 
 
The basic idea is to permit non-elected citizens to have a role in the allocation of 
public money, with direct decision-making power at the local level, the power 
of co-decision at the city level, and oversight capacity at all levels. The 
participatory pyramid has three levels: assemblies open to all in the 
neighborhoods, assemblies, and a participatory council of delegates in the 
districts, and a general participatory council at the city level (Sintomer et.al, 
2012: 5).     
 
To this simple definition Sintomer et al. (2012), add five criteria: (1) Discussion of the use 
of a limited budget; (2) Involvement of the city level, district or similar (beyond the 
neighbourhood level); (3) Repetition over the years (a one-off event is not a PB); (4) 
Deliberation at specific and separate meetings/forums (citizens invited to deliberate on 
budget issues to existing local councils is not enough); (5) Accountability about the results 
of the process (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 3). These criteria serve to specify some elements that 
separate PB from other instances designed for common citizens’ involvement, such as 
minipublics, which as we saw many times are not repeated through the years. Note that 
although PB offers deliberation unlike referenda, not every PB nor the full process is totally 
binding. The decisions made by citizens at the local and city level do have an impact and are 
to be included on the final budget, but unlike referenda, outcomes do not directly reflect in 
policy. The municipal level has the capacity to object to citizens’ proposals, which would 
therefore not be adopted for the final Budget. Much relies on the citizens and grassroots’ 
organisations to exercise strong oversite and demand for accountability of the results—as 
included in the criteria mentioned above.      
 
PB first took place in Porto Alegre in Brasil as the result of a mix of favourable 
circumstances, one of which was the electoral victory of the Workers’ Party (PT) in 1988. 
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The initiative, nonetheless, was promoted not only by the newly elected left-wing local 
government, but also by community associations. In this sense, PB began as both a bottom-
up and top-down initiative. The peak of participation was in 2002 with 17.200 people for 
main district meetings and many more for the neighbourhood level. In terms of the 
characteristics of those who seem to participate more, Sintomer et.al hold that “lower income 
people tend to be more involved than others, women have become a majority in the 
assemblies” (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 6). Since this first case PB have been expanding, from 
initially spreading around Latin America in the 1990’s to close to 200 cases in Europe in 
2010, between 40-120 experiments in Asia, and the constant development of participatory 
procedures for budgeting in Africa (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 3).  
 
Direct participation as an alternative of political participation offers un-mediated 
involvement of all citizens and grants them either binding decision-making attributions, or 
the chance to contribute to shaping the budget for their local communities.  
 
6. Direct participation: examining a classic form of inclusion  
 
Let us evaluate how direct participation fares with regards to inclusion, equality, 
deliberation, and accountability.  
 
If we consider inclusion, the two forms of direct participation that I included in the 
characterisation of this alternative, do very well. One of the main advantages of forms of 
direct participation lies on its capacity to include all citizens. There is, of course, a smaller 
number of participants in PB for practical reasons. Just like in the case of citizen sortition, 
when a process requires more time invested, motivation, as well as practical considerations, 
come into place. People who are unable to set time aside because of their jobs will be less 
able to take part of a PB even if they are actually interested. Similarly, those who usually are 
politically more active will surely be more motivated to participate. Referenda and voting, 
in general, have the capacity to be more inclusive because they represent a one-off event, 
but then again, we already discussed the disadvantages that one-off events have for all the 
desiderata.  
 
Regarding equality, voting with universal suffrage allows us to effectively stand on the same 
footing with other citizens. It permits having a say that will have the same weight than that 
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of any other citizen, regardless of their social or economic position and power. However, it 
is key to make some clarifications regarding the differences between the sort of voting we 
discussed in electoral representation—electing representatives—and referenda as included 
in the previous section. I have already stated one of the main differences between voting for 
representatives and participating on referenda, namely, the authority to make a binding 
decision that reflects into the implementation of a law, a policy, a new constitution, versus 
the authority to contribute to the election of a political representative. These kinds of 
authority differ because the capacity of choosing something that will be directly 
implemented is surely weightier than a vote to support one candidate over the other. But 
more importantly, I have not yet addressed a key difference in terms of the equality that is 
expressed in both forms.  
 
Voting for representatives is unfortunately vulnerable to a number of technical (and not so 
technical) matters that can have a strong impact on the initially equal standing of citizens 
and the equal weight of their votes. Gerrymandering—shaping the boundaries of a 
constituency in order to provide an unfair advantage for a specific party—is one of them; 
non-proportional seats for each district is another. If the area you live is in fact bigger but 
gets less representatives appointed, one could argue that the weight of your vote is not the 
same than the vote of a person who lives in an over-represented area (too many seats for a 
small population). This and other problems (lack of transparency and regulation of campaign 
funding, for example) distort the ideal of equality that voting for elections wants to represent; 
“one person one vote”. Referenda, conversely, is not exposed to these problems and as such 
does seem to fair better on guaranteeing the equal weight of votes, which in turn means, the 
equal standing of each citizen when they vote.  
 
PB offers the equal chance to participate to common citizens, as well as instances of 
discussion that also involve representatives and local authorities. At the same time, it 
connects citizens to community organisations, and allows the former not only the chance to 
choose from already settled alternatives but to suggest and help shape the priorities for the 
budget. In this sense, it grants citizens capacities for agenda-setting that expresses the equal 
standing between common citizens and political authorities in a way that is rarely seen. 
Although I defined equality in terms of standing more than equal distribution of (or access 
to) resources, opportunities, or capabilities, I included distribution as an important element 
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for political participation, precisely because of what it does to our standing. Thus, it is worth 
mentioning that PB (out of all the forms we have examined) promotes re-distribution:  
 
 
PB has led to a reorientation of public investments towards the most 
disadvantaged districts, at least those investments decided within the 
participatory process (…) primary health care was set up in the living areas of 
the poor, the number of schools and nursery schools was extended, many streets 
in the slums were asphalted and most households now have access to water 
supply and waste water systems (Sintomer et.al, 2012: 6).     
 
 
The forms of direct participation that I examined have the most noticeable departure when 
we think of their ability to promote deliberation. Referenda offer the chance for deliberating 
in private, which one could argue grants each person more time to consider issues separated 
from external pressures. Nonetheless, the only way in which this can actually be an 
advantage of referenda is by securing transparent and well-informed campaigns before the 
voting takes place. Deliberation could be highly improved if it is supported by access to good 
information regarding the issue at hand. But this kind of individual deliberation is not ideal, 
namely, because it is very vulnerable to manipulations and does not allow for discussions 
between contrasting arguments in more appropriate setting. Again, citizens with better 
access to good information, or who are better trained at distinguishing manipulated contents 
from veridical material, will have the chance to deliberate in much better conditions. Hence, 
this unequal setting for deliberation makes referenda weaker in this respect.  
 
PB instead, fosters deliberation between different actors as well as one that is supported by 
good access to information. As with citizen sortition, deliberation includes representatives, 
local organisations, common citizens, and experts. Although experts and community 
organisations do not directly take part in discussions, they are playing an enabling role for 
them to happen under good conditions. Additionally, the fact that PB includes different 
settings for deliberation (separate assemblies at the different levels) makes those instances 
better suited to promote more detailed discussions. Hence, the great departure between 
referenda and PB has to do with on the one hand a form that does not necessarily involve 
open discussions between competing arguments, but private reasoning of the options; versus 
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another, that enables contact with experts, representatives, and a floor for common citizens 
to discuss amongst themselves the competing arguments.        
 
Finally, even though one could think that accountability is one of the strong features of direct 
participation, it appears that both forms do not fare equally well in this regard. PB, in this 
case, does less well than referenda. Since the outcomes of the discussions are not necessarily 
binding, the authorities in charge of making the final decisions can exercise their higher 
authority to not take into consideration the citizens’ recommendations, which is why 
ensuring accountability of the results in how they will be included at the end of the process 
is key to avoid distortions and manipulations.  
   
 
Although there are accountability problems because leaders may not follow their 
supporters’ interests, PB councillors should in principle ensure that the priorities 
of the districts are taken up in the budget to the largest extent possible. 
Independent NGOs train the representatives of the participatory budget to enable 
them to co-plan with the administration. The process has a one year cycle 
(Sintomer et.al, 2012: 5). 
 
 
Conversely, referenda theoretically guarantee that, if the process follows the appropriate 
conditions established for any election, the results will reflect what citizens themselves 
chose. In this case, direct involvement appears to abide by its classical commitment to grant 
accountability. Being a direct actor in the decision-making process should be the best way 
to ensure accountability because it implies more control and transparency, but we have to 
keep in mind that as PB, even direct participation needs to include mechanisms to ensure 
accountability of results and of people’s roles.   
 
I have now examined the three democratic alternatives of political participation I introduced 
at the beginning of this chapter: electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct 
participation. We looked into different forms to implement each of them and how these 
forms allowed for inclusion, equality, deliberation and accountability. 
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7. Contrasting the alternatives    
 
Before moving on to describe what I take to be the best way to implement collective self-
government, I would like to conclude the analysis by briefly presenting my conclusions by 
contrasting the alternatives. The previous section described and analysed in some detail each 
of the alternatives by mostly attending to the forms in which they are implemented. The 
latter helped us consider their potential in practice in terms of strengths and weaknesses 
when confronted with each desideratum. However, each alternative has a clear focus that, in 
turn, tends to reflect into the capacity to promote one or two of the desiderata. In what 
follows, I will discuss this consideration and summarise how the alternatives foster the 
desiderata.  
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Table 1. Comparing alternatives of political participation  
 
Alternative Inclusion Equality Deliberation Accountability 
Electoral 
representatio
n 
Method: 
all 
citizens 
Decision 
making: only 
representativ
es (or other 
authorities) 
Equal weight of 
every citizen's 
vote but most 
decision-making 
is restricted to 
representatives  
Personal 
deliberation 
for voting and 
discussions 
between 
representatives 
only 
Mainly via 
elections and 
spaces to make 
outcomes 
available to the 
public 
Citizen 
sortition 
Method: 
citizens 
elected by 
sortition 
from a 
sample 
that 
includes 
all 
citizens  
Decision 
making: 
elected 
citizens, 
representativ
es, experts 
and other 
authorities 
Creates 
instances of 
deliberation that 
promote 
discussion on an 
equal footing 
between all 
actors. It also 
grants authority 
to make binding 
decisions to 
citizens in some 
cases    
Creates 
instances of 
deliberation 
that promote 
informed 
discussions 
between all 
actors (with 
binding and 
non-binding 
outcomes)   
Through voting, 
by including 
diverse actors in 
discussions and 
making 
outcomes 
public.  
Direct 
participation 
Method: 
all 
citizens  
Decision 
making: 
open to all 
citizens 
Votes with 
equal weight 
lead to (mostly) 
binding 
decisions 
Fosters either 
personal 
deliberation 
and informal 
public ones 
(referenda) or 
discussions 
between all 
actors (PB)   
Via voting and 
making 
outcomes public 
Source: Author’s elaboration  
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Electoral representation focuses on the deliberation that takes place between representatives. 
The idea is to provide a space where authorities chosen by universal suffrage—thus, by the 
people—can discuss matters of public importance, which should mean that representatives 
themselves bring people’s concerns into those discussions in some way. Such focus on the 
representatives’ deliberation surely shows this alternative’s potential to do well precisely in 
terms of allowing for deliberation. Although even that aspect can be tainted by party 
pressures, and by protecting the interests of campaign funders over those of the people. But 
suppose that we can improve those spaces for deliberation—some countries do better at 
keeping those distortions under control—electoral representation’s focus on deliberation 
also means that it seems to fall short on the other three desiderata.  
 
As we can see in table 1, inclusion and equality usually go hand in hand, and electoral 
representation with its focus on mediated involvement does not express much equality nor 
grant inclusion. Electoral representation does involve a relevant expression of equality and 
inclusion by conducting elections that are open to all and binding in character, but there is 
no substantive inclusion of common citizens in decision-making nor clear opportunities for 
them to relate to authorities and experts as equals. Accountability, on the other hand, gets 
reduced to the same method that is used to express equality and inclusion. Voters reward or 
punish the performance of authorities by supporting them with their vote, or choosing to 
elect another candidate, and they also get it by having some access to outcomes. But this is 
a very limited way to get accountability, especially given that the vote does not “say” much; 
it can be read as expressing various things which makes interpreting them quite difficult and 
granted that looking for those outcomes usually requires personal effort (they are not made 
easily available in many cases).    
 
Citizen sortition also focuses on deliberation, but this time it offers instances where common 
citizens, experts and political authorities can discuss. Accordingly, we could say that it also 
focuses on a sort of inclusion that, even if it does not ultimately include all citizens, it does 
reach all of them by giving them the chance to be elected via lottery to take part in decision-
making processes directly. This, as shown on the table, amounts to citizen sortition’s 
capacity to meet the desiderata that escape its focus much better than electoral representation 
did. It is important to recall that citizen sortition also has its weaknesses as discussed above—
its accountability could be improved—but overall, sortition provides instances of shared 
decision-making that promote most of the desiderata.  
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Finally, direct participation focuses on inclusion. As I mentioned before, inclusion and 
equality go together, since access usually implies “levelling the field”. Nevertheless, we 
know that access is not sufficient to guarantee being granted the status of peers in political 
discussions. Direct participation is not always capable to secure something beyond open 
access, which makes it less able to foster collective deliberation. Accountability is better 
guaranteed by taking direct part of decision-making, be it via forms like referenda or 
Participatory Budgeting, although we also found some weaknesses on this respect for PB.  
 
To conclude, every alternative of political participation examined here seems to have a focus 
feature that makes it desirable, whilst at the same time failing at important desideratum, 
overall, the “weak spot” of all of them is accountability. Some, of course, do better than 
others—citizen sortition with a permanent deliberative body would help for this—they tend 
to share the mechanisms they use in order to guarantee some level of accountability. Taking 
all these elements into account, I will now continue by presenting what I suggest is the best 
model of political participation to truly implement Collective self-government.   
 
IV. Collective self-government: a model of political participation  
 
 
Each of these has a place in an ideal democratic system. Whenever feasible, a 
direct participatory process might prove effective at tackling a wide range of 
local public problems. At larger social scales, however, a trade-off emerges. 
Elections embody the ideal of government by the people (i.e., the full electorate), 
whereas sortition advances the goal of government of the people (i.e., the 
sortition assembly). Pairing those together, as we suggest, helps ensure a good 
measure of both in legislative bodies (Gastil & Wright, 2018:307) 
 
 
Relating as peers requires spaces where there can be communication and a “flow of 
information” between all agents in the political sphere—which we normally lack in our 
democracies. In light of the analysis of the three alternatives I presented above, I will devote 
the final part of this chapter to introduce my model of political participation, which connects 
all three alternatives. The central and novel feature of what would be the implementation of 
my collective self-government is a sortition legislature. I take Gastil & Wright’s (2018) 
 
 
128 
 
proposal, as well as their suggestion of complementing the sortition legislature with the other 
two alternatives. Accordingly, I include Deliberative Polling (DP), Participatory Budgeting 
(PB) and electoral representation. I will explain how they all interact in more detail in what 
follows.  
 
1. Connecting Sortition legislature, Participatory Budgeting and Deliberative 
Polling  
 
The previous analysis of the alternatives of political participation showed some of the 
strengths of citizen sortition. Its focus on inclusive and well-informed deliberation is 
probably the most important one, but I would like to point out another key benefit from 
establishing a sortition legislature, which I believe greatly justifies its implementation—
before moving on to the practical aspects. All three alternatives proved to be badly equipped 
to guarantee accountability. However, a closer look into sortition legislature shows its 
potential to foster a very high level of accountability.   
 
 
(…) The sortition body forces its elected counterpart to consider whether 
prospective bills will pass muster in a relatively deliberative assembly. Since the 
citizen sortition assembly can block party-generated policy, the elected chamber 
has to craft policy that not only meets its political objectives but also has a good 
prospect of passing muster under citizen scrutiny (Gastil & Wright, 2018:324). 
 
 
The accountability that comes from having a legislature constituted by common citizens is 
unprecedented. A sortition legislature would promote an agenda-setting that has to be 
connected to common citizen’s concerns, which is precisely one of the weakest aspects of 
our democracies. The pressure that the sortition legislature would put on elected 
representatives would certainly make them want to improve how their proposals reflect 
citizens’ concerns, which would basically amount to better policies.   
    
Regarding the practical aspect of implementing a sortition legislature, the main 
transformation would be changing democracies into a bicameral system—like many of them 
already have—that consists of one elected legislature and one sortition legislature. My model 
keeps representatives on their role as we know it, but with important re-arranging of the 
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division of labour in political decision-making, by including the sortition chamber and other 
participatory means for common citizens and experts. The reason to keep the elected 
legislature is very well presented by Gastil and Wright; we need the negotiation that takes 
place within the elected legislature.  
 
 
(…) Given the nature of power and inequality in contemporary societies, there 
are conflicts of interest in society that cannot be resolved simply through 
disinterested deliberation. Thus, bargaining and compromise will remain an 
important part of politics (Gastil & Wright, 2018:322). 
 
 
The members of the sortition legislature would be selected by lottery from a sample that 
includes all citizens, but that is stratified by the following criteria: gender, 
ethnicity/indigeneity, disability, socio-economic status, and geography. This would prevent 
exclusions of already marginalised groups by securing their inclusion in decision-making 
processes. The criteria should be flexible to adjust to the social, cultural, and economic 
reality of each context, but it would always be crucial to apply sortition by stratification of 
the sample to guarantee seats for minorities.  
 
In terms of the more detailed characteristics of the sortition legislature in practice, as stated 
by Gastil and Wright (2018), what works for the elected legislature would also work for the 
sortition body. They explain in more detail that clearly an important consideration to 
establish a sortition legislature is to set incentives for participation. People do not usually 
have the resources to devote their time to legislate without compensation, and a lack of it 
would amount to limiting the plurality of the group. Thus, the sortition legislature would be 
payed the same salary than the one received by members of the elected legislature. Formal 
faculties would also be the same between both chambers. The main difference would be not 
just that it is composed of common citizens chosen by lot, but the duration of their terms. 
Following Gastil and Wright’s proposal, the sortition body would serve for a two-year period 
and would be given a chance to serve for an additional term. Each selected member for the 
sortition legislature could decline for creditable circumstances that prevent them from 
serving, as well as postpone their role for one period to accommodate to their existing 
responsibilities (Gastil & Wright, 2018:314).    
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In order to provide an inclusive space that keeps the connection with local organisations and 
thus, with grassroots democracy, my model also includes regular PB. As mentioned, PB 
would also help tackle re-distribution and better use of resources on matters that really are 
salient in people’s communities. Following Gastil and Wright´s (2018) suggestion, my 
model gives the PB the capacity to raise issues directly to the sortition legislature. At the end 
of the deliberation for a set period (semester, trimester or year) budget, the PB would be able 
to meet the sortition legislature and present their conclusions with respect to both local and 
higher-level budget priorities. This not only offers an additional mode of accountability for 
the members of the sortition body but allows for an agenda-setting capacity that would be 
key to grant real impact and authority to local communities.  
 
 
Participatory budgeting processes could be tethered to the sortition legislature to 
influence some of their budgetary priorities, at every level of government (…) 
The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly also provides a model, now used in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere, to craft legislative proposals that could 
come to the sortition legislature for review” (Gastil & Wright, 2018:321). 
 
 
The third form of citizen’s involvement included in this collective self-government model is 
DP. This form of minipublic would provide an additional instance of informed deliberation 
as a one-off event for those who cannot commit to more time-consuming roles. Collective 
deliberation and a connection to experts would both ratify the experts’ capacity to contribute 
to political decision-making and educate common citizens on exercising the role of 
deliberators. At the same time, DP would serve as an additional measure to help increase 
accountability by making proposals more salient—candidates would have to focus on 
making a clear statement of what they support—and by making the results of discussions 
regarding the potential of each candidate’s suggestions available via national television. 
Universal vote to elect representatives would remain the same, whilst the use of referenda 
would be suggested for some relevant decisions. Ideally, prior to the referenda, a DP could 
take place to secure access to information and a safe space for open discussion of the issues 
at stake.  
 
This model would make substantial changes to our democracies by opening regular spaces 
of informed discussion that connect all actors, which would especially foster an appropriate 
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flow of information between experts and the people that is so difficult to find in our 
democracies. Introducing various instances of direct involvement of common citizens would 
become educational and transform people’s notion of their own authority. Seeing the impact 
that they can have beyond being one vote amongst many, would help address the problem 
of disaffection. Democracies have been struggling with low turnout for voting for years, 
many have explained this lack of motivation by suggesting that people just do not see any 
point in voting; they realise their individual vote has very little impact over the overall result.  
 
It is relevant to conclude by mentioning that local involvement and discussion would still be 
key to this model. Not everyone would be able to join the new instances of deliberation. 
Hence, strengthening existing grassroots democracy organisations should be part of the 
overall project.    
 
2. Challenges for the proposal  
 
Like all models, implementing collective self-government as I suggest, has strengths and 
shortcomings. In this section, I would like to briefly address the challenges to the proposal 
in light of the desiderata. Although there are difficult challenges that my model would have 
to face, overall, it still offers what I deem the most suitable implementation—even though 
as I said at the beginning of the chapter, I am open to other options.  
 
The kind of mixed implementation that I offer, fares very well in terms of inclusion. It takes 
the good elements from each alternative to try to secure open participation and universal 
suffrage, whilst adding the special kind of inclusion that a sortition legislature would 
embody. Nonetheless, making sure that the sample is indeed representative, and that the 
criteria correctly track the groups that should be included could be two very pressing 
challenges. The best way to calibrate whether the model does generate the right group for 
the sortition chamber will, unfortunately be trial and error. However, there is enough 
evidence from other minipublics and experiences that have been very successful at sampling 
that could certainly make this process easier. Women and all marginalised groups were at 
the centre of the concerns I discussed throughout the analysis of political participation. 
Stratified sampling would work like quotas, which we know are insufficient to face 
subordination, but opening spaces of deliberation that involve binding authority and agenda 
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setting capacities could amount to substantive changes. It could bring issues and concerns 
into decision-making processes that would otherwise probably not be there.  
 
Regarding equality, although the model again intends to combine the alternatives to foster 
equal treatment, I do not hold a naïve idea of the impact and scope that institutional and 
formal political changes can have over persistent unequal treatment. I followed Fraser’s 
(2000) view of recognition and placed it at the centre of what I suggest are Relations of 
Mutual Recognition. The main goal to face misrecognition from that perspective was to 
change the patterns of cultural value that have been institutionalised and label some as less 
worthy of respect. My model of collective self-government wants to aid that transformation, 
but I acknowledge that there is a lot more than rearranging our political division of labour 
that needs to be done to accomplish cultural changes. However, this different way of relating 
to one another in the political sphere could promote long term changes. By providing 
instances where we truly relate to one another as equals in discussions, we could reclaim the 
political as an area where Relations of Mutual Recognition can and should take place.  
 
About deliberation, most of the challenges I identified in the discussion regarding citizen 
sortition would also apply for my model. Since I include as a key part of the model, three 
different forms of citizen sortition, my proposal also faces the issues regarding making 
deliberation truly informed by all views, taking especial care to include those voices that are 
usually not an active part of political decision-making, i.e., from members of minorities. 
With respect to accountability, preventing sortition legislature becoming another space open 
to manipulations and bribes by private interests could be an additional difficulty. As we saw 
with citizen sortition in general, there must be a way to make deliberators accountable to 
each other and to the broader public. The best way to do this is something that would have 
to be sorted with time. Again, successful participatory experiences would be helpful for this 
process.  
 
All practical challenges aside, the main difficulty I foresee to implement this model would 
be resistance to change. The political sphere is filled with those who have played the same 
role for a long time, and who are thus very used to one way of conducting political decision-
making. Moreover, there are still a number of democratic theorists who wonder about both 
the capacity and entitlement of common citizens to become deliberators in a more 
substantive way (as we will see in Chapter 5). Therefore, resistance could come from all 
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flanks; researchers, politicians, and common citizens themselves. Those working on sortition 
models and radical democracy have surely encountered this kind of opposition. Nonetheless, 
the experiences of success that are growingly being implemented for minipublics and PB 
could provide a strong evidential foundation to support my model.     
 
V. Conclusions  
  
Throughout this chapter, I examined three democratic alternatives of political participation, 
namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition and direct participation. The idea was to 
analyse how each of them promoted or failed to fully meet four desiderata I identified as the 
result of the discussion on political participation from the previous chapter: inclusion, 
equality, deliberation, and accountability. I described each of the alternatives of participation 
and gave some detail of their most relevant forms of implementation, such as Participatory 
Budgeting and Deliberative Polling. I continued by contrasting each alternative in order to 
discover their focus and key contributions. I concluded by presenting my model, based on 
Gastil and Wright’s (2018) sortition legislature proposal, whilst also including the forms that 
the analysis showed would contribute to the desiderata. The analysis was concluded by 
mentioning some of the challenges and difficulties that could come up for my suggested 
model to implement collective Self-government.     
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Chapter 5: Locating my proposal: participatory and deliberative  
 
I. A participatory form of deliberative democracy 
 
Collective self-government involves implementing forms that belong to all three of the 
alternatives of political participation that I explored: electoral representation, citizen 
sortition and direct participation (See Chapter 4). The analysis of each alternative and their 
forms of implementation showed that deliberation, participation, and representation are not 
incompatible. I describe my proposal as a participatory version of deliberative democracy, 
or as a form of participatory democracy that requires deliberation29—with participatory 
understood here as implying the inclusion of common citizens in political decision-making. 
This strong connection between participation and deliberation distinguishes my view of 
relations of mutual recognition from most accounts of deliberative democracy, as well as 
from representative government or electoral democracy.  
 
In this chapter, I will identify the differences my view has with some versions of deliberative 
democracy. I want to focus on showing how there seems to be a problem in the conceptual 
background of proceduralist, and proceduralist-minded versions of deliberative democracy.  
 
I will argue that the lack of emphasis on involving common citizens (directly) in political 
decision-making puts proceduralist deliberative accounts at risk of failing to adequately 
challenge the status quo of our democracies. One of the main features of deliberative 
democracy is its intention to include those affected by decision-making, but a too marked 
attention to the importance of procedures and epistemically improved outcomes makes these 
accounts lose sight of this central component. This translates into them reducing deliberative 
democracy to a project that only has something to say about the legitimacy of the use of 
political power.  
 
My view intends to promote the transforming potential of deliberative accounts that is 
expressed precisely by the relevance of inclusion in the form of ‘giving voice’ to those 
affected by political decision-making—especially to marginalized groups. I claim that this 
                                                          
29 My proposal could also be labelled as a form of radical democracy. I do not use this label only for clarity 
purposes given that what radical democracy implies is fairly under-defined, or sometimes used to refer 
to different things; connected to Marxist inspirations (see Mouffe & Holdengräber, 1989), or radical in 
terms of implying structural transformations (Sintomer, 2018; Cohen & Fung, 2004).   
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should be the driving force of deliberative accounts of democracy if they are to exercise their 
capacity to promote structural changes to the way that our democracies work. I hold, 
following Iris Marion Young’s (2010) inclusive deliberative democracy, that in order to do 
this we have to present a justification of deliberative democracy that relies on its capacity to 
promote more just outcomes, by way of collective and inclusive deliberation. At the same 
time, the participatory emphasis of my view takes inspiration from Carole Pateman’s (2012) 
participatory democracy, which I argue is completely compatible with a deliberative model 
like Young’s.  
 
In what follows I begin by discussing Jon Elster’s (1998) and Joshua Cohen’s (1998) 
versions of deliberative democracy. Elster provides a characterisation of deliberative 
democracy that supports my claim about the risk of not challenging the status quo that some 
versions of deliberative democracy face, due to distancing the project from common citizens’ 
involvement. I continue by analysing Cohen’s proceduralist account of deliberative 
democracy, not only because of its relevance for the literature but because it allows me to 
show the problems that an excessive attention to the legitimate use of political power can 
bring for deliberative democracy. The final part briefly discusses the kind of deliberative 
project that my view supports and its connection to Young’s (2010) understanding of just 
outcomes from political decision-making, as well as the inspiration I take from Pateman’s 
(2012) participatory democracy.   
 
II. Proceduralist deliberative democracy: reasoned arguments for political 
legitimacy 
 
One of the main features of deliberative democracy is the intention to reach well-reasoned 
and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them 
in collective deliberation. However, the commitment to involve every reasonable citizen that 
will be impacted by the decision is not equally central, nor defined in the same terms in all 
versions of deliberative democracy. As in most cases, there is an ample variety of 
interpretations of the view, which make a sometime contrasting emphasis. In this part, I will 
look into one general description of the main features of deliberative democracy, and I will 
analyse a proceduralist version of deliberative democracy. The idea is to show that what is 
problematic and can sometimes even extend to other—not just proceduralist and epistemic—
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accounts of deliberative democracy is how they justify what I just identified as one of the 
main features of deliberative democracy:  
 
Reaching well-reasoned and well-informed decisions by involving the relevant 
actors that will be affected by them in collective deliberation.  
 
I will show here that proceduralist accounts in particular hold that the reason why we should 
engage in this sort of deliberation is to improve the legitimacy of our outcomes. Accordingly, 
inclusion is reduced to a necessary component of a procedure that can make results more 
legitimate. If common citizens can consider that they are in some way part of decision-
making processes, then the resulting outcomes of such process have the ‘seal of legitimacy’ 
required.30 I will conclude that this makes these approaches unable to challenge the current 
dominating political relations we experience in our democracies. In order to do so, I will 
begin by presenting Jon Elster’s (1998) overview of what deliberative democracy entails, 
followed by an analysis of Cohen’s (1998) proceduralist view.            
 
1. Jon Elster: Types of decision making and the representatives in deliberation 
 
In order to provide a definition for deliberative democracy Elster (1998) describes the 
meaning of both the democratic and deliberative component: 
 
 
(…) The notion includes collective decision making with the participation of all 
who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the 
democratic part. Also, all agree that it includes decision making by means of 
arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of 
rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part (Elster, 1998:8).  
 
 
He wants to show that even though there are differences amongst people who support the 
notion of deliberative democracy, the concept has these two basic requirements, namely, the 
                                                          
30 The intention to improve the quality of the outcomes is a separate matter that affects epistemic 
accounts more directly and that I will also address here in more detail 
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participation of the relevant parties for the decision-making, and a commitment to the use of 
reason and impartial arguments.  
 
To track the historical background of the idea of deliberation in its connection to democracy, 
Elster (1998) quotes writers from Thucydides to Edmund Burke. The latter gives a speech 
that Elster qualifies as “probably, the most famous statement of the case for deliberative 
democracy” (Elster, 1998:3). The passage of the speech he focuses on expresses the 
incompatibility of voter’s control over their representatives with the “deliberative nature of 
democracy”. Accordingly, representatives are not supposed to be an advocate of people’s 
interests but to participate in a deliberative assembly where there is only the common interest, 
or general good, in mind. Hence, it is implied by Elster’s emphasis that the deliberative 
component does not refer to a scenario where common citizens should be involved, but to 
the manner in which their representatives should behave. Furthermore, representatives are to 
be entrusted with the responsibility to promote the common good beyond the particular 
interests of the people they represent. Recall Pitkin’s (1967) distinction between 
representatives as advocates versus trustees. Elster’s analysis suggests that deliberative 
democracy is based on the second kind since deliberation—here undertaken by 
representatives—portrays them as trustees guided by a concern for the common good.    
 
In order to emphasise the benefits of deliberation as a form of collective decision-making, 
Elster describes three types of collective decision making, other than deliberation. These are: 
arguing, bargaining and voting (Elster, 1998:5).  According to Elster, the first two constitute 
speech acts, unlike voting, and all three of them are at the same time related to three ways of 
considering subject’s preferences: aggregation, transformation, and misrepresentation. 
Aggregation equals to voting, transformation is the aim of arguing, and every type of decision 
making is susceptible to misrepresentation. Another trichotomy can be found in the 
member’s motives, which he describes can come from reason, interest, or passion. Arguing 
is “intrinsically connected” (Elster, 1998:6) to reason, for it requires the provision of 
arguments based on “impartial values” (Elster, 1998:6), but the other two, voting and 
bargaining, can come from any of the mentioned motives. Hence, Elster holds that 
deliberation is the most appropriate type of collective decision making since it provides 
reasonable arguments that can transform preferences.  
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There are some important things to say about Elster’s characterisation of deliberative 
democracy. Going beyond particular interests is one of the strengths of the idea of 
deliberation, still, it is very important to consider the risks of giving too much centrality to 
the representative’s role like Elster’s characterisation suggests. Setting aside concerns 
regarding the common good as something that can or should be what guides deliberations, 
as the analysis of non-domination showed (Chapter 2, Part II), representatives can be very 
susceptible to both internal (from their political party) and external (economic and other 
interests of powerful affected parties) pressures. Relatedly, granting representatives the 
whole weight of the responsibility of decision-making processes, as most contemporary 
democracies do, can jeopardise the inclusion of ordinary citizen’s interests, given that too 
much depends on the latter’s capacity to know or interpret those interests (see Chapter 4).  
 
On the other hand, if what deliberative democracy offers as a project has only to do with 
setting a standard and conditions for the deliberation amongst representatives, its capacity to 
challenge the status quo in terms of improving the inclusion of those affected by decision-
making gets restricted, which seemed to be one of its main goals. According to Elster, 
deliberative democracy contributes something novel to debates around democracy because 
it implies arguments being offered ‘by and to’ participants in political decision-making, 
which should include those affected by the decision. Nonetheless, Elster adds to this last 
element of deliberative democracy—which he calls the democratic component—that 
deliberative democracy can include all or their representatives. This final caveat is the one 
that puts the project in danger of restricting common citizens’ inclusion.  
 
The last consideration has to do with the risk of elitism that deliberative democracy can face. 
Elster includes a concern that is also present in Cohen’s (1998) view, as I will discuss in the 
following sections, namely, regarding the epistemic quality of the outcomes from collective 
deliberation. Elster leaves the issue of differences in knowledge and how to secure a well-
informed deliberation whilst preventing elitism as an open question: 
      
 
Does the unequal distribution of education, information, and commitment pose 
a threat to deliberative democracy? Will deliberation produce all its good effects 
if it takes place mainly within an elite that is self-selected because it knows more 
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than others about public issues and is more concerned about them? (Elster, 
1998:16).  
 
 
The problem is that Elster’s characterisation of deliberative democracy claims that 
deliberation is supposed to be a means to transform people’s preferences. According to most 
accounts of deliberative democracy, people’s preferences are not fixed but susceptible to 
transformation by our interactions with others. This is one of the alleged strengths of 
deliberation, that it allows for outcomes to really represent the best alternative because it 
involves an exchange of reasons to support each view, which both leads to transform some 
people’s perspective because they are persuaded by the reasons offered and opens the space 
to include various perspectives—which also plays a role in the transformation. This aspect 
of deliberative democracy emphasises precisely how crucial it is to have an inclusive and not 
elitist sort of deliberation process. The risk of elitism, thus, threatens to prevent that 
deliberation, as Elster puts it: ‘produce all its good effects’.    
  
2. Joshua Cohen: an idealised deliberation procedure  
 
Having discussed some elements of deliberative democracy as described by Elster and having 
also sketched some of the challenges the project can face, I will move on to consider Cohen’s 
account of deliberative democracy. This section will present my analysis of the shortcomings 
I identify in his view, but more broadly what is problematic about proceduralist and other 
legitimacy-based accounts of deliberative democracy. The idea is to show that proceduralist 
(and proceduralist-minded) views build a theoretical background that restricts what is one of 
the fundamental elements of deliberative democracy accounts as a whole: inclusion. 
Regardless of the differences, deliberative accounts share a similar starting point, as we saw 
in Elster’s characterisation, which is wanting to include those affected by decision-making. 
The main difference is the reason why they want this to happen, or the motivation behind 
each project, which has an important impact over proposals. In the case of Cohen, and 
proceduralist accounts, they are motivated by the search for legitimacy. This section will 
show the issues that come from that concern. Since my project can be labelled as a 
deliberative account, the ultimate aim of this analysis is to emphasise the different motivation 
behind my participatory version, which will prove how it is better capable of challenging the 
status quo and offering a transforming project of our current dominating political relations.  
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Cohen (1998) holds that the “fundamental democratic idea” (Cohen, 1998:222) is that 
“decisions about the exercise of state power are collective” (Cohen, 1998:222). To develop 
the idea further, he separates versions of democracy into two types, both collectively binding: 
aggregative and deliberative. For the first conception, democracy complies with being 
collective only if decisions come from a procedure that gives: “equal consideration to - more 
generically, are positively responsive to” (Cohen, 1998:186) the interest of each person 
affected by the decision. Conversely, a deliberative conception is collective when it: 
“emerges from arrangements of binding collective choice that establish conditions of free 
public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions” (Cohen, 1998:186).    
 
Deliberative democracy, in particular, is understood by Cohen (1998) as a procedure of 
deliberation where members provide reasons that can be acceptable to other reasonable 
members (Cohen, 1998:193).  
 
 
The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an ideal of 
political justification. According to this ideal, justification of the exercise of 
collective political power is to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning 
among equals. A deliberative democracy institutionalizes this ideal (Cohen, 
2009: 160).  
 
 
Both Cohen’s (1998) general idea of democracy and his deliberative conception emphasise 
the centrality of the justification of power through collective decision-making. What matters 
most is not that citizens have a right to be involved in the process that will result in the 
policies governing their lives, but that those outcomes are reached by a reasonable process 
that shows an equal regard for people instead of their interests. Thus, this view of deliberative 
democracy seems to be neither about improving the fairness of the outcomes nor about the 
exercise of authority that our equal standing should grant all citizens for political decision-
making. 
 
Additionally, Cohen (1998) states that his definition of deliberative democracy is able to 
foster a form of political autonomy and constitutes a kind of political community. He holds 
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that to achieve the former, deliberative democracy asks for the bases of decisions that will 
govern other lives to be acceptable to them “even when they disagree with the details of the 
decision” (Cohen, 1998:222).  
 
 
[I]n this assurance of political autonomy, deliberative democracy achieves one 
important element of the ideal of community (…) because providing acceptable 
reasons for the exercise of political power to those who are governed by it—a 
requirement absent from the aggregative view—expresses the equal membership 
of all in the sovereign body responsible for authorizing the exercise of that power 
(Cohen, 2009: 163-164).  
 
 
Cohen appears to understand deliberation as the best-suited procedure to express respect for 
every citizen’s autonomy. However, as I argued above, respect for autonomy is insufficient 
as a justification for deliberative democracy, and even more so for the participatory form that 
I promote.  
 
Knowing that others deliberated in an informed and reasonable way, whilst also being 
presented with acceptable reasons that justify a particular outcome, certainly contribute to 
accountability, and can even represent a form of inclusion. Nonetheless, mediated 
involvement can only take our so far. As we saw in the discussion regarding non-domination 
and control (Chapter 2), we need to have real authority in the form of political power that 
can be exercised in decision-making. The inequalities that put us in different positions to 
influence political outcomes—cultural, economic—cannot be countered by mere formal 
respect for our autonomy. Hence, thinking of deliberation in terms of a procedure that allows 
for a legitimate exercise of political power—done by others—is problematic because it 
reduces the goal of deliberative democracy to just this, the search for a legitimate procedure 
of power exercise. What I described at the beginning of this part of the chapter as a central 
feature of deliberative democracy, namely, reaching well-reasoned and well-informed 
decisions by involving the relevant actors that will be affected by them in collective 
deliberation, becomes instrumental to this goal.  
 
The second issue that I identified as problematic in proceduralist views is one that I also 
claimed belongs to some epistemic versions of deliberative democracy. Focusing on the 
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epistemic quality of the outcomes from our political decision-making leads these accounts to 
introduce something that I call the Knowledge Requirement. Deliberation turns into an 
instance that should only produce high-quality outcomes, which requires that those involved 
in the process are actually capable of such a feat.  
 
 
Deliberation depends on participants with sufficient knowledge and interest 
about the substantive issues under consideration. But on any issue, the number 
of individuals with such knowledge and interest is bound to be relatively small, 
and so the quality of deliberation will decline with the scope of participation 
(Cohen, 2009: 342-343). 
 
Wanting to improve the epistemic quality of outcomes is certainly not problematic and even 
desirable. The problem is that exaggerating the kind of knowledge required this sort of 
argument leads to questioning the importance of open participation and its compatibility with 
‘good quality’ deliberation. In line with this kind of argument, Cohen, and Archon Fung 
(2004) describe ways in which deliberation and participation can clash. They also discuss 
possible ways of facing the apparent conflict between increasing participation and improving 
deliberation by exploring strategies that radical democrats could take to overcome the 
tension. Nonetheless, their conclusions are sceptical of the possibility to properly balance the 
trade-offs implied: 
  
 
1. Improving the quality of deliberation may come at a cost to public 
participation. 2. Conversely, expanding participation – either numbers of people, 
or the range of issues under direct popular control – may diminish the quality of 
deliberation. 3. More fundamentally, social complexity and scale limit the extent 
to which modern politics can be both deliberative and participatory (Cohen & 
Fung, 2004: 27).  
 
 
Along with these three assertions, the authors claim that broader participation could lead to 
forms of manipulation and confrontation between previously fixed postures (Cohen & Fung, 
2004: 27). It is puzzling that Cohen distrusts the capabilities of common citizens to be part 
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of deliberation when in other articles (Cohen, 2009) he accepts that it does not seem to be 
the case that the necessary skills are absent from, or too demanding to comply with:  
 
 
(…) Deliberative capacities seem reasonably widely shared, even when issues 
are more abstract and less locally focused. Critics of deliberation, it seems, were 
too quick to conclude that deliberative decision-making empowers the verbally 
agile (Cohen, 2009:337). 
 
 
In conclusion, proceduralist views such as Cohen, as well as those too focused on the 
importance of improving the epistemic quality of outcomes take these emphases at the 
expense of what seemed to be a central feature of deliberative democracy: including those 
affected by decision-making. This goal should make deliberative democracy a project with 
the capacity to challenge the status quo of our democracies by contributing with a novel and 
proposal to respond to current dominating relations. The latter is impeded by on the one hand, 
making the legitimate use of power the goal of deliberative democracy, and by introducing 
something like the knowledge requirement with the related risk of elitist consequences as 
Elster wondered could happen.    
 
III. A participatory form of deliberative democracy (or the other way round) 
 
Discussing Elster’s (1998) and Cohen’s (1998) approach to deliberative democracy already 
showed some of the main concerns that guide my intention to promote what I call a 
participatory form of deliberative democracy. In this final part I will say more about the kind 
of approach to both deliberative democracy and participation that make my project able to 
fall under two labels: either as a participatory deliberative democracy, or a deliberative 
participatory democracy. The emphasis in both options serves to argue that not only do I 
think participation and deliberation are compatible, but that they are inseparable. Sometimes 
(collective) deliberation will take place in open assemblies, other times it will happen 
amongst representatives and in informal forums, but behind all decision making there should 
be clear and mostly formal channels for deliberation. The same is true about participation. 
The involvement of common citizens (what we are referring to when saying participation 
here) should always be part of decision-making processes. As I have argued along this 
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research project, the only considerations that should lead the decision to restrict the number 
of participants or to design different means to involve them are practical considerations. 
Adjusting to time, context and people’s restrictions to participate (work responsibilities, care 
responsibilities, inequalities in access, and different motivations, among others).  
 
There are two approaches to both deliberative democracy and participatory democracy that I 
take inspiration from and that therefore, model my understanding of this double label 
alternative: Iris Marion Young’s (2010) inclusive democracy and Carole Pateman’s (2012) 
participatory democracy.  
 
Young (2010) addresses and has a particular understanding of three important concepts in 
her proposal of deliberative democracy, which are crucial to portray the sort of participatory 
form that I support: inclusion, self-determination, and justice.  Young defines inclusion in a 
way that seems to be at the core of deliberative democracy as an overall project (as we have 
seen throughout this chapter); the idea that decision-making processes should include 
everyone affected by the decisions being made. In order to narrow down or better explain 
who we should consider as being affected by decisions, Young adds that they are those that 
will see their options for action significantly conditioned by them. The particularity of her 
definition though, lies on her understanding of the ideal an its inevitable connection to 
political equality.  
 
 
As an ideal, inclusion embodies a norm of political respect. Persons (and perhaps 
other creatures) are being treated as means if they are expected to abide by rules 
or adjust their actions according to decisions from where determination their 
voice and interests have been excluded. When coupled with norms of political 
equality, inclusion allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and 
perspectives relevant to the problems or issues for which a public seeks solutions 
(Young, 2010:23).     
 
 
According to Young, people should not only be included in decision-making nominally, but 
given equal rights and “effective opportunity to express their interests and concerns” (Young, 
2010:23). This norm of equality is for Young entailed by the norm of inclusion. This 
understanding of inclusion is notably different from what we saw in Cohen’s (1998) account. 
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The proceduralist approach conditions inclusion to legitimacy in the sense that what matters 
most is that we find a collective way of legitimately exercising political power, but the 
inclusive character of that collective is not at the centre of its concerns. Moreover, Young’s 
ideal of inclusion speaks of having an effective opportunity. To go beyond what she calls 
nominal inclusion, Young sets requirements that have to do with having the actual capacity 
to influence outcomes, to express one’s interests, and this is precisely the sort of authority 
that I argue is required to secure inclusion that is not merely nominal (see Chapter 3 Part II 
on political power).  
 
Self-determination and justice are also connected ideals. Young claims that deepening 
democracy does not require a comprehensive theory of justice because appeals to principles 
of justice in political decision-making have a more practical function. Principles of justice 
are appealed to as part of the arguments provided to support an alternative regarding what 
should be done. People do not need to agree “on a general conception of justice in order to 
argue productively about their problems and come to morally legitimate resolutions” (Young, 
2010:29). Thus, Young defines social justice as an ideal that she believes is even more 
abstract than a set of principles. Social justice is for Young the institutional conditions that 
promote two ideals: self-development and self-determination (Young, 2010:33). Self-
development follows Amartya Sen’s (1992) definition of equality as capabilities, which 
importantly goes beyond the importance of access and distribution of goods for people’s 
development. I will not say more about this component of Young’s definition of justice 
because it is in her approach to self-determination that I find the strongest connection to my 
concern for autonomy and how it should shape our understanding of deliberation.  
 
Self-determination is defined by Young as the capacity to be part of determining our actions 
and the conditions for our actions. The opposite to self-determination is domination. Young 
follows Pettit’s (2010) definition of domination, especially in terms of how it identifies 
institutionalised power relations that prevent us from living truly free lives:  
 
 
The ability to follow one’s own pursuits in one’s own way is often restricted not 
only by direct interference by other agents, but more importantly by institutional 
relations, including those that award differential power to some agents to 
constrain the choices and actions of others. These are institutional relations of 
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domination. Real freedom means the absence of such relations of domination 
(Young, 2010:32).       
     
 
My proposal of relations of mutual recognition aims precisely at preventing and confronting 
relations of domination in the political sphere. Young’s definition of social justice involves 
a conception of autonomy, i.e. self-determination, that considers the impact of dominating 
relations as well as their structural and institutionalised character. Furthermore, social justice 
is defined by Young in a way that does not commit her project to a comprehensive theory of 
justice, whilst still being able to inform her view on the value of deliberation. My approach 
to deliberation is inspired by this more pragmatic approach to justice, and specially by the 
central role that autonomy plays in the justification of deliberation. Deliberation improves 
the justice of the outcomes in our democracies because via inclusive and effective decision-
making we allow for the exercise of authority and expression of our interests that our equal 
autonomous standing requires. The justice of outcomes depends on how they promote our 
self-determination or personal autonomy, and it responds more to local deliberation of the 
best mode of action under specific circumstances than to a comprehensive theory of justice.  
 
Pateman (2012) separates her participatory democracy from deliberative democracy under 
the conviction that, although deliberation is central to democracy, it is not sufficient. In other 
words, she objects to the idea that deliberation on its own is synonymous with democracy 
(Pateman, 2012:8). According to Pateman, participatory democracy is different from other 
alternatives because it argues for the democratisation of both the social and political sphere 
in order to allow individuals to take part in important decision-making that affects their 
everyday lives. But I would stress that what makes her view particularly different is her 
relational emphasis. Pateman’s approach to participation is an important inspiration for my 
proposed Relations of Mutual Recognition in the way that it connects to our social and 
political interactions. I found in Pateman a theory that added the more explicit political 
component that I felt missing in relational accounts of autonomy, which is implicit in her 
definition of how political participation shapes the authority we have over our lives. This is 
what justifies challenging the structures and political interactions that Young qualified as 
dominating:     
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The capacities, skills, and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with 
forms of authority structures. Individuals learn to participate by participating 
(…) Thus, individuals need to interact within democratic authority structures 
that make participation possible. Participatory democratic theory is an argument 
about democratization. That is, the argument is about changes that will make our 
own social and political life more democratic, that will provide opportunities for 
individuals to participate in decision-making in their everyday lives as well as in 
the wider political system. It is about democratizing democracy. What I called a 
participatory society (in Participation and Democratic Theory) needs to be 
created. The changes required are structural; they necessitate reform of 
undemocratic authority structures” (Pateman, 2012:10). 
 
 
As I have argued in this chapter as well as throughout this project, respect for autonomy is 
insufficient to challenge the dominating relations we experience in our democracies and 
accordingly to support and justify the needed structural changes for our enjoyment of 
autonomy—not just in the political sphere but in general. Pateman’s view of participation as 
the way to democratise our shared spaces, directly connects with the elements that I have 
highlighted in Young’s inclusive deliberative model. Both accounts inspired the deliberative 
and participatory component in my proposal, which ultimately tries to make justice to the 
centrality of both deliberation and participation. My proposal holds that these two 
components should not be separated or one of them take a more relevant role than the other, 
because deliberation without participation of common citizens does not advance but harm 
our autonomy. Likewise, participation without a deliberation that ensures all relevant 
interests are properly considered, and that we have the chance to make our voices heard, does 
not serve our autonomy either.     
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss some of the theoretical assumptions of proceduralist 
and other accounts of deliberative democracy (I discussed epistemic ones) that render them 
incapable of challenging the status quo and its dominating political relations. This problem 
is caused by a too marked attention to the legitimacy of the exercise of political power and 
the epistemic quality of outcomes. Both reduce deliberation and inclusion, which are 
definitional components of deliberative democracy accounts in general, to an instrumental 
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role instead of promoting them as the way to improve the justice of political outcomes. I 
looked into two accounts in particular to support these claims, namely, Cohen’s (1998) and 
Elster’s (1998). The former evidenced the shortcomings that come from valuing deliberation 
merely in terms of its capacity to constitute a legitimate way to exercise political power, and 
the latter exposed the problems with restricting deliberation to our representatives.  
 
Finally, I presented two accounts that inspire my own proposal and the way in which 
deliberation and participation interact in it. These are Young’s (2010) and Pateman’s (2012) 
approaches. I concluded by stating that both participation and deliberation are crucial to 
promote our autonomy and to challenge the dominating relations we experience in our 
democracies.          
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Chapter 6: Democratic Autonomy 
 
I. Exploring Richardson’s Democratic Autonomy 
 
Both Richardson’s and my proposal connect non-domination and autonomy by arguing that 
acknowledging each agent’s autonomy should lead to non-domination in political processes. 
Nonetheless, one of the key differences between Democratic Autonomy and my Relations 
of Mutual Recognition is that the former considers the political process as a relevant space 
where our autonomy should be respected, whilst the latter thinks of political processes as 
part of the political aspect of autonomy. I will devote this chapter to describe Richardson’s 
view in some detail, in order to analyse Democratic Autonomy’s main features, as well as 
its shared concerns with my Relations of Mutual Recognition. This analysis aims at showing 
that a democratic project that rests on a concern for people’s personal autonomy should be 
relational when approaching political processes if it is to challenge the status quo.  
 
As I argued in Chapter 5, some deliberative democracy projects—Richardson’s is one of 
them—need to move past their concern for providing good reasons to legitimise power 
exercises, towards emphasising the inclusive aspect of deliberative democracy. In this 
chapter, I will describe the similarities between my view and Richardson’s proposal. But 
more importantly, I will analyse the differences in the conceptual framework between his 
Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition. This analysis will provide 
support for my claim about the importance of the relational perspective of my project, as 
well as for thinking of our political interactions as the political aspect of our autonomy 
(instead of as external to it).    
  
I will begin by presenting a general description of Richardson’s (2002) Democratic 
Autonomy, followed by an analysis of three of its features: non-domination, popular rule, 
and deliberation. Part III develops a more detailed analysis of the deliberative component. 
Part IV will discuss the consequences and the importance of thinking of our political 
relations as a constitutive part of autonomy.  
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II. Democratic autonomy: Government action, the public and the 
representative’s deliberation 
 
Henry Richardson’s (2002) “Democratic Autonomy” is an approach to democracy motivated 
by the impact that bureaucratic domination can have over our autonomy. This project 
uniquely intends to connect various ideas that have been considered competing. Richardson 
calls his project republican, liberal, populist and rationalist (Richardson, 2002:84). Three 
features included in his account also play a central role in my proposal, namely, securing 
non-domination, deliberation, and autonomy. Furthermore, what makes his view especially 
relevant to explore for my research is that his proposal is based on the value of autonomy. 
Democratic Autonomy wants to show how our political processes should look like if they 
were organized around respect for our autonomy. Richardson argues that non-domination—
among other—is a necessary requirement to express respect for our autonomy. I now explain 
how Richardson reaches the position that I have just sketched. 
 
1. An overview 
 
Richardson (2002) wants to address what he calls the “threat of bureaucratic domination” 
(Richardson, 2002:17). His aim is to develop an idea of public reasoning able to reconcile 
administrative power and discretion with democratic control so that we avoid arbitrary 
exercises of bureaucratic power (Richardson, 2002:17). The motivation for his project comes 
from what he identifies as a shared concern between liberals and republicans, namely, that 
even democratic government actions need to be justified, due to the risk to individual 
freedom they can represent.       
 
 
Government action comes under a burden of legitimation because it impinges on 
freedom. It does so in two ways. The liberal is rightly concerned about 
government action because it can undercut or violate fundamental rights. The 
republican is rightly concerned about government action because it can put us 
under new duties and may do so arbitrarily (Richardson, 2002:23).  
 
 
In order to face this risk to our freedom, what we need is focusing on respect for citizens’ 
autonomy in political processes. Richardson holds that individual autonomy consists of self-
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rule expressed by the reasons each person believes there to be to behave in a specific way. 
In turn, reasoned self-rule by collective democratic procedures constitutes what he calls 
“democratic autonomy” (Richardson, 2002:18). The idea is that “the liberal demand that the 
political process treat individuals as autonomous persons” (Richardson, 2002:63) leads to 
three requirements: that citizens are addressed as being capable of joining in public 
discussions by the political process; that accordingly, each citizen is asked to participate as 
a potential decision-maker; that individuals are treated by the political process as “self-
originating sources of claims” (Richardson, 2002:63). 
 
These three requirements are what justify a democratic political process that is deliberative 
and inclusive. “The requirement that the political process respect the autonomy of citizens 
demands that the process invite them to take a role in deciding, together, what ought to be 
done” (Richardson, 2002:65). Richardson argues that acknowledging every person’s 
autonomy amounts to having to reason together. Respect for autonomy requires providing 
each other with reasons for what ought to be done. Accordingly, political participation or 
what he calls the populist strand of his theory is the idea that voting and allowing public 
discussion means to treat people as equals and to respect their personal autonomy.  
 
The only realistic way to engage citizens as autonomous agents in the political 
process is to invite them to vote and express their opinions in public discussion. 
The real attraction of populism, therefore, is that it is a necessary aspect of 
politically respecting individual autonomy (Richardson, 2002:63). 
 
 
As mentioned above, Richardson describes his argument as republican, liberal, populist and 
rationalist. He claims that his project includes the republican concern for domination, the 
liberal advocacy for individual rights and liberties, the populist idea of rule by the people, 
and the centrality of providing rationally reasoned arguments held in a deliberative fashion.  
 
 
As I see it, our ideal of democracy commits us to reasoning together, within 
the institutions of a liberal republic, about what we ought to do in such a way 
that it is plausible to say that we, the people, rule ourselves (Richardson, 
2002:17).  
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In summary, Richardson (2002) combines views that initially seem distant from each other 
in a way that entwines every concern with the need for an account of democracy with 
autonomy at its centre. Respecting agent’s freedom and autonomy in his argument appears 
to naturally lead to the need for populist democratic processes, which likewise require the 
provision of reasons through deliberation to prevent domination. My proposal shares both 
the general aim of protecting our autonomy from domination in political processes and the 
intention to do so through democratic, open deliberation. Nonetheless, there are relevant 
differences regarding the conceptual framework that supports each project—much like what 
I explained with respect to deliberative democracy in Chapter 5.   
 
The following sections (2 to 4) will analyse three elements from Richardson’s proposal that 
show these differences in our conceptual framework. First, I will address his approach to 
non-domination, which explains the centrality of his concern for the legitimacy of the 
exercise of political power. Second, his definition of populism and the public, to show his 
understanding of popular political participation; and third, the deliberative feature of his 
proposal, especially in terms of who should deliberate.  
 
2. Non-domination: a concern for the legitimacy of government action  
 
In what follows, I will address Richardson’s approach to non-domination, which explains 
the centrality of his concern for the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. As 
mentioned above, according to Richardson there are two ways in which government action 
can encroach freedom; by undercutting our fundamental rights or by arbitrarily imposing 
new duties. Democracies should not curtail freedom in the first way but even if they meet 
“basic requirements of legality and justice” (Richardson, 2002:26) they will have to impose 
new duties, which will inevitably affect freedom in the second way. This risk to freedom is 
what Richardson characterises as domination. Here I will discuss some consequences of this 
reading, in particular, with respect to the emphasis on the legitimacy of government action.  
 
Richardson bases his approach to domination on a slightly different interpretation of Pettit’s 
(2010) definition of domination: 
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[M]astery, or domination is a normatively richer notion than the idea of a 
capacity to interfere. Domination is the capacity to make people’s lives or 
situations worse by arbitrarily imposing duties on them, or by arbitrarily 
purporting to impose duties on them (Richardson, 2002:34).  
 
 
This interpretation comes from Richardson’s scepticism with the sort of “potential” to 
dominate that is part of Pettit’s definition of non-domination (see Chapter 2 part II). Recall 
that Pettit (2010) defines domination as an agent’s capacity for arbitrary interfere with 
another’s life, and later (2012) as the exposure to another’s power of uncontrolled 
interference. Richardson holds that defining domination as the capacity to arbitrarily 
interfere as Pettit does is too broad. According to Richardson, kidnappers, for example, have 
the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with people’s lives, but we would not want to say that 
kidnappers dominate their potential victims, given that this could include everyone 
(Richardson, 2002:34). Instead, Richardson claims that his re-definition is able to stress the 
normative aspect of domination by focusing on what it is that is harmful about the 
interference. It is not the capacity of arbitrary interference that is problematic but arbitrarily 
imposing duties that can make people’s lives worse off. This interpretation allows 
Richardson to show why government action is under such a heavy burden of legitimacy, but 
at the same time, it takes away an important aspect that was captured by Pettit’s broader 
definition.  
 
Thinking of domination as the capacity to arbitrarily interfere lets Pettit’s view emphasise 
the centrality of experiencing an equal standing with others. It is the power relations that put 
some in a position where they cannot look others in the eye that need to be challenged. 
Having the capacity to arbitrarily interfere does not necessarily amount to being able to 
impose duties, what it does imply is a difference in standing that translates into relations of 
domination. What Pettit calls the “eyeball test” refers to being able to look each other in the 
eye and not having to rely on deference to avoid these interferences by others. Thus, the 
broadness of Pettit’s definition helps to characterise subtler forms of domination. Being 
dominated according to Pettit’s definition does not depend on whether new duties are in fact 
imposed—or could be imposed—upon us. What Pettit’s approach does is track the 
pernicious character of relations that put some in a position where they can subject others to 
their will. This broader and relational character of Pettit’s view gets lost in Richardson’s 
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interpretation. My view takes the relational character of Pettit’s approach as one of the key 
elements of non-domination, which makes my view more capable of addressing dominating 
relations also in its subtler forms.          
 
The burden of legitimacy that government action is under is central to Richardson’s project, 
because domination amounts to nothing other than an illegitimate exercise of political power. 
Since government action will surely lead to impose new duties, it is crucial that it is not 
arbitrary, and the way to prevent this is by showing respect for people’s autonomy.  
 
 
My simple proposal is that political power is nonarbitrarily used when it is 
constrained to operate within fair procedures that respect persons as free and 
equals and provide adequate protection for their fundamental rights and liberties. 
This is obviously a distinctively liberal proposal (Richardson, 2002:47). 
 
 
Richardson marries liberal ideas of respect for basic liberties and securing basic rights to his 
interpretation of neo-republican domination, in order to, justify the relevance of legitimacy 
in the exercise of political power for our autonomy. This move is not problematic in itself, 
due to the similarities between both (broadly conceived) traditions with respect to 
government action. Pettit himself also wants to argue for similarities rather than contrast 
between his neo-republicanism and liberal views. However, republicans do not share the 
premise that any governmental action will amount to hindering freedom in some level; 
instead, they actually hold that some initiatives will aid non-domination: “If there is 
interference, but no domination, as in the case of the non-mastering interferer, only the ideal 
of non-interference will see anything to criticize” (Pettit, 2010:23). The non-mastering 
interferer is described by Pettit (2010) as “the law and government that obtains in a well-
ordered republic” (Pettit, 2010:31).  
 
Therefore, even though republicans share the liberal distrust in government action and its 
impact on personal liberties, they address their lack of trust by describing specific means to 
avoid domination by the government (separation of powers, the law, and channels for 
popular contestation), which is not initially conceived as dominating, but able to fall into 
domination. Governmental action is supposed to aid freedom as non-domination. 
 
 
155 
 
Accordingly, whether a governmental action will impinge on freedom will heavily depend 
on the arbitrariness of the initiative. 
The problem is that Richardson shifts the focus from Pettit’s intention to secure non-
dominating relations by challenging our power relations, towards guaranteeing non-
dominating exercise of power by respecting autonomy. The latter makes his view’s capacity 
to challenge the status quo heavily rely on what “respecting autonomy” means.   
 
It is important to note that throughout this research, I have been very critical of Pettit’s 
approach to non-domination precisely because it falls short of offering ways to effectively 
challenge the status quo. I have argued that Pettit also seems to focus more on the legitimacy 
of the exercise of power than on the importance of standing on an equal footing within the 
political sphere (Chapter 3). However, what I have taken as the inspiration for my own 
project is the potential contained in Pettit’s definition of non-domination to elaborate a 
proposal that does stress how crucial it is to enjoy an equal standing—which is one of the 
main aims of my Relations of Mutual Recognition. Thus, Richardson’s push towards an even 
more marked concern for legitimacy falls prey to the same issues I have identified in Pettit’s 
view, whilst also risking losing the transformative potential contained in Pettit’s definition 
of non-domination: the importance of enjoying an equal standing.     
 
3. Populism and popular rule 
 
In this section, I will introduce Richardson’s (2002) perspective on populism. In order to do 
so, I will look into both his idea of popular rule and his understanding of the “will of the 
people”. My intention is to highlight two issues present in his view: the lack of impact of 
popular rule at the individual level, and the formation of the will of the people understood 
as distributed across the constitutional structure.  
 
Richardson identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997) as the precursor of populism, and at the 
same time, as the one to be blamed for the ideal of populism being labelled dangerous. 
Richardson wants to show that one can nonetheless have a populist project without holding 
on to the Rousseauvian version. In order to do so, he explores what is usually identified as 
the danger of populism in the Rousseauvian version, namely, that the will of the people can 
do no wrong. According to Richardson, there can be two reasons why we could think the 
will of the people can do no wrong, either because obeying the will of the people equals to 
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perfect freedom, or because the will of the people is unfailing. Richardson states that if we 
bracket Rousseau’s dislike for democracy and thus take “the will of the people” to mean “the 
general will”, we can find ideas like compelling people to be free if they do not obey the 
general will, as well as claims about the infallibility of the general will. Hence, Rousseau’s 
perspective seems to include these two ways of justifying the notion that the will of the 
people can do no wrong, which invites to majoritarian tyranny and the mentioned sinister 
thought of forcing people to be free (Richardson, 2002:58).   
 
Richardson argues that a populist project should therefore reject the claim that the will of 
the people can do no wrong, and accordingly, move away from Rousseauvian interpretations. 
Populism without the dangers Richardson identifies in Rousseau, is “the view that voting is 
a method for citizens to participate in making law and that the law thus made is the will of 
the people” (Richardson, 2002:58). Such version, Richardson holds, is committed neither to 
the idea that following the will of the people guarantees freedom nor to state that the people 
are never wrong about what should be done.  
   
Richardson argues there is another problematic issue that results from following the 
Rousseauvian version, which is allowing an inherently collective idea like popular rule to be 
deemed as having a straightforward individual impact.  
 
 
Popular rule is a way that we rule ourselves. As such, it may fairly be taken to 
ground a sense in which we are free (…) This kind of claim about the freedom 
conferred by popular self-mastery applies only at the collective level, however, 
and does not factor down to the individual level (Richardson, 2002:59).  
 
 
Even if rule by the people involves some form of collective freedom, what Richardson wants 
to avoid is endorsing the idea that rule by the people entails “that each citizen experiences 
or enjoys a kind of freedom when he or she obeys the law” (Richardson, 2002:59). 
Richardson argues that such reading of positive freedom or self-mastery excludes two central 
elements that his view proves are necessary requirements for freedom: not being placed 
under new duties without good reasons and being free from domination. According to 
Richardson, the idea that obeying the will of the people makes us in some way free is 
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incapable of guaranteeing “elemental and republican freedom” (Richardson, 2002:59). Thus, 
a populist should reject the idea that obeying the will of the people is a form of freedom 
because, on the one hand, the claim excludes other important aspects of freedom and on the 
other, it ignores the “conceptual gap between collective self-rule and the wills of individuals” 
(Richardson, 2002:60).  
 
Obeying the will of the people surely cannot guarantee a more substantive sort of freedom 
like the one Richardson wants to advance. Basic rights and liberties as well as non-
domination require much more than obeying the will of the people, which he equates to 
obedience to the law. But before reaching further conclusions, we need to investigate his 
interpretation of the will of the people in more detail. According to Richardson, there is no 
coherent definition of the people’s will aside from the deliberative institutions that aid in its 
construction (Richardson, 2002:181). Hence, the people’s will is constituted by the set of 
procedures through which the people reach their decisions (Richardson, 2002:67).  
 
 
[T]he normative importance for democracy of the idea of the will of the people 
is not that it is an object to be discovered. Rather, the requirement that the 
political process respect the autonomy of citizens demands that the process 
invite them to take a role in deciding, together, what ought to be done. What 
they then decide is their will (…) It demands only that the political process be 
constructed so that what emerges from it can fairly be counted as constituting 
the people’s will (Richardson, 2002:65-66).     
 
 
We can see more clearly here why Richardson thinks of obeying the will of the people and 
obeying the law as the same thing. If the law-making process succeeds at inviting citizens in 
some capacity to decide together what ought to be done, then the law that emerges can be 
considered the will of the people. Additionally, Richardson points out that there is no single 
government institution that can be considered to validly speak for the people.  Congress, for 
example, does not by itself, speak for the people. Therefore, we should look for a way to 
distribute the formation of the popular will across different parts of the constitutional 
structure. This is what he calls “institutionally distributed systems for forming the will of the 
people— ‘institutionally distributed popular sovereignty’, for short” (Richardson, 2002:70). 
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The latter amounts to hold that democratic self-rule will depend on how adequately the 
different stages of the political process align to form the will of the people. Richardson 
claims that rule by the people requires that they do so generally and not by mere accident 
and that these various stages go from “public discussion and voting to debate and voting in 
an assembly, due ratification (if needed) by a chief executive, refinement and 
implementation by administrative agencies, and reflective public acceptance in the end” 
(Richardson, 2002:72).  
 
The idea is that a political process that is structured in a way that respects the autonomy of 
each agent can be regarded as producing decisions that reflect the will of the people 
(Richardson, 2002:72). This description, nevertheless, tells us very little about what is 
implied by the alignment of each stage, especially in terms of the role that common citizens 
play within the structure. We need to know more about the implementation requirements of 
this “institutionally distributed popular sovereignty” to understand the implications of his 
view of popular rule and the formation of the will of the people.  
 
4. Inclusion and the rule of the people 
 
Richardson’s understanding of popular rule and the will of the people show the remarkable 
differences between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition, 
especially in terms of the way in which he characterizes the role of common citizens. Both 
popular rule and Richardson’s understanding of the formation of the will of the people, speak 
of a project that is far less participatory than mine. I will discuss this in more detail in what 
follows.      
 
First, I would like to point out two important considerations and how they show a relevant 
contrast between his project and mine. First, although I do not refer to the will of the people 
in my proposal, both Richardson’s and my understanding of the political process claim that 
political decisions should include citizens if they are to really respect their autonomy and 
reflect their interests and concerns—in his words, reflect the will of the people. Nonetheless, 
the participatory aspect (to achieve the concern for inclusion) of his distributed popular 
sovereignty is not clear. As I said, so far, we have not explored the implementation of the 
project, which could grant more details about its participatory aspect, but Richardson’s 
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institutionally distributed popular sovereignty seems to imply a more limited direct 
involvement of common citizens than what my project deems necessary.  
 
Richardson stresses that to secure the active participation of autonomous citizens would be 
impossible if it had to go all the way back to the origins of the constitution, as well as if it 
had to be expressed in a single moment of the political process (Richardson, 2002:72). The 
latter, he claims, justifies thinking of a popular will formation that is distributed across the 
political process as something more feasible. Richardson’s objection to going all the way 
back to the origins of the constitution is understandable, given what he defines as the will of 
the people. Surely, as he argues, a will of the people that depends on constitutional 
institutions cannot be the one to elaborate the constitution since it does not exist prior to its 
creation. Nonetheless, it appears that thinking of the formation of the will of the people as 
distributed across the political process responds more to practical than theoretical concerns.  
 
Richardson’s project, like mine, require the involvement of the people in political decision-
making processes if they are to respect people’s autonomy. Therefore, distributing the 
formation of the people’s will across institutions has to do with making that involvement 
more feasible rather than effective. It also seems to connect with his intention to move away 
from Rousseauvian populism by making sure that the law indeed reflects the will of the 
people, but that distributing its formation across different stages guarantees it is not seen as 
infallible or an example of true freedom. If the will of the people is formed through political 
decision-making of different sorts, then it depends on the constitution and constitutional 
structures that shape it, which leaves way for the other components of his definition of 
freedom and non-domination. In other words, it helps to reduce the risk of equating obeying 
the will of the people with true freedom.  
    
The second consideration relates to his approach to popular rule, more specifically, to its 
alleged lack of impact at the individual level. We can find reasons for Richardson’s 
reluctance to confer any impact of popular rule at the individual level in his understanding 
of autonomy. Since he does not define autonomy as dependent upon the relations, we enjoy, 
but as reasoned self-rule, popular rule and the collective form of freedom it represents are 
unable to directly impact our autonomy. The “conceptual gap” between collective self-rule 
and the individual will of every agent, refers to this distance between an individual ideal like 
autonomy and what he calls collective self-rule. 
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Both considerations show an important distance from the conceptual background that 
motivates my concern for autonomy. In my proposal, democracy with a high level of 
political participation from common citizens not only contributes to our enjoyment of 
personal autonomy, but our autonomy depends on it. Political participation—which I define 
more broadly as the role each agent plays in the political sphere—should allow for a 
particular kind of relations amongst people: of recognition. Those Relations of Mutual 
Recognition are required for political autonomy, without which personal autonomy cannot 
be enjoyed. This does not mean I want to support what Richardson calls the “dangerous 
Rousseuvian claim that each citizen experiences or enjoys a kind of freedom whenever he 
or she obeys the law” (Richardson, 2002: 59). But that, contrary to what he argues 
(Richardson, 2002:59), popular rule does have an impact at the individual level. Popular 
rule, when it really involves binding participation from every agent, has a double function; 
respecting each agent’s capacity for autonomy and putting them in a position that allows 
their self-government to be effective in the political sphere. I will say more about this double 
function in Part IV.  
 
III. Representative government: the deliberative component     
 
Richardson’s definition of popular rule and of the will of the people show, as I have 
suggested above, some of the conceptual differences between his Democratic Autonomy and 
my Relations of Mutual Recognition. However, the main differences and similarities will 
become more clearly apparent when looking into another aspect of his view; the deliberative 
component or the rationalist label he gives to his proposal. This part will discuss this final 
feature.  
 
For Richardson, acknowledging the fact that every person is capable of autonomy amounts 
to having to reason together, providing each other with reasons for what ought to be done. 
However, he acknowledges that respect for each other’s autonomy in itself does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that we need collective reasoning (Richardson, 2002:78). 
Another way to show respect for people’s autonomy would be to leave space for 
independence, trusting their capacity to make their own decisions. According to Richardson, 
this is precisely why both liberals and republicans insist on protecting fundamental freedoms. 
What helps to make the connection between respect for autonomy and the requirement of 
reasoning together is the responsibility that each agent has to achieve democratic self-rule. 
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Every citizen has an individual role to play if the political process is to respect people’s 
autonomy. Thus, it is the populist idea that we should rule ourselves in a democracy, that 
proves crucial to this argument about reasoning together.  
 
The importance of self-rule also discards the idea of “standing back and letting citizens 
exercise their right to vote” (Richardson, 2002:80) because ruling ourselves requires the 
capacity to frame alternatives for the political agenda, which should not be left to lobbyist 
and bureaucrats. This capacity, instead, should be integrated into the democratic process by 
which we rule ourselves, and it requires deliberation to discuss the merits of the alternatives 
(Richardson, 2002:80).  However, Richardson claims there is a tension between reasoning 
together and equality. Based on this tension he identifies; he looks into the requirements that 
are necessary for democratic deliberation and the difficulties in thinking of the right way to 
implement them.  
 
In this part of the chapter, I will discuss the deliberative or rationalist component—as he 
calls it—by considering two important elements present in Richardson’s view: the 
challenges that reasoning together raises, and the role that representation plays for his overall 
project. I will conclude that, although he intends to go beyond the checks and balances 
proposed by neo-republicans like Pettit, his deliberative component does not push the status 
quo enough to qualify as succeeding at that task.      
 
1. Deliberation and equality 
 
According to Richardson, the tension between reasoning together and equality hails from 
the fact that people have different reasoning skills and different abilities of persuasion. Thus, 
even if we have a system that follows the principle of ‘one person one vote’, this fact about 
differences in abilities gives rise to political inequality (Richardson, 2002:85). To explain 
this idea further, he takes Thomas Christiano’s (1996) distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative equality. Christiano states that we can secure quantitative equality following the 
principle of ‘one person one vote’, but that more is needed for qualitative equality. Christiano 
holds that democratic deliberation requires a fair or equal chance to influence debates in 
legislature and in the public sphere.  
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Although the tension between reasoning together and equality identified by Richardson 
seemed initially to focus on people’s different reasoning skills, he frames his concern for 
qualitative equality more broadly, in line with Christiano’s definition. Qualitative equality, 
Richardson claims, is threatened by power inequalities, inequality of resources or unequal 
persuasive ability (Richardson, 2002:85). To face these challenges to qualitative equality 
one can, take either a direct or an indirect approach. Richardson holds that direct approaches 
either idealise politics or presume a precision they cannot achieve. Thus, he suggests taking 
an indirect approach instead.  
 
Richardson illustrates the idealisation by looking into Habermas (1990) and his idea that the 
force of the better argument can neutralize all motives other than the search for truth. 
Richardson argues that views inspired by Habermas tend to make it difficult to set the 
conditions for deliberation, because they aim at an invariance of the distributions of power 
and resources that is unrealistic.  
 
 
The very freedoms that, as I argued in the previous chapter, are necessary to 
nurture the existence of a public will also have latitude for some individuals or 
groups to gain more influence than others over the effective channels of 
communication (Richardson, 2002:86).   
  
 
The problem of illusory precision, on the other hand, tracks views that intend to define 
equality in a precise way, even though Richardson believes that if we took a definition like 
James Bohman’s (1996), we can see this does not work. According to Bohman we should 
define communicative equality in terms of a person’s capacity to initiate public debate on a 
certain topic. However, Richardson points out, this definition is also inadequate, since it 
intends to ‘pin point’ things we are unable to identify, such as which issues are those required 
to establish that a person indeed has that capacity? Which are the issues that require 
inclusion? These questions become even harder to answer when we consider pluralism and 
the fact that there is thus no way of ranking issues. 
 
To avoid these problems, Richardson introduces his indirect strategy to achieve qualitative 
equality in deliberation, which involves “developing an account of the institutions needed to 
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preserve the background justice of democratic deliberation” (Richardson, 2002:88). 
Richardson identifies four conditions for this purpose: (1) protecting equal political liberties 
in the constitution; (2) securing that citizens are equals before the law; (3) implementing 
effective measures to mitigate the concentration of economic power in the few (4) allowing 
the chance of participating to every person so they can counteract to some extent, the 
influence of economic and political power disparities (Richardson, 2002:88-89).  
 
The first condition refers to protect liberties such as freedom of speech, of assembly and of 
taking part in public affairs. The second condition implies that fundamental rights are 
afforded to all citizens regardless of any differences in birth or class. About the third 
condition, on the other hand, Richardson does not provide many details of what it entails, 
but he mentions some examples such as progressive income tax, inheritance taxes and the 
idea that property ownership should be sufficiently dispersed so that no one can easily buy 
votes or participation from others. Finally, the fourth condition is again not really specified, 
but some examples given are measures within legislatures to assure that majority rule does 
not silence minorities, such as equal time allocation in debates for members of each party.  
These four conditions are meant to tackle the first two threats to qualitative equality 
identified by Richardson, namely, inequalities of power and of resources, but there was a 
third threat he referred to as unequal persuasive ability. 
 
Richardson argues that the best way to diffuse and mitigate the impact of citizen’s different 
persuasive abilities is to safeguard a diversity of fora, so that each person can find a forum 
where they can indeed be persuasive. Modern democracies already offer these fora, which 
means that what is required according to Richardson is protecting freedom of association 
and of expression. He adds that another possibility to promote giving voice to those that may 
not be otherwise heard is by creating an instance where people can share their experiences 
to government officials.   
 
 
[F]or officials to organize a forum, not around a pre-defined issue (…) but 
rather around listening to people’s life stories so that their perspectives might 
indirectly inform policy making. Such for a would help put on the public 
agenda issues that might not otherwise surface (Richardson, 2002:92).       
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An additional novel requirement of Richardson’s view of deliberation is his suggestion that: 
“In addition to being open to the public, the legislature ought also to hold hearings at which 
interested member of the public are invited to comment on draft legislation” (Richardson, 
2002:196). However, both instances would have no legally binding character. It is a matter 
of trying to influence legislation in an indirect way. 
 
There are several important things to note from Richardson’s approach to deliberation. First, 
although he justifies the importance of reasoning together by appealing to his idea of self-
rule, his characterisation of what reasoning together should amount to, is from the beginning, 
connected to a key tension. The idea that reasoning together is in tension with what he latter 
calls qualitative equality (borrowing from Christiano) is not problematic in itself. What 
Richardson wants to show is that there are relevant threats to qualitative equality in practice, 
because a realistic picture of our democracies should acknowledge that there are indeed 
differences in resources that usually translate in later differences in influence. One could be 
critical of Richardson’s view by claiming that acknowledging the all too real differences in 
resources in our democracies should not lead us to acceptance, rather to working on direct 
approaches—instead of his preferred indirect strategy—to prevent them from translating into 
differences in influence, differences in political power. But setting this worry aside, what 
seems problematic is how he suggests we address the tension.  
 
The four conditions for qualitative equality in deliberation correspond to institutions and 
measures that are already in place in most democracies. Hence, it seems strange that 
Richardson does not offer clear measures beyond existing ways to counterbalance these 
differences, especially when by indirect he meant an approach that looks into the institutions 
that will preserve the necessary background justice for deliberation. Clearly, since he shares 
my diagnosis of the problematic relations that we currently experience within the political 
sphere, something must change, and if the focus is on the institutions, then that is where he 
should be suggesting the changes to happen. However, Richardson fails to suggest major—
or small—effective additions to current institutions and formal channels of deliberation. 
There are only two new instances proposed by Richardson to try to work towards inclusion 
of those that may be excluded precisely due to differences in resources, both of which would 
have no effective impact over decision-making because they do not involve any legally 
binding capacity. 
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On the other hand, his worry about differences in persuasive abilities—although not 
directly—tells us something about what Richardson thinks deliberators should be like. A 
concern for the persuasive abilities of deliberators reveals that although respect for autonomy 
dictates that people should be treated and offered inclusion in deliberation, there are some 
requirements for deliberators. Thus, that Richardson includes differences in persuasive 
abilities as a threat to qualitative equality in deliberations, shows that there are additional 
concerns that do not have to do with illusionary precision or the idealisation of deliberation, 
but with the sort of deliberators that our democracies need.  I will move on now to discuss 
Richardson’s view on the representative’s role, which will be illuminating to continue 
exploring this final point further.  
   
2. Representation 
 
Richardson argues that we should conceive democracy as a form of government in which all 
of us actively partake in deciding what ought to be done. This should involve a fair process 
that treats citizens as equals and respects their autonomy, which in turn, should be reflected 
in “inviting them to rule by reasoning with one another” (Richardson, 2002:195). With this 
definition in the background, Richardson explores representative government’s 
compatibility with Democratic Autonomy. He is interested in discovering whether 
Democratic Autonomy is realizable in a representative government. In order to do so, he 
considers (a) how we should structure elections; (b) with respect to what should legislators 
represent the public; (c) if legislative decision-making can be considered as articulating the 
will of the people (Richardson, 2002:193). Here I would like to focus on the last two issues.  
 
Describing Richardson’s take on what legislators should represent with respect to the public, 
as well as what we should take their decisions to embody, will show what Democratic 
Autonomy amounts to in practice. Moreover, it will prove that the apprehension I mentioned 
above about his concern for differences in persuasive abilities, does transpire into what he 
describes as the characteristics of deliberators. But more importantly, it adds crucial 
elements to understand what the role of common citizens is in Richardson’s project. 
Ultimately, the common citizen’s role assigned by Richardson does not seem to follow from 
his inclusive definition of democracy.    
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Richardson begins by stating his agreement with Bernard Manin’s (1997) idea that 
representative government is not inherent to democracy, because western democracies were 
founded on an idea of democracy connected to the ancient Greek tradition of electing 
legislators by lot, whilst representative government belonged to aristocracy. Selecting people 
for representative government by imposing property-holding and other qualifications 
reinforced the idea that these were to some respect wiser than average citizens. According 
to Richardson, “while this specific claim of distinction may no longer be credible, its residue 
is our general lack of any assumption that legislatures should look, in all respects, like 
microcosms” (Richardson, 2002:194). Richardson argues that this is one way in which 
representative government is different from direct democracy; namely, we do not expect 
legislatures to represent the specific reality of a constituency. Another difference between 
direct democracy and a representative government has to do with the independence of 
legislators to rely on their own judgement for decision-making, as I discussed in Chapter 4.   
       
Richardson believes there are good reasons why our representatives are no longer elected by 
lot. One of these is that in ancient Greece, decision-makers did not have to deal with complex 
issues like the ones our legislators do need to figure out nowadays. Hence, it would be very 
demanding on citizens if we elected legislators by lot like some countries do for juries. 
Similarly, he argues that legislators learn how to build coalitions and navigate through 
pressures, as well as develop expertise whilst they exercise their role, which would not be 
available for citizens elected by lot.  
  
 
Elected legislators have time during political campaigns to build alliances with 
citizen’s groups. While this opens opportunities for corruption and undue 
influence, it also gives the legislators the ability to work effectively on building 
coalitions. To thrust ordinary citizens into the position of making laws, today, 
would be to subject them to a maelstrom of pressures with which they would not 
be able adequately to cope (Richardson, 2002:195).  
 
 
The reasons he presents against electing legislators by lot, also show us his view on the 
characteristics of legislators. The importance of electing legislators seems connected to the 
requirements that the role of decision-maker imposes, i.e., the complexity of issues, the 
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capacity to resist pressures, develop coalitions and possessing expertise. Moreover, he 
returns to this point later on to straightforwardly claim that it is not desirable to have common 
people legislating.   
 
If average people were wanted, they could be selected by lot, as in ancient 
Greece. It is in effect, because we recognize the importance of the governing 
done by legislatures that we seek and accept above-average political 
excellences in our legislators (Richardson, 2002:197).  
 
 
Thus, Richardson’s characterization also explains why he believes independence from the 
will of the people for legislators to rely on their own judgement is so important; “necessary 
in order for them to carry democratic deliberation to the next stage” (Richardson, 2002:194). 
Since their expertise and capacities are above average, we should rely on their judgement 
for decision-making. Independence is not problematic for Richardson also because, even if 
we grant independence to legislators, we would still be capable of influencing them in two 
ways; by the electoral process and via public suasion (Richardson, 2002:196). 
 
Let us now return to one of the questions that Richardson wanted to answer about legislators: 
(b) with respect to what should legislators represent the public? His reply to this question is 
that the object of representation should be citizen’s views. As he explained when justifying 
his indirect approach, thinking of representing people’s interests implies that these are in 
some way static, and that we can actually determine which issues should be included and 
which we should discard. Richardson also argued that pluralism prevents us from making a 
sort of ranking of issues. Likewise, his approach on selection by lot provided his reasons 
against thinking that what we should represent are people in the way of a microcosm of a 
constituency. Representing views instead, according to Richardson, allows legislators to use 
their judgement for political decision-making which is framed by the people’s perspective.     
 
  
Having, with luck, elected legislators who fairly represent the range of the 
public’s views and perspectives, and keeping open this possibility for direct 
communication, legislators should then be allowed to frame their deep 
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compromises and to vote on the basis of their best judgment about what it is that 
we ought to do. Within such a context, they thereby can help frame the will of 
the people (Richardson, 2002:202). 
 
 
This claim also answers (c) whether legislative decision-making can be considered as 
articulating the will of the people. Richardson claims that given that legislators should 
include citizen’s views in their decision-making, the process can be considered as helping to 
articulate the will of the people.   
3. Inclusiveness 
Richardson constantly argues that decision-making should not be concentrated in one part 
of the constitutional structure like the legislature, but that it has to be distributed across 
diverse political institutions. Richardson adds that: 
 
Institutions that make laws that put citizens under new duties must be regarded 
as part of this distributed process of political will-formation: It is not enough 
that they be subject to the contestatory checks that republicans would 
recommend (Richardson, 2002:179).  
 
Furthermore, his definition of democracy seems to portray an ideal with a strong 
participatory requirement. Recall that he described democracy as a form of government that 
includes every citizen’s involvement in deciding what ought to be done, which should 
include a fair process that treats people as equals and respects their autonomy, precisely by 
inviting them to rule by reasoning amongst each other (Richardson, 2002:195).  
However, we can see from his approach to deliberation and the representative’s role, that the 
participatory element is much less of a protagonist than what one would expect from his 
definition of democracy. In terms of inclusion, if the formation of the will of the people 
articulates itself across different political institutions, citizens would have to be in some way 
part of those institutions or been given an effective way of communicating with them in 
order to really count as being included. Still, Richardson only suggests a very modest open 
space for citizens to propose some inputs to legislators, and the creation of a kind of forum 
where they can share their experiences as way of communication. Additional means 
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mentioned by Richardson are those already present in our democracies, such as transparency 
and openness of political decision-making by offering some kind of open record of 
legislative discussions. Regarding the profile of deliberators, it seems clear by the previous 
analysis that he thinks of decision-makers as people who should be wiser than the average 
citizen, and moreover, that it is not desirable to think of common citizens as capable of 
legislating—why is why he objects election by lot. My view instead, emphasizes the 
importance of making common citizens’ part of deliberation processes by suggesting a 
sortition legislature as a permanent body (Chapter 4).   
But then again, in practice, our democracies entrust the technical and more complex matters 
not to above-average legislators, but to ad hoc experts especially called upon to provide 
adequate information on diverse subjects. Expertise about legislating is something that is 
usually acquired in time whilst exercising the task, as Richardson himself acknowledges, 
which means that common citizens exercising this role would be equally capable of 
developing this expertise. Therefore, his view on the requirements for legislators appears to 
be founded more on his apprehensions over citizen’s expressive voting (Richardson, 
2002:198-199).  
On the other hand, the idea that what should be represented are citizens’ political views and 
not their preferences, next to the importance Richardson gives to the legislator’s 
independence to rely on their judgement, show that most of the weight of the deliberation 
process is to be done by legislators and other government officials. Thus, although 
Richardson does not want the formation of the will of the people to be concentrated in one 
segment or body, his own approach to deliberation and representation show otherwise. It is 
puzzling how representatives are expected to take seriously or share the citizen’s political 
views when the mechanisms offered cannot assure communication or connection between 
them, and so much relies on the elections that appoint legislators to their roles.  
4. Democratic autonomy and participation 
From the previous analysis we can conclude that Richardson conceives political participation 
as informal deliberation within the public sphere, where people should reflect over decisions 
being made, or having already been made by our representatives. At the same time, those 
decisions should express citizens’ political views—mostly via voting for candidates. 
Political participation seems reduced to what we already have in our democracies, and to 
what Richardson seemed to have been opposing from the beginning of his proposal, i.e., the 
idea of sitting back and letting people vote. Stating that “reasons, arguments, views and 
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proposals need to be developed in the informal public sphere” (Richardson, 2002: 179), 
whilst also neglecting to suggest formal and binding instances for those views to be shared, 
is problematic.  
In the long run, his proposal does not appear to be doing more than the republican 
contestatory system, which is nothing other than offering formal channels for after the fact 
contestation of political decisions. Moreover, although such contestation is indeed 
insufficient (both for securing republican non-domination and Democratic Autonomy), 
Richardson’s project falls short of even securing that right. The republican concern for 
domination from the government seems forgotten from Richardson´s project due to this 
restricted notion of political participation, where too much of the formation of the will of the 
people depends on the goodwill of our representatives.  
 
IV. The political aspect of autonomy vs respect for autonomy 
 
Richardson develops an interesting proposal that puts autonomy at the centre, whilst arguing 
for deliberation and for securing non-domination. I am in principle more than sympathetic 
to all of these elements that feature in his project—they are also very relevant for my 
project—but as the analysis has by now shown, there are important conceptual differences 
between his Democratic Autonomy and my Relations of Mutual Recognition. These 
differences can be summarised in an idea that is crucial for my project, namely, that our 
political interactions are partially constitutive of our autonomy, instead of understanding 
them as relations that should reflect respect for our autonomy.  This main difference explains 
why we can find all of the above contrasts between Richardson’s and my account, even 
though both are based on the value of autonomy. Furthermore, thinking of securing respect 
for autonomy rather than addressing the political aspect of autonomy, neglects the impact of 
dominating political relations for our autonomy and makes the project incapable of 
challenging the status quo as it should. I would like to discuss this difference and present my 
reasons for preferring the political aspect approach in what follows.   
 
 
 
1. A limited sort of influence and popular rule 
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Richardson’s Democratic autonomy starts from the premise that if we value autonomy, then 
our democratic systems should be organized in a way that shows respect for our autonomy. 
One of the requirements for respecting our autonomy is inviting us to rule. This amounts to 
being able to have some say in the process where we decide what ought to be done. Thus, 
influence seems to play an important role in the project. According to Richardson citizens 
should have the capacity to frame alternatives for the political agenda, and for what we saw, 
voting for representatives, participating in informal public fora for discussions, and having 
access to our legislators’ debates, is sufficient for this purpose. The problem is that the kind 
of influence he deems appropriate and these related requirements to implement it, seem 
inadequate to connect autonomy with the need to reason together set by his project. Respect 
for autonomy does not require us to push for being included or having more influence than 
indirectly giving inputs to our legislators. Richardson, as mentioned, acknowledges that 
respect for autonomy on its own cannot justify having to reason together; in other words, it 
does not imply a stronger sort of inclusion. In order to argue for the centrality of reasoning 
together, Richardson invokes popular rule or the populist vein of his project.    
Richardson argues that our decision-making processes should be designed in a way that 
allows us to state that we rule ourselves. Recall that laws are supposed to express the will of 
the people, because decision-making processes in turn are supposed to involve legislators 
that represent the views of the people. Thus, popular rule should be achieved by following 
the will of the people that is being articulated within political institutions and their decision-
making.  
Let us assume that Richardson’s approach to the formation of the will of the people is right. 
This would mean that having legislators that represent the views of the people, in addition 
to an active informal public sphere, is sufficient for stating that we indeed rule ourselves. 
Should we not ask ourselves still how is it that legislators get to represent our views in the 
first place? Law-making does not include common citizens, and as we saw, Richardson 
thinks doing so would be undesirable. But if people’s influence in the shape of inputs should 
be able to frame alternatives for the political agenda, we surely require something other than 
voting—as Richardson himself acknowledged. Qualitative equality is supposed to track 
people’s capacity to influence legislative debates, beyond being treated as equals by the 
principle of ‘one person one vote’. Furthermore, Richardson identified inequalities of power 
and resources as threats to qualitative equality, which would justify securing means of 
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communicating citizens’ views—especially for minorities—beyond existing legal measures 
and voting for representatives.    
Hence, the fact that Richardson does not consider crucial to include some additional 
mechanism to communicate people’s views shows that respecting our autonomy ultimately 
was not about being invited to rule but about indirectly influencing political decision-
making. Thus, respect for autonomy and this understanding of the rule of the people seem 
incapable of presenting a convincing argument that connects autonomy to the importance of 
inclusive political deliberation.  
2. A challenge to the status quo 
 
Finally, the mentioned approach to respect for autonomy and the kind of deliberation it 
requires seems unable to address the impact of dominating political relations for our 
autonomy. Although Richardson’s project is motivated by his concern for bureaucratic 
abuses of power and the domination they represent, respecting our autonomy in the political 
sphere via such a weak form of inclusion of common citizens in decision-making processes, 
does not suffice to prevent domination. As I discussed in Chapter 2, non-domination requires 
participation in the form of an effective, active capacity to have an impact over decision-
making, and this capacity, or political power, should take into account the inequalities of 
power that will affect its exercise.     
As I briefly mentioned above at the end of Part II, granting binding participation for all 
agents in the political sphere has a double function; on the one hand, it shows respect for 
every agent’s capacity for autonomous decision-making (and their equal standing as 
autonomous agents), and on the other, puts people in a position that provides effective self-
government in the political sphere. Accordingly, the sole aim of reflecting respect for 
autonomy in the political sphere is not able to play this double function, and without the 
second function, dominating relations fail to be addressed. In other words, not envisaging 
novel ways of challenging the power relations that exist in our democracies will surely fail 
at addressing the domination both Richardson and I agree is present.  
When instead, we think of our political interactions as being part of our autonomy, we not 
only want them to reflect our equal standing as autonomous agents—to be treated as such 
by the law and institutions—but to enjoy relations that allow our autonomous capacities to 
be exercised in important decision-making. We require political power, which I define as 
authoritative influence (Chapter 3), and direct involvement. To be fair, Richardson does 
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acknowledge that his ambition is not to establish or develop a novel form of government or 
anything of the sort but to defend a way of reasoning that is already in place.  
 
I do not take my task to be that of peddling a radical new invention, a hitherto 
untried mode of public reasoning, but rather to be articulating and providing a 
philosophical defense for a mode of reasoning that our best public servants 
actually use (Richardson, 2002: 76).  
 
Thus, it appears that although some of his claims indicate that more inclusion and 
participation of common citizens is required for respecting our autonomy, the goal is to 
promote a sort of decision-making that some legislators and institutions already instantiate. 
That being the case, it seems that the similarities between his project and mine come apart 
at the very beginning, because his diagnosis implies that some deliberation in our 
democracies is indeed autonomy-respecting, whilst my diagnosis is much less optimistic. 
Setting that aside, his proposal does allow for a more ambitious autonomy-minded project, 
but as I have said, it would require thinking of our political interactions as crucial for our 
autonomy (because they constitute it), and therefore, challenging the way that they happen 
nowadays.    
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I aimed at analysing the differences between Richardson’s Democratic 
Autonomy and my project. I began by presenting an overview of Richardson’s Democratic 
Autonomy; then I moved on to analyse three of its main features: non-domination, popular 
rule and deliberation. The last part discussed the advantages of thinking of our political 
relations as a constitutive part of our autonomy.   
The idea was to show that a proposal focused on autonomy should be relational and 
participatory in its approach to political processes if it is to be capable of challenging the 
status quo. Thus, although I share the same general concerns and the central focus on 
autonomy, I showed that my project is better qualified to address the problematic political 
interactions we experience in our current democracies. I argued that thinking of our political 
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interactions as the political aspect of autonomy promotes a more ambitious project than what 
respect for autonomy allows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Epistocracy: a different view of participation 
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I. Epistocracy and the search for competent voters  
 
The proposal I have been discussing comes from a concern for the problematic power 
imbalances, with its related relations of subordination, that I identify in our democracies. 
But not all theorists interested in improving our democracies take this concern as their 
starting point. A series of unexpected outcomes from decision-making such as Brexit, the 
election of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro has revived debates regarding our democracy’s 
electorate and its behaviour. More specifically, discussions seem to focus on the capacity of 
electors to make competent high stakes political decisions. This has fostered interesting 
discussions around ideas like technocracy (rule of experts), and epistocracy (restricted 
electorate based on competence). Of these, epistocracy is the most significant contemporary 
manifestation, and so it is what I focus my attention on here.  
 
Roughly, epistocracy amounts to distributing political power in accordance with each 
citizen’s competence for political decision-making (Brennan, 2016a). There are different 
forms of epistocracy distinguished by their preferred way to implement a competence-led 
distribution of political power. Most of them include some means to assess political 
competence like a voter qualification exam that tests citizen’s level of information on 
politically relevant issues. The problem, epistocrats hold, is that most voters in democracies 
are incompetent to vote, which makes them support suboptimal or bad policies and 
candidates (Brennan, 2018:58). On the basis of this diagnosis, epistocrats propose focusing 
on competence to improve outcomes. 
 
This represents a clear departure from the diagnosis that I have made about our democracies. 
Throughout this research, I have argued that one of the key problems with our democracies 
is the kind of political relations we hold in them. What makes our democracies incapable of 
fulfilling their full potential are the dominating political relations we stand in, which harm 
our autonomy. The main difference between each diagnosis is that, in order to address the 
central issue that I identify, we need (among other things) more involvement of common 
citizens in political decision-making—or political participation as is commonly defined. 
Instead, epistocrats’ focus on competence looks for the exact opposite; the problem of 
incompetence would not be addressed but worsened by increasing citizen participation. This 
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contrast poses an interesting challenge to my proposal since, if epistocrats are right, my 
project would be mistaken both about the diagnosis and consequently about the best way to 
face the problems identified by it.  
 
For the sake of argument, I will assume that the epistocrats’ diagnosis is right and direct my 
attention to challenge their approach instead. I will argue that epistocrats have not paid 
sufficient attention to the way in which they define competence. I will try to elucidate their 
definition of competence and show that their focus is on information. However, I will argue 
that there is an important kind of information missing, namely, common citizen’s 
preferences. This neglect has problematic consequences because it prevents them from 
addressing an important issue included in their very diagnosis. A central element of 
epistocrats’ diagnosis is that the cause of bad outcomes is largely attributable to lay citizens’ 
incapacity to choose the right means to foster their preferences (Brennan, 2016; Ahlstrom-
Vij, 2019). I call this the Preferences/Means Problem. However, an elite restricted electorate 
would fail precisely at being competent in terms of having sufficient information about 
common citizens’ preferences. I call this lack of access of the restricted electorate, the 
Information Gap. I will hold that the Information Gap makes epistocrats unable to properly 
address the Preferences/Means Problem.  
 
My analysis will show that we would be better equipped to address the Preferences/Means 
Problem by focusing on improving the flow of information between all actors instead, as my 
proposal of collective self-government suggests.      
 
The chapter has three other parts. Part II begins by introducing epistocracy’s main features 
as a general system and continues by considering their approach to competence. Part III 
moves on to provide two interpretations of competence. Part IV continues by describing the 
Information Gap and showing that epistocracy’s approach to competence is unable to 
overcome it.  
 
 
 
 
  
II. The epistocratic system 
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Epistocracy is a system that challenges universal suffrage31. More precisely, ‘A system is 
said to be epistocratic to the extent that the system formally allocates political power on the 
basis of knowledge or political competence’ (Brennan, 2016a, n.p). I will begin by 
introducing some of the main features of epistocracy. An important part of this introduction 
will be to explore Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij’s comments on social deliberation. His view 
presents key concerns that motivate epistocratic projects such as what I name the 
Preferences/Means Problem. Section 4 will examine the epistocrats’ understanding of 
competence in more detail. I will focus on Jason Brennan’s account given its relevance for 
the literature on epistocracy.    
 
1. A brief overview  
 
Although there are different accounts of epistocracy, most views share a general argument. 
This argument begins by claiming that voters in democracies are ignorant, misinformed or 
irrational concerning politics. Such an ignorant electorate tends to support suboptimal or bad 
policies and candidates, hence, epistocrats believe knowledge and wisdom are not salient 
features of this group. This is problematic because politicians cater to the ignorant electorate, 
which means there is a high risk that they will indeed implement the bad policies preferred 
by the electorate (Brennan, 2018:58).  
 
Additionally, epistocrats deny the intrinsically just character of democracy, and object to 
deontological reasons supporting universal suffrage. Finally, epistocrats claim that 
regardless of the problematic circumstances that may come from implementing epistocracy 
in the real world, the results it would produce would still be more just than the ones 
democracy brings about (Brennan, 2018:58). 
 
In order to address the problem of the incompetent electorate, epistocracy suggests 
identifying competent and incompetent citizens, usually by enacting some kind of voter 
qualification exam. The latter involves presenting citizens with a set of questions on 
politically relevant matters, so that those who prove their qualifications by passing the exam 
                                                          
31 Epistocracy has its strongest contemporary exponent in Brennan (2011, 2016, 2018). See also 
Mulligan (2018), Caplan (2007), López-Guerra (2014) and Jeffrey (2018). For some interesting 
objections to epistocracy, see: Estlund (2008), Moraro (2018), Gunn (2019), Reiss (2019), Umbers 
(2019).     
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can vote or have additional political powers to the ones offered to the unqualified citizens. 
Epistocrats hold this and other ways of testing the citizens would secure a politically 
competent electorate and thus prevent undesirable outcomes such as passing racist laws32.    
 
2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij: concerns about social deliberation 
 
Starting from what he calls the “fact of widespread incompetence” (Ahlstrom-Vij, 
2012:199); Ahlstrom-Vij is a sceptic of the aggregate competence of a deliberating group. 
Ahlstrom-Vij develops a critical analysis of deliberation and suggests that the epistemic 
defence of democracy fails. His concerns provide relevant support to an epistocratic system 
and therefore contribute to describing the motivations behind epistocratic projects. I will 
present them in what follows.  
 
Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) argues that the widespread incompetence of the electorate has 
problematic consequences. Evidence from social psychology shows that social deliberation 
only favours the view of the majority. According to Ahlstrom-Vij, people are not moved by 
the arguments of an informed minority, which leads to two relevant consequences; it 
questions the epistemic benefits that come from social deliberation, as well as the capacity 
of a deliberating system to include epistemically important perspectives.  
 
In order to argue that the fact of widespread incompetence poses a problem for deliberative 
democrats—especially to those who hold the role of deliberation goes beyond basic justice 
issues (Ahlstom-Vij, 2012:200)—Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) considers social deliberation in times 
of election. He claims that the relevant issues we need to think about in times of elections—
such as economic trends, moral issues, and policy consequences—will only be accessible to 
an informed minority. However, social psychology’s evidence shows that group judgements 
are driven by the majority and not by the informed minorities. Ahlstrom-Vij states that this 
suggests quantity is more relevant than quality to have an impact over group judgements. 
What matters is having a good number of well-informed people instead of the quality of the 
judgements that some minority of well-informed people can have, because most of the times, 
people are not moved by the better judgements (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012: 203-205). Accordingly, 
                                                          
32 Additionally, different forms of epistocracy result from each view’s implementation of the distribution 
of political power guided by competence concerns. These include from voter qualification exams, to 
lottery systems and veto power over passed legislation. For some examples of these see: Caplan, 2007; 
Mulligan, 2018; López-Guerra, 2014; Brennan, 2016 
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he claims this evidence questions both the alleged learning effect from deliberation and the 
idea that aggregate competence is more remarkable, which amounts to questioning the 
overall epistemic benefits of social deliberation.  
 
Likewise, this shortcoming of social deliberation also “runs the risk of depriving the practice 
of epistemically important perspectives every time those perspectives are represented by a 
minority” (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012:214). Thus, Ahlstrom-Vij holds, not only does social 
deliberation not lead to outcomes that reflect the impact of well-informed people but can 
also deprive us of relevant perspectives if they belong to minorities.    
 
According to Ahlstrom-Vij, deliberative democrats might argue there are some instances of 
deliberation that are not susceptible to the worries raised by empirical evidence from social 
psychology. But he argues that this is not a satisfactory answer because it places the burden 
of proof in the wrong place, since it is they who should show the particular cases where this 
information does not apply.  
 
 
(…) In light of the empirical evidence and the importance that the deliberative 
democrat places on social deliberation, it is incumbent on her to show that some 
particular kind of social deliberation that she has in mind is not susceptible to 
the relevant problem (2012:205). 
 
 
Nonetheless, he adds one could take the data but deny the implications. Ahlstrom-Vij claims 
this is the case Robert Talisse (2009) wants to make by taking Bruce Ackerman and James 
Fishkin’s (2002) research on Deliberative Polling.  Talisse (2009) argues that people lack 
the resources for deliberation, but they are able to muster those resources with some help. 
Research proves that in smaller groups, which are provided with appropriate information 
(minipublics), results are promising.  
 
However, Ahlstrom-Vij points out that these successful experiences show we would require 
a complete re-design of deliberation as we know it, which would be very costly because it 
implies to mirror those conditions of highly monitored and controlled settings for everyday 
deliberations. Ahlstrom-Vij holds this costly effort seems inadequate, considering that the 
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initial argument in favour of deliberation was based on the alleged epistemic benefits it 
carries.  
 
To summarise, Ahlstrom-Vij argues that widespread ignorance has two crucial problematic 
consequences over social deliberation. Namely, it turns it incapable of securing informed 
outcomes from decision-making and, at the same time, offers fewer chances to minority 
voices to be heard.  
 
3. The Preferences/Means Problem 
 
In addition to its inability to secure informed outcomes, and to include the views of informed 
minorities, connecting widespread incompetence to social deliberation amounts to opposing 
people’s preferences to what they mistakenly see as the best means to achieve them. 
Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) claims that the problem with having a majority of incompetent voters 
is that, although they know what their preferences are, they are ignorant regarding the best 
means to foster them. Furthermore, they can even choose means that go against their 
preferences. But he is not alone in this assessment, Brennan (2016) also supports this view 
and states that “We sometimes mistakenly believe a policy will promote our favored 
outcomes, when that policy will, in fact, undermine those outcomes” (Brennan, 2016: 50-
51). This is what I refer to as the Preferences/Means Problem.  
 
In this section, I will describe the problem in more detail and show how it seems to be at the 
heart of the epistocratic proposal. In order to do so, I will introduce Brennan’s version of the 
problem, followed by a more detailed description of Ahlstrom-Vij’s analysis. Ahlstrom-Vij 
not only identifies the Preferences/Means Problem, but in light of it, he argues against views 
that offer epistemic arguments in favour of democracy.   
 
To start, let us then look at Brennan’s understanding of what I called the Preferences/Means 
Problem. Brennan identifies two kinds of preferences that people have when they vote; he 
calls them policy preferences and outcome preferences. The former are those policies that 
people want their candidate to support; the latter are the consequences they want their 
candidate to produce (Brennan, 2016:50). The idea he wants to put forward is that voters 
actually do have the common good in mind when they vote, but that what happens is that 
they do not always succeed at promoting it. What prevents voters from succeeding at 
promoting the common good is that they are mistaken about the policies that would indeed 
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foster it. Thus, the problem does not lie on people’s selfishness when they are casting their 
vote, instead, they are incapable of identifying the right means to promote their preferences.  
 
 
So, for example, in 2008, Republicans sincerely believed cutting taxes and 
government spending would stimulate economic growth. Democrats sincerely 
believed increasing taxes and spending would stimulate economic growth. They 
can’t both be right (Brennan, 2016: 51). 
 
 
People can have good outcome preferences, but that does not mean that they are competent 
enough to have good policy preferences (Brennan, 2016: 51). This characterisation of 
citizens’ preferences puts the Preferences/Means Problem at the centre of epistocracy, 
because it has a crucial explanatory purpose; it shows the effects of incompetence over 
voting. Furthermore, it seems to give us relevant information about what it means to be 
incompetent.   
 
I will move on to explore Ahlstrom-Vij’s version of the Preferences/Means problem. 
Looking at the effect of public ignorance over voting serves Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) to argue 
that whatever view of voting one holds, public ignorance has a negative impact over the 
outcomes. Much like Brennan, Ahlstrom-Vij’s analysis shows that a key part of his 
justification for the negative impact of public ignorance relies on the Preferences/Means 
Problem. Ahlstrom-Vij argues that whatever version of what voting represents that one has, 
public ignorance will have a detrimental effect over the outcomes (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2018:9). 
This leads him to suggest that some form of expert rule like epistocracy might be the most 
appropriate option.  
 
Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) contends there are two central views on the nature of voting, one of 
them holds that voting amounts to making a statement about the policies that reflect the 
general will or common interests of the people. According to Rousseau (1997), if voters are 
adequately informed, their deliberation would lead to a decision that reflects the general will. 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem advances a similar idea. Condorcet (1976) suggested that when 
voters are competent and vote independently, increasing the size of the group also increases 
the possibility that they vote correctly. However, Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) argues that Condorcet 
conjectured voters were, in fact not generally competent. Still, both Rousseau and Condorcet 
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presuppose that voters are competent, which means that public ignorance makes voting an 
unlikely expression of the popular will.  
 
The ‘miracle of aggregation’ (Converse, 1990) can also be invoked to rebut the worry for 
the impact of public ignorance. The latter states that under appropriate conditions, individual 
errors are random and tend to cancel each other out. Ahlstrom-Vij takes Caplan’s (2007) 
argument for public ignorance about economics to object to the miracle of aggregation. 
According to Caplan (2007) public ignorance regarding economics is systematic. People’s 
mistaken beliefs do not tend to point randomly in different directions but in one direction. 
This would be very problematic if it generalises to other domains that are relevant for the 
political. Ahlstrom-Vij claims this information is sufficient to question the miracle of 
aggregation and put the burden of proof on the defender of the former.  
 
The second view of voting defines it as expressing preferences (Caplan, 2007). Because 
preferences cannot be understood as true or false, one could say voter ignorance is not a 
concern to those supportive of this view. However, Ahlstrom-Vij (2019) argues that 
preferences can be either badly or well informed, which affects their likelihood to come 
about or be frustrated: 
 
 
For example, if we prefer a society where no one lives in economic destitution 
to one where some do, but have wildly inaccurate views about what political 
candidates or policies will realize the kind of society we thereby prefer, then 
our preference might end up frustrated (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2019:4).            
 
 
Hence, voter ignorance is relevant even if we think of voting as expressing preferences 
because choosing the wrong means to foster those preferences due to ignorance affects the 
quality of democratic decision-making. This is what I call the Preferences/Means Problem 
and, according to Ahlstrom-Vij, what suggests considering forms of expert rule:  
 
 
Assuming that there are at least some people able to make decisions that are in 
the real interest of the people at least some of the time—an assumption that is 
necessary for there to be any form of legitimate government, be it democratic 
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or not—then we might still be left with some form of expert rule (Ahlstrom-
Vij, 2018:11). 
 
 
Finally, the Preferences/Means Problem provides additional evidence to question the 
capacity that democracy to abide by the promise of equal inclusion, as mentioned in the 
previous section. Granted that electors do not know which are the best means to foster their 
preferences, having an inclusive deliberating system like democracy would not report 
outcomes that reflect the diverse preferences of its electors, 
 
 
It is not clear why including those not currently represented should be expected 
to make for greater equality (…) if people do not know how to vote in a way that 
advances their real interests, why will further inclusion improve matters? 
(Ahlstrom-Vij, 2018:7). 
 
 
The Preferences/Means Problem seems to be a crucial part of the argument that proves both 
democracy’s epistemic shortcomings, and the impact of voter incompetence. It helps 
epistocrats to make the case that a form of expert rule like epistocracy could allow a better 
approach to improve the quality of public decision-making outcomes.  
 
Before moving on to discuss epistocracy’s understanding of competence, I would like to 
point out that looking at both the introduction of the main arguments for epistocracy, and 
the Preferences/Means Problem shows that epistocracy seems to include various concerns 
under the idea of competence. Epistocrats appear to want to face the problem of 
irrationality, lack of information, lack of knowledge and lack of wisdom all at the same 
time. Without conducting an exhaustive search for definitions of competence in the 
literature on epistocracy—which would require a lot more space than I can grant here—we 
can see that the competent electorate means something like a politically qualified group of 
people, where qualified can involve either, or all, of the above characteristics, i.e., well-
informed, rational, knowledgeable, wise.   
 
 
4. Epistocracy’s understanding of competence 
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This section will focus on identifying Brennan’s view on competence, in order to discuss the 
apparent unspecific way of approaching competence in epistocratic projects.  
 
Much has been said regarding both benefits and shortcomings of epistocracy, however, both 
supporters and detractors of the view seem to take for granted that there is some tacit 
understanding of competence underlying epistocratic proposals, but a brief look into the 
most popular accounts shows something different. Instead of providing a clear definition of 
competence, accounts of epistocracy either appeal to ignorance, irrationality, lack of 
information and incompetence interchangeably, or focus on offering features of an 
incompetent electorate.  
 
Brennan (2011), for example, uses ‘epistemic competence’ to describe one of the 
requirements for a citizen to be granted the right to vote. However, Brennan (2009) only 
characterises what he calls bad voters without defining what he means by epistemic 
competence. Others like Kristofer Ahlstrom-Vij appear to use ‘widespread incompetence’ 
and ‘widespread ignorance’ interchangeably. Ahlstrom-Vij (2012) claims “(…) The 
majority of the public is likely to be incompetent with respect to the issues of relevance to 
governance (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2012:199)” but to support this claim; he refers to evidence 
regarding political ignorance. In recent work (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2019), he uses “widespread 
ignorance” instead, and again refers to the same findings that supported his previous claim 
on incompetence.  
 
Additional examples are Jeffrey (2018), who uses political expertise, Caplan’s (2007) focus 
on rationality, and how Umbers (2019) objects to Brennan’s competence principle by 
identifying two different kinds of competence (individual and collective), which nonetheless 
do not add or question Brennan’s understanding. In this section, I will focus on Brennan’s 
approach to competence, due to his view’s relevance for the epistocracy literature.  
 
Jason Brennan (2009) develops an argument in favour of epistocracy by pointing out what 
he believes is democracy’s main flaw: including incompetent voters. In what follows, I will 
present the central elements of his proposal to describe his use of the idea of competence for 
voters.             
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A bad voter, according to Brennan, is one who votes without sufficient reason for unjust and 
harmful policies, or for candidates who might advance them. Thus, Brennan characterises 
bad voting as biased, irrational or uninformed attitudes when voting. It is to act upon 
unjustified political beliefs (Brennan, 2009: 535- 538).  
 
The point Brennan wants to make is that biased, uninformed, and irrationally made decisions 
can lead to implement lower levels of welfare and other problems, which are imposed on the 
rest of the citizens by bad voters. Brennan’s proposal to address the problem of bad voters 
is to disenfranchise those who are proven to not be qualified to vote.33 “In contemporary 
democracies, citizens should have to possess sufficient moral and epistemic competence in 
order to have the right to vote” (Brennan, 2011: 701). We can formulate this proposal as 
follows: citizen C can vote if and only if C is (i) sufficiently morally competent and (ii) 
sufficiently epistemically competent. In the following sections my analysis will focus on the 
second requirement.  
 
Brennan claims that the justification for excluding bad voters—a citizen that fails (i) or (ii) 
in the above formulation—is based on what he calls the competence principle. He argues 
that every citizen has the right to have a competent electorate making decisions, which 
trumps every citizen’s right to vote. Therefore, the competence principle—our right to have 
a competent electorate—would be violated in our democracies due to the enactment of 
universal suffrage (Brennan, 2011:704).    
 
Brennan (2011) suggests that one way to determine competence (he acknowledges there are 
other ways) could be subjecting every citizen to a voter qualification exam34.  
 
 
[This would be] akin to a driver exam, which tests generally relevant basic social 
science and basic knowledge about the candidates. The purpose of the exam 
                                                          
33 Brennan’s (2009) initial claim is that although every citizen has the right to vote, if voting, she has a 
moral obligation not to vote badly (Brennan, 2009: 545), because voting badly is to take part in a 
collectively harming activity, and each individual has a moral obligation not to participate in such 
activities. He concludes bad voters should refrain from exercising their right to vote, especially, since 
doing so does not amount to high personal costs (Brennan, 2009: 535- 538). However, later papers show 
and explain his transition towards this stronger view that requires forceful disenfranchisement.  
 
34 In later work, Brennan’s preferred form of epistocracy, is what he calls Government by Simulated 
Oracle (Brennan, 2016).  
 
 
186 
 
would be to exclude badly incompetent citizens from voting, by screening out 
citizens who are badly misinformed or ignorant about the election, or who lack 
the social scientific expertise to evaluate a candidate’s proposed policies 
(Brennan, 2011:714). 
 
 
Brennan’s competence principle alludes to what he called the need for voters’ epistemic 
competence. Nonetheless, when describing the object of voter qualification exams, he refers 
to excluding misinformation and ignorance.  
 
In a more recent rendition of his account, Brennan (2016) claims that in order to advance his 
view of epistocracy he does not require more than “relatively uncontroversial platitudes 
about competence” (Brennan, 2016: 162). According to Brennan, what is required instead 
of a precise theory of political competence that draws a clear line between competent and 
incompetent voters, is to show that most voters are on the wrong side of that line (Brennan, 
2016: 162).  
 
To support this claim, he takes four criteria used in medical ethics to determine a patient’s 
competence to decide for herself, and applies them to voters. These criteria are defined by 
Jillian Craigie (2011) as the “standard criteria for competence”. 
 
 
Patients must be aware of the relevant facts; they must understand the relevant 
facts; patients must appreciate the relevance of those facts for their own 
particular case; patients must be able to reason about those facts in an appropriate 
way (Brennan, 2016: 162).   
 
 
If we apply these criteria to voters, Brennan (2016) states that they are ignorant of the 
relevant facts, as well as lacking in knowledge about basic recent history, civics, the power 
of diverse offices and social science, which are required to evaluate a candidate’s proposals 
or performance. Likewise, voters ignore what the challengers want and who they are, and 
what would happen if they succeed. All the above, according to Brennan, makes voters 
decide in an irrational way (Brennan, 2016: 164). Consequently, Brennan outline what could 
be basic requirements for political competence: 
 
 
187 
 
 
 
A moderate position on democratic competence might hold that voters should 
do the following: Voters should act on widely available, good information, if not 
always the best information available anywhere. They should avoid mass 
superstition and systematic error. They should evaluate information in a 
moderately rational, unbiased way (…) at least with the degree of rationality a 
first- year college student brings to thinking about introductory organic 
chemistry. Voters should be aware of their limits, and thus always look for more 
and better information on any high- stakes decision (Brennan, 2016: 165). 
 
 
Looking at the general characteristics of epistocracy and Brennan’s approach to the notion 
of competence showed that there are various ideas surrounding epistocrats’ understanding 
of competence, but no straightforward definition (apparently, intentionally in Brennan’s 
case). Brennan’s approach to competence nonetheless includes two elements that seem to 
follow from the epistocratic project’s concerns—as presented in sections 1 to 3. These are: 
epistemic virtues, and information.  Having epistemic virtues to be considered competent 
would point at a very well-defined notion of competence, whilst possessing sufficient or 
relevant information seems to lead on the direction of a broader definition in the direction of 
what Brennan qualified as “uncontroversial platitudes”.  
 
III. Competence for better outcomes 
 
This part of the chapter will elucidate epistocrats’ understanding of competence following 
both the epistemic virtues more defined approach, and what could be considered an intuitive 
version focused on information. The goal will be to determine which kind of approach seems 
to portray better what epistocrats mean when they refer to competence, so that we can then 
analyse whether it is indeed able to play the role it should play in epistocratic projects, 
namely, improve outcomes. 
 
 
 
1. Two versions of competence 
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In what follows, I will offer two possible interpretations of competence for epistocratic 
projects: as a reliable epistemic disposition, and as possessing sufficient information. The 
first definition follows from the use of ‘epistemic competence’ we find in Brennan’s 
proposal, and the second intends to capture both a less stringent approach to competence, as 
well as, a definition that could appeal to epistocrats. I conclude that the sufficient information 
version is more compatible with the epistocratic project and does not lead to the costly 
implementation that the reliable epistemic disposition suggests.  
 
1.1. Competence as a reliable epistemic disposition  
 
Brennan’s reference to epistemic competence tracks the intuition that there is something like 
epistemic virtues involved in our notion of what it is to be a competent person. Here, I will 
examine an epistemic version of competence, as a reliable epistemic disposition.   
 
The importance of competences for epistemology has been the subject of significant debates 
in contemporary virtue epistemology35. These approaches focus on the intellectual virtues 
and vices of individuals and communities (Turri, et. al., 2019). So, we could think of an 
epistemically competent agent as intellectually virtuous in some way, because she holds 
characteristics, virtues, ‘which make for an excellent cognizer’ (Turri, et.al, 2019: n.p.). 
There are different ways of characterising epistemic virtues, they can include faculties like 
perception, memory, and intuition—faculty virtues—or character traits—trait virtues—such 
as open-mindedness and conscientiousness (Turri, et.al, 2019: n.p.). Setting aside the debates 
on this matter, the important thing to note is that epistemic virtues are different from 
epistemic states like knowledge; they are the means to acquire them.  
 
We can analyse in more detail how the understanding of epistemic competence as having 
epistemic virtues would fit Brennan’s or any epistocratic proposal by looking at an approach 
from virtue epistemology such as Ernest Sosa’s (2010) impactful view. Sosa describes 
competences as ‘dispositions of an agent to perform well’ (Sosa, 2010:465). As such, they 
have three components: constitution, condition, and situation. Applied to archery 
competence, for example, constitution is the seat of the archer’s skill, the condition is to be 
awake and sober, and the situation would be normal winds and enough light.    
 
                                                          
35 See Sosa, (2010); Pritchard, (2009); Miracchi, (2014); Carter, Jarvis & Rubin, (2015).   
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If the requirement for competence of an epistocracy is of the kind described by Sosa, as 
having the disposition to perform well, voters would require proving that they can choose 
the most optimal candidate, which Brennan stated is not what a citizen needs to do to be a 
good voter. Additionally, it is clear that a voter qualification exam is insufficient and 
inadequate to test the voters’ competences under this definition. In order to test the 
disposition of voters to perform well, what would be required would be something like 
voting exercises evaluated through a period of time to make sure it is not due to a lucky 
occurrence but to a reliable disposition to vote well.  Agents would be unable to show their 
epistemic competence only by answering general questions about civic issues or economics, 
because these would assess their level of information on those areas, not their capacity to 
skillfully ‘hit the target’, in this case, to reach an appropriate result. Hélène Landemore 
(2012) makes this point by stressing that possessing raw data about political facts is different 
from showing competence.   
 
Furthermore, Landemore argues that the difficulty to establish the causal link between 
holding information of a certain kind measured by surveys and being competent lies on the 
fact that it is hard to think of a ‘good empirical benchmark for political competence that 
would be distinct from a good benchmark for information level’ (Landemore, 2012:276). 
Additionally, since electing representatives constitutes most of the voting instances in our 
democracies, it would be very difficult to establish what counts as performing well.  
 In light of the discussion presented in this section where I showed the problems of defining 
competence as a reliable epistemic disposition—too difficult and costly to measure among 
other considerations—this version should be discarded as an option available to epistocrats.    
 
1.2. Competence as possessing sufficient information 
 
By looking at the two proposals that I focused on to characterise epistocracy, we can identify 
a concern for information. Although as I pointed out there is some inconsistency in the way 
that epistocrats refer to what counts as being competent, they do tend to stress that ignorance, 
as a lack of relevant information, is at the root of incompetent voting. Ahlstrom Vij (2019) 
analysed the impact of ignorance over voting as well as Brennan (2016) mentioned a lack of 
information when applying the criteria used in medical ethics to voters.  
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Brennan (2011) also identified three kinds of bad electorate that he qualifies as the ignorant 
electorate, the irrational electorate, and the morally unreasonable electorate. This suggests 
that, setting aside the moral considerations, even his idea of epistemic competence addresses 
mostly ignorance, understood as a lack of appropriate information.  
 
 
The voters who put the national Socialists in power in Germany in 1933 cannot 
be held responsible for everything their government did. But much of what their 
government did was foreseeable by any reasonably well informed person 
(Brennan, 2011: 707).    
 
 
Additionally, the idea of a voter qualification exam is connected to the notion of assessing 
levels of information, because they test the citizen’s capacity to answer information-related 
questions on economics and political information, rather than skills.  In this sense, 
competence seems best understood as possessing information instead of virtues.  
 
Finally, the Preferences/Means Problem identifies precisely an issue with regards to 
information. What electors do not have is the right kind of information about the appropriate 
means to foster their preferences. Voters are ill-informed in terms of policies and ways to 
promote their goals, which makes them sometimes even choose those that are detrimental 
for them.   
 
Let us assume then that what Brennan and others mean by requiring competence, is 
something like possessing sufficient information. What we need to elucidate now is the kind 
of information required, assuming that “sufficient” refers not to amounts but relevancy of 
the information possessed. Consider that, as mentioned, one of the proposed methods by 
epistocrats to measure competence is a voter qualification exam, which should assess a 
defined set of contents. Thus, one of the difficulties with this notion of competence in 
practice is actually determining which are the contents deemed relevant. Identifying the sort 
of information that makes a voter politically competent is at the base of the complexity of 
defining competence in the first place—as acknowledged by Brennan (2016). In addition, as 
pointed out by Ilya Somin (2019) we would have to determine who would define the content, 
which could make the test open to manipulations to serve the interests of a group—from the 
State to a non-profit organisation. However, determining the relevant content as well as 
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devising ways to avoid manipulation are not unsurmountable problems, so these 
considerations do not put epistocrats under too much pressure.  
 
Brennan (2011) has hinted at the content of a qualification exam as mentioned above and 
referred to “basic social science” and “knowledge of candidates” (Brennan, 2011:714). 
When sketching what he called a “moderate position on democratic competence”, Brennan 
appears to lower the requirement by suggesting voters should “act on widely available, good 
information” (Brennan, 2016: 165) and not follow superstitions.   
 
On the other hand, Ahlstrom-Vij discussed what the evidence shows about people’s 
ignorance with respect to economics (Caplan, 2007), to object to the ‘miracle of aggregation’ 
(Converse, 1990). His intention was to show that lay people’s uninformed views about 
economics could be generalisable to other domains such as politics. This analysis implies 
that the sort of information that voters should have can be compared to information on 
economics.  
 
Civics, social science, or simply information regarding the specific candidate and “widely 
available” information represent a very broad set of possible content that could be considered 
relevant.  Social science information is certainly more demanding than acting on good 
available information, but what all of them have in common is that they refer to some kind 
of formal information. Competence as having sufficient information does not appear to 
consider citizens’ preferences as a relevant part of the information we need for good 
outcomes. And this is exactly what the problem with thinking of competence in this way is. 
Competence as sufficient information is focused on describing what being a competent voter 
amounts to, more than the necessary competences to achieve good outcomes. The difference 
between these two notions is slight, but the consequence of taking the first option as 
epistocrats do is problematic.  
 
If what matters is identifying what a competent voter is, we clearly do not consider 
information that common citizens already possess, information about their own preferences. 
By preferences here I mean what Brennan called “outcome preferences”. It is not the 
information about their preferred policies that I identify as important information for good 
outcomes—these are the ones that epistocrats show are usually mistaken—but their 
preferences regarding their own goals.    
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IV. The competence of the restricted electorate  
 
I will devote this last part of the chapter to suggest that what seems to be the main problem 
with the epistocrats approach to competence is that it fails to include something that a 
restricted electorate would not have and that is information about lay citizens’ preferences. 
I will explain in more detail what I mean by the lack of access of the restricted electorate, or 
the Information Gap, to common citizens’ preferences, which I claim constitute an important 
kind of information to secure good outcomes. After doing so, I will discuss two ways of 
dealing with the Information Gap, one that follows the epistocratic logic of the restricted 
electorate with some improvements to include lay people’s preferences, and a second one 
that focuses on the direct inclusion of common citizens. The first option I call Improved 
Epistocracy and the second corresponds to the proposal I have already discussed in detail in 
this research; collective self-government.  Finally, I discuss some relevant thoughts on 
competence and present my conclusions of the chapter in part V.    
 
1. The Information Gap  
 
It has already been pointed out, especially by David Estlund (2008), that due to current 
persisting inequalities, a restricted electorate of the kind envisaged by an epistocratic system, 
would be constituted by an elite sharing particular demographic and socio-economic 
features.  The latter, Estlund claims, faces the risk of reproducing the shared implicit biases 
of the restricted electorate’s members. But a related negative aspect arises by considering 
Estlund’s concern about biases in some detail. Acknowledging the likelihood of biases 
within an elite also implies that for the same reasons its members will have limited access to 
lay people’s preferences.  
 
A group of well-informed or highly qualified people would certainly be better at determining 
which means correspond to promote their preferences, but it seems unlikely that they would 
be capable of having access to the disenfranchised people’s preferences. Standpoint theories 
in epistemology argue something along these lines. They hold that people of specific social 
standing, have either epistemic privilege in accessing some truths or that they at least have 
practical advantages to discover truths. ‘The scope of the claimed privilege includes the 
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character, causes, and consequences of the social inequalities that define the groups in 
question’ (Anderson, 2019: n.p.). 
 
The argument from standpoint theories—either in the classic version about epistemic 
privilege in access, or the weaker notion of practical advantages to discover truths—supports 
the concern for the limited access of the epistocracy elite to the rest of the citizen’s 
preferences. Our social standing does play a central role in the way we can access 
information. The restricted electorate will have an also restricted access to the 
disenfranchised people’s preferences, because they are in this case the unprivileged group. 
It is therefore questionable that establishing the distinction between well-informed and ill-
informed and restrict our electorate accordingly would lead to better outcomes.  
 
The restricted electorate could be well-informed about the best means to foster preferences 
in general, but it would certainly be ill-informed about lay people’s preferences. There is a 
gap of relevant information that the elite electorate cannot fill, which could result in 
outcomes disconnected and inadequate to promote most people’s preferences. Recall the 
Preferences/means Problem and its centrality for the epistocratic project. This Information 
Gap I have just described makes epistocracy unable to overcome it, because it only manages 
to shift the focus of the problem from lack of information regarding what Brennan (2016) 
called policy preferences, to lack of information about outcome preferences.   
 
2. Two ways to face the Information Gap 
 
In what follows, I will consider two possible ways to face the Information Gap. The 
Information Gap questions epistocracy’s ability to improve outcomes because the idea of 
competence that motivates the project neglects to include an important kind of information 
in the shape of people common citizen’s preferences. I suggest thinking of two options as 
potential ways to solve the Information Gap: Improved Epistocracy, and Collective Self-
government. This analysis will show that instead of focusing on having a competent 
electorate as epistocracy does, a focus on improving the flow of information between 
different agents (legislators, common citizens, specialists) like Collective Self-government 
offers, would include all the relevant information with less risks of manipulation and more 
accountability, which makes it better qualified to improve the outcomes of our democracies.   
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Imagine we had a restricted electorate constituted by an elite of highly well-informed people 
that, in order to have access to lay people’s preferences, communicates with a council 
conformed of representatives from diverse groups and identifications—considering 
important matters such as sexual orientation, ethnic identification, socio-economic 
characteristics, religious beliefs, disability, and others. The latter regularly provides the 
restricted electorate with the preferences information they gather from each of their 
‘constituents’. This is Improved Epistocracy. 
 
On Collective Self-government we have universal suffrage combined with a sortition 
legislature, Participatory Budgeting and Deliberative Polling. Advisory committees of 
specialists in areas as diverse as economics, psychology and art are part of all three instances 
of deliberation. They provide both legislators and the electorate with sound information on 
their subjects, to ‘fill the gap’ regarding adequate methodologies to implement their 
preferences before the electorate votes. At the same time, common citizens in Improved 
Universal Suffrage have these formal and regularly available channels to inform legislators 
of their preferences, and can become legislators themselves, which gives them agenda setting 
powers. In other words, the people have their lay representatives which raise issues that will 
have to be part of legislative discussion.   
 
Both Improved Epistocracy and Collective Self-government would have to face the common 
problems that all representative arrangements have about real inclusiveness of every relevant 
group. But in the case of Improved Epistocracy, disenfranchised people would have to rely 
on the good will of the restricted electorate to include their preferences when voting. 
Unselfish behaviour and trustworthiness would thus be central issues that seem unlikely to 
be solved in such scenario. Even if you are not persuaded by the standpoint theories’ 
argument presented above, the lack of accountability from the elite electorate towards the 
disenfranchised, motivates a related objection. The elite will not have to respond to or be 
sanctioned by the disenfranchised, so there are no incentives for unselfish behaviour (See 
Anderson, 2008). The latter would be the case even in our Improved Epistocracy because a 
necessary part of the epistocratic project has to do with granting extra powers of decision-
making to the restricted electorate whilst also limiting the decision-making power of the 
incompetent. Therefore, competent versus incompetent is a distinction that implies little or 
no accountability of the former to the latter. If we go back to the four desiderata that I 
discussed in Chapter 4, namely, inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability, 
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Improved Epistocracy does not seem to fare well in any of them. As I explained, inclusion 
will depend on the goodwill of representatives, equality is compromised by the mere fact 
that we are as citizens not treated equally from the beginning, deliberation is not improved 
in any special way to our current democracies, and accountability is surely not achievable 
under this arrangement.      
 
Collective Self-government does not seem subject to the issue of limited accountability, 
since it basically introduces direct communication with technocrats to our current democratic 
system, as well as a straightforward channel of communication between common citizens 
and legislators. This participatory democracy would become educational in time, by 
improving the common elector’s capacity to choose between means and at the same time, 
communicate information about preferences to legislators. Such a model seems to elicit more 
promising results by focusing on the importance of having an appropriate flow of 
information between the members of a democratic system. Furthermore, this option would 
deal with the Preferences/Means Problem, since it would make citizens better informed 
about the means to foster their goals.   
 
3. What the improved versions tell us about competence 
 
One of the main conclusions that this exercise of improved versions shows is that there is 
something amiss in the epistocrats’ approach to competence if what they look for is to 
improve the outcomes of our democracies. If epistocrats believe that the problem lies in the 
lack of information, as I argued throughout this chapter, then securing a better flow of 
information is a better option than restricting the electorate. The idea of restricting the 
electorate does not intend to improve the pool of electors but to choose a better one, hence, 
it does not provide a long-term solution like the focus on improving the flow of information 
does. Surely a long-term solution should be a preferable approach to improve outcomes.  
 
Someone could argue that I have not engaged with another central concern for epistocrats: 
rational ignorance (Downs, 1957). Maybe the whole point of having a restricted electorate 
is to address the issue that in our democracies common citizens prefer to remain badly 
informed, because it is too costly and time consuming to do otherwise given the little impact 
that their vote can have. This lack of incentives keeps our electorate incompetent; therefore, 
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the best approach is to focus on choosing a pool of electors that although faced with the same 
lack of incentives are not incompetent.  
 
However, there are two important things to point out if this is the case. First, if rational 
ignorance is indeed one of the main problems for epistocrats, implementing a restricted 
electorate would, again, not solve the problem. Limiting the vote does not give any sort of 
incentive for electors to be better informed but actually makes things worse. Disenfranchised 
people would certainly lack incentives to become better informed. Second, what rational 
ignorance helps prove is that there is a problem with the little impact that voting has in our 
democracies. Facing the lack of incentives to be better informed should lead us to rethink 
the ways in which common citizens participate, in order to, address the little capacity they 
have to make a strong impact. Deciding to restrict the electorate to face the problem of 
rational ignorance does not seem to do this.         
 
Finally, an epistocracy that gives more power to an elite could, as we saw above, result in 
distorted outcomes that are disconnected from the disenfranchised citizens’ preferences, 
which would be largely worse than finding other ways of providing appropriate information 
for all parties in our democracies. Imagining two cases with advisory committees, and 
participatory instances is a good exercise to foresee that improving our democracies through 
educational means and better flow of information amongst its members—as would occur in 
a participatory democracy—provides a safer, long term and more just approach to the 
problem of lack of information that has been framed as ‘voter incompetence’.     
 
V. Conclusions  
 
The idea of competence that epistocratic projects rely on has rarely been questioned or 
analysed in depth. Throughout this chapter, I examined what epistocrats mean by a 
competent electorate. I argued that their idea of competence relies on information. 
However, I showed how their approach to competence leaves out an important kind of 
information: common citizen’s preferences. This Information Gap makes epistocrats unable 
to respond to the Preferences/Means Problem; citizen’s incapacity to choose the right means 
to promote their preferences, which is at the centre of epistocratic concerns in the first place. 
Collective Self-government which focuses on improving the flow of information amongst 
specialists, and common citizens proves a much better option, even when confronted to an 
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improved version of epistocracy, to improve outcomes in our democracies and face the 
Preferences/Means Problem, especially when considering the four desiderata I introduced 
in Chapter 4.     
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Conclusions and Further Work 
 
I began this project by pointing out that one of the central problems of our democracies is 
the kind of political relations we hold. As our political interactions currently stand, they 
promote power imbalances that lead to dominating relations amongst all actors—common 
citizens, representatives, social organisations, and experts—in the political sphere, which 
greatly harms our personal autonomy. Standing in relations of domination reduces our 
effective capacity to be authoritative over decisions of strong impact over our lives, which 
are determined in the political sphere. I suggested starting by interrogating the value and 
place we grant our political interactions for the enjoyment of autonomy. Looking at 
relational accounts for autonomy in Chapter 1, I claimed that their ability to show the 
relevant impact of our social relations for our autonomy, as well as their focus on the effects 
that oppressive political contexts can have over our autonomy, proves that we need to equally 
acknowledge the relevance of our political interactions. The first step to do so is labelling 
them relations, so that we can interrogate what kind of relations are the ones that would 
enhance and not harm our autonomy.  
Chapter 2 and 3 focused on characterising the political relations that would help us enjoy 
our autonomy, which I called Relations of Mutual Recognition. In order to do this, they 
identified the conditions to establish these relations; non-domination and control, and the 
approach to political participation—Collective Self-government—that would enable 
implementing appropriate means to uphold them. Chapter 4 analysed three democratic 
alternatives of political participation, namely, electoral representation, citizen sortition and 
direct participation. The idea was to consider each alternative’s potential to fulfil the 
desiderata that resulted from the prior theoretical analysis of political participation. These 
are: inclusion, equality, deliberation, and accountability. According to the benefits and 
shortcomings of each alternative of participation, I elaborated my preferred implementation 
of political participation.  
Chapter 5 located my proposal amongst deliberative democracy accounts by identifying my 
connections and differences with proceduralist accounts. Additionally, I briefly presented 
two views that my project takes inspiration from, namely, Young’s (2010) and Pateman’s 
(2012). Accordingly, I defined my view as a version of either participatory deliberative 
democracy or deliberative participatory democracy.  Relatedly, Chapter 6 looked to 
distinguish my view from Richardson’s (2002) Democratic Autonomy, which also locates 
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my view, this time within the broader literature on democracy. His view like mine focuses 
on autonomy and non-domination. However, in this chapter I explained how my Relations 
of Mutual Recognition are better capable to challenge our current dominating political 
relations due to the relational character of my view, and its capacity to create adequate 
political conditions for the enjoyment of our autonomy. The latter, because Relations of 
Mutual Recognition argue for the political aspect of autonomy which requires securing non-
domination and active control, instead of relying on upholding mere respect for autonomy 
as an external matter like Richardson does.  
 
Chapter 7 offered an analysis of epistocracy, as a view that suggests a different diagnosis of 
where our democracies’ failure lies: within the characteristics, more specifically the 
(in)competence, of the electorate. This analysis aimed at elucidating the epistocrats’ 
approach to competence to show that there seems to be something lacking. I concluded that 
a participatory approach like mine does not have the shortcoming of excluding common 
citizens’ preferences that epistocracy does, whilst it also implies a longer-term approach 
solution to the problem their diagnosis focuses on.  
The conclusions I have summarised here connect to other worries and could lead to related 
explorations that merit further work. I will briefly outline them in what follows.  
Exploring different approaches to autonomy 
In order to privilege the attention to our relation’s role for our autonomy, my research relied 
on a basic general concern for social relations, which led me to focus on the relational 
perspective. It would be interesting to contrast different approaches to autonomy, as well as 
different relational accounts in terms of their capacity to accommodate to my view of 
Relations of Mutual Recognition. Moreover, confronting various approaches to autonomy 
regarding their ability to include the political aspect of autonomy could elicit fruitful 
findings. Similarly, further work on how my project would change if the relational view 
supporting it were procedural, mixed or strongly substantive might help to better delineate 
the scope of my research, as well as maybe unravel other necessary elements to complete 
my Relations of Mutual Recognition. Likewise, it would represent a separate, but very 
interesting project, to discuss whether or not Mackenzie’s attempt to move beyond the 
procedural/substantive division indeed accomplishes this goal.   
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Including intersectionality  
My proposal constitutes a feminist approach to autonomy with a focus on the political aspect 
of autonomy. One of the crucial motivations to analyse our political relations comes from 
the experience of marginalisation that already marginalised groups (in other domains) endure 
in our democracies. My concern for dominating relations, thus, is also deeply connected to 
worries regarding intersectionality—how belonging to various groups (race, gender, and 
various others) shape our identities. Our political standing and the means I envisage to 
improve it will surely depend on these other aspects of our identities. Challenging and 
changing the patterns of cultural value identified by Fraser (2000) is part of what I also 
described should make us transform our political relations. However, much more work needs 
to be done in terms of an analysis that takes intersectionality as the framework to devise 
strategies to reclaim the political for minorities. Further exploration of the approach to 
political power that I developed here seems like a promising avenue to pursue these 
concerns.     
Egalitarian views: material equality 
Further work on the material requirements to enjoy an effectively equal standing in the 
political sphere is crucial. This research only tangentially included recommendations to 
address redistribution of resources to guarantee relating as peers in the political sphere. A 
theory of specific ways to tackle the inequalities that perpetuate dominating relations would 
contribute to complete a model of implementation that not only reaches political 
participation (our political roles), but our relations in all other domains as well.    
Epistemic arguments regarding democracy’s value 
Finally, there is an abundant and absolutely relevant literature on the epistemic value of 
democracy that I did not include in this research. The scope of my arguments did not require 
an examination of diverse views regarding the value of democracy. Nonetheless, a project 
that takes the shortcoming of the epistocratic notion I briefly discussed here and expands it 
to see its full potential, could contribute to arguments about the epistemic benefits of 
democracy.  
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